When Are Pay Gaps Good or Bad for Firm Performance? Evidence from China

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1030-1056
Author(s):  
Jin-hui Luo ◽  
Yuangao Xiang ◽  
Ruichao Zhu

ABSTRACTThere is still an ongoing debate regarding the firm performance implications of pay gaps between top executives and subordinate employees. This study integrates relative deprivation theory and tournament theory to investigate the potential nonlinear effects of pay gaps. We expect that at low levels of pay inequality, increased inequality hurts firm productivity, while at higher levels of pay inequality, increased inequality helps firm productivity. Our study of Chinese firms confirms that pay gaps have an approximately U-shaped relationship with firm performance. This nonlinear relationship is weaker in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than in non-SOEs, suggesting that state ownership is an important moderator in the association. Overall, this study explains previous mixed findings regarding consequences of pay gaps with meaningful implications for policymakers and entrepreneurs in China and other economies with similar cultural and institutional backgrounds.

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 72-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trien Le ◽  
Amon Chizema

Based on a sample of Chinese listed firms, this paper seeks to understand the role of state ownership on firm performance (accounting-based returns) and firm value (market-based indicators). Results show that state ownership is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, state ownership has a moderating effect on the association between firm performance and firm value. At low levels of state ownership, firm performance is negatively associated with firm value. However, at high levels of state ownership, the association becomes positive. Drawing on signaling theory, the study helps to understand the role of state ownership in the association between firm performance and firm value, an area that has received minimum attention in research.Specifically, state ownership may be a strategic asset for Chinese listed firms boosting accounting returns but perceived differently by the market.Given the current levels of state ownership in many transitional economies, this study sheds light for policy makers on the effects of high or low levels of state ownership on firm performance and value. Moreover, the study may assist would-be investors who may contemplate investing in privatized SOEs, in China or other countries with similar institutional arrangements.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Siyu Hou ◽  
Zhaoyang Guo ◽  
Chuangneng Cai ◽  
Xiaobo Jiao

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of firm performance on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and its possible moderating effect. Despite the significance of CSR, there remains an extensive debate about how it is affected by firm performance. Design/methodology/approach The conceptual model is mainly built on goal-setting theory. Based on archival data from multiple data sets on 1,650 companies, collected from 2010 to 2017, the hypotheses are tested using the two-stage instrumental variable regression method. Findings There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between firm performance and CSR that first increases and then decreases. In addition, considering the boundary conditions, state ownership makes the inverted U-shaped curve steeper, while high executive wage concentration makes the inverted U-shaped curve flatter. Research limitations/implications This study harmonizes the traditional contradictory findings of the influence of firm performance on CSR, that is, it supports a positive, negative or neutral relationship between the two. Originality/value This research provides a necessary structure for the CSR literature. By delving deeply into the relationship between firm performance and CSR, it enables scholars to better address the critical management question of whether earning more will lead to doing good.


2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-472
Author(s):  
Benjamin Ehikioya ◽  
Yuanjin Qin ◽  
Keifa Xie ◽  
Chen ru Yun

This study investigates how ownership structure impacts on the corporate performance of listed firms in China. The study uses sample data of firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the five year fiscal period that ended 2005. The results of the panel data regression analysis suggests firm performance to have positive and significant relation with the proportion of shares held by the institution, through the legal person holding companies. In addition, while state ownership indicates negative influence on performance, individual and foreign investors are found to have positive effect on performance, though at a minimal levels. Interestingly, the effect of ownership structure is stronger in firms experiencing the dominance of legal person share holdings over state shares. Further, firm size and ratio of debt to equity are also observed to have influence on the performance of Chinese listed firms. These findings are of great significant to policymakers, academics, shareholders and other stakeholders.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Liu ◽  
Wen Qu ◽  
Janto Haman

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between firm performance and product market competition (PMC), and then examine the mitigation effect of corporate governance and/or state-ownership (SOEs) in the association between PMC and firm performance using Chinese listed firms. Design/methodology/approach The authors consider three determinants of the PMC that affect the nature of competition, and use market concentration, product substitutability and market size as proxies for PMC. The authors construct a corporate governance index which measures the extent of board independence, monitoring strength of supervisory board over board of directors, and monitoring strength of board of directors over CEO. The authors use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm performance. The authors use a sample of 20,706 firm-year observations listed on the Chinese stock market between 2001 and 2016 to empirically investigate the research questions proposed in the paper. Findings The authors find that higher PMC is associated with lower firm performance. The authors find that good corporate governance practices moderate the negative effect of higher PMC on firm performance. The association between higher PMC and lower performance is weaker for firms controlled by SOEs compared to non-SOEs. Further, the moderation effect of SOEs on the association between higher PMC and lower performance is more pronounced for firms with good corporate governance practices compared to firms with weak corporate governance practices. Originality/value Extant studies investigating the relationship between PMC and corporate governance suggest an either complementary or substitution relationship in developed economies. Our study highlights the interactive role played by SOEs and good corporate governance practices in firm performance in highly competitive product markets in an emerging economy. The findings provide insightful information to regulators of other emerging countries that SOEs with good corporate governance practices can play an important role in the economy by mitigating the negative effect of higher PMC on firm performance.


2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (03) ◽  
pp. 307-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
DONGWEI SU

This article tests several predictions of tournament theory on executive compensation in the context of a transition economy. Using an unbalanced panel of 34,701 executives in 1,386 public listed firms in China during 1999 and 2006, the paper finds that (1) pay increases as executives move up the corporate hierarchy into higher ranks; (2) pay gap is the largest between the first- and second-tier executives; (3) pay dispersion increases with the number of tournament participants and the risk of the business environment; (4) state ownership of shares reduces pay, pay gap and the sensitivities of the contestant pool and business risk to pay dispersion; (5) board composition and independence, CEO duality and the independence of the supervisory committee all affect pay and pay dispersion. Overall, this paper shows that listed firms in China, as they become more and more market-oriented, have adopted a pay structure that is largely consistent with the predictions of tournament theory, and that it is important to consider both state ownership and corporate governance in analyzing executive compensation structure.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinyu Guo ◽  
Bo Zhou ◽  
Haili Zhang ◽  
Chunjia Hu ◽  
Michael Song

AbstractIs organizational slack good or bad for firm performance? Research addressing this question has obtained mixed results. Such studies have focused mainly on the impact of environmental conditions on the slack–performance relationship. In this study, instead of focusing on the uncontrollable external environment, we consider actions determined by firms internally, in particular strategic planning. Using data from 183 US firms, we explore the connection between organizational slack and firm performance with different levels of strategic planning. The results suggest that at low levels of strategic planning the slack–performance relationship is linear, while at high levels of strategic planning this relationship is inverse U shaped. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document