Caring Actions

Hypatia ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Steyl
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Care Ethics ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Theory Of Caring

AbstractThough the literature on care ethics has mushroomed in recent years, much remains to be said about several important topics therein. One of these is action. In this article, I draw on Anscombean philosophy of action to develop a kind of meta- or proto-ethical theory of caring actions. I begin by showing how the fragmentary philosophy of action offered by care ethicists meshes with Elizabeth Anscombe's broader philosophy of action, and argue that Anscombe's philosophy of action offers a useful scaffold for a theory of caring actions. Following this, I defend an account of caring actions as those that aim to meet needs. I argue that care aims at satisfying eudaimonistic needs, those things without which one cannot flourish. I then consider the place of caring actions in care ethics. I suggest that if caring actions are to be a starting point for an ethical theory, we ought to reject the notion that a caring action must bring about its intended consequences, and I show how the concept of practice better equips us to evaluate caring actions.

Utilitarian Strategies in Bentham and John Stuart Mill

Utilitas ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. J. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Recent Scholarship ◽  
Careful Scrutiny ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
The Common ◽  
Utilitarian Theory

The argument of this paper is part of a general defence of the claim that Bentham's moral theory embodies a utilitarian theory of distributive justice, which is developed in his Civil Law writings. Whereas it is a commonplace of recent revisionist scholarship to argue that J. S. Mill had a developed utilitarian theory of justice, few scholars regard Bentham as having a theory of justice, let alone one that rivals in sophistication that of Mill. Indeed, Gerald J. Postema in his bookBentham and the Common Law Tradition, argues that Bentham had no substantial concern with the concept of justice, and that what analysis of the concept there is in Bentham's thought is unlike the utilitarian theory of justice to be found in chapter five of J. S. Mill'sUtilitarianismAlthough Postema's interpretation is not the only one that will be addressed in this paper, it serves as an important starting point for any rival interpretation of Bentham's ethical theory for two reasons. Firstly, it is the most comprehensive and most penetrating discussion of Bentham's utilitarian theory, drawing as it does on a wide variety of published and unpublished materials written throughout Bentham's career. Secondly, it is interesting in this particular context because the contrast that Postema draws between Bentham's and Mill's theories of justice depends upon a particular reading of Mill's theory of justice and utility which is derived from recent scholarship and which is by no means uncontroversial. As part of the defence of the claim that Bentham had a sophisticated theory of distributive justice, it will be argued in this paper that the contrast drawn between Bentham and Mill does not stand up to careful scrutiny, for insofar as Mill's theory of justice can be consistently defended it is not significantly different from the utilitarian strategy that Bentham employed for incorporating considerations of distributive justice within his theory. This is not to claim that there are not significant differences between the theories of justice of Bentham and J. S. Mill, but it is to claim that whatever technical differences exist between their theories, both writers saw the need to incorporate the concept of justice within utilitarianism. Therefore, rather than showing that Mill is an interesting thinker to the extent that he abandons his early Benthamism, by demonstrating how close Mill's theory of utility and justice is to that of Bentham, it will be possible to argue that Bentham employed a sophisticated and subtle utilitarian theory that was responsive to the sort of problems which occupied Mill a generation later.

Anscombe on Brute Facts and Human Affairs

2020 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 85-99
Author(s):  
Rachael Wiseman
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Philosophy Of Psychology ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy

AbstractIn ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ Anscombe writes: ‘It is not profitable at present for us to do moral philosophy. It should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking’. In consideration of this Anscombe appeals to the relation of ‘brute-relative-to’ which holds between facts and descriptions of human affairs. This paper describes the reorientation in philosophy of action that this relation aims to effect and examines the claim that this reorientation makes possible the sort of philosophy of psychology that can provide a starting point for ethics.

A Care Ethical Theory of Right Action

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Steyl
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Care Ethics ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Ethical Frameworks

Abstract One of the most striking and underexplored points of difference between care ethics and other normative theories is its reluctance to offer a theory of right action. Unlike other normative ethical frameworks, care ethicists typically either neglect right action or explicitly refuse to provide a theory thereof. This paper disputes that stance. It begins with an examination of right action in care ethics, offering reasons for care ethicists not to oppose the development of a care ethical theory thereof. It then considers some potential formulations of a first premise of a theory of right action, both demonstrating the diversity of possible first premises and arguing for a monistic subset of these. It subsequently presents some potential second premises, arguing that a care ethical theory of right action ought to adopt a eudaimonistic approach to care. The paper thereby makes several inroads into a care ethical account of moral evaluation.

Pacifism: The Dynamics of Dissent

Worldview ◽  
1967 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 8-11
Author(s):  
Edmund J. Egan
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Conscientious Objection ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Current Wave ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Common

In the current wave of conscientious objection, draft refusal, pacifism, crypto-pacifism and simple concern with war and morality, it is noteworthy that informed discussion of “just war” theory has been at a minimum, Tiiis fact is worth examining within a somewhat wider philosophical dimension than is perhaps customary.The notion of “just war” represents an aspect of classical, even Hellenic ethical theory. In it the emphasis is macrocosmic, taking as its starting point the community considered as an organic whole, and seeking the “common good” of that community. This search for “common good” necessarily entails a balancing of claims, rights and needs. Historically, such a calculus has for its goal a benevolent reasonableness in the society, a quality that has generally been termed justice.

scholarly journals Empirical and Armchair Ethics

Utilitas ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 467-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
GREG BOGNAR
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Health Care Resource ◽  
Empirical Ethics ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Allocation Problems

In a recent paper, Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve present a novel argument against prioritarianism. The argument takes its starting point from empirical surveys on people's preferences in health care resource allocation problems. In this article, I first question whether the empirical findings support their argument, and then I make some general points about the use of ‘empirical ethics’ in ethical theory.

scholarly journals Sobre a lógica deôntica não-clássica

1987 ◽  
Vol 19 (55) ◽  
pp. 19-37
Author(s):  
Leila Z. Puga ◽  
Newton C.A. Da Costa
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Classical System ◽  
Propositional Calculus ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
First Order ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Expository Paper ◽  
Classical Propositional Calculus

Our starting point, in this basically expository paper, is the study of a classical system of deontic propositional logic, classical in the sense that it constitutes an extension of the classical propositional calculus. It is noted, then, that the system excludes ab initio the possibility of the existence of real moral dilemmas (contradictory obligations and prohibitions), and also can not cope smoothly with the so-called prima facie moral dilemmas. So, we develop a non-classical, paraconsistent system of propositional deontic logic which is compatible with such dilemmas, real or prima facie. In our paraconsistent system one can handle them neatly, in particular one can directly investigate their force, operational meaning, and the most important consequences of their acceptance as not uncommon moral facts. Of course, we are conscious that other procedures for dealing with them are at hand, for example by the weakening of the specific deontic axioms. It is not argued that our procedure is the best, at least as regards the present state of the issue. We think only that owing, among other reasons, to the circumstance that the basic ethical concepts are intrinsically vague, it seems quite difficult to get rid of moral dilemmas and of moral deadlocks in general. Apparently this speaks in favour of a paraconsistent approach to ethics. At any rate, a final appraisal of the possible solutions to the problem of dilemmas and deadlocks, if there is one, constitutes a matter of ethical theory and not only of logic. On the other hand, the paraconsistency stance looks likely to be relevant also in the field of legal logic. It is shown, in outline, that the systems considered are sound and complete, relative to a natural semantics. All results of this paper can be extended to first-order and to higher-order logics. Such extensions give rise to the question of the transparency (or oppacity) of the deontic contexts. As we shall argue in forthcoming articles, they normally are transparent. [L.Z.P., N.C.A. da C.] (PDF en portugués)

scholarly journals Book Review: A Theory of Moral Education

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Cam
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Salient Feature ◽  
Moral Systems ◽  
Moral Standards ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
History Of ◽  
General Assent

In A Theory of Moral Education, Michael Hand homes in on a central problem of moral education and offers us a solution. Briefly put, the problem is this: There is often widespread disagreement about moral matters, even among those who have thought long and hard about them. So how is moral education possible without resorting to indoctrination? We are all aware of familiar strategies to avoid this problem, such as introducing various moral systems and conflicting beliefs without taking a stand on them, encouraging students to reach their own conclusions about moral matters, or even keeping well clear of the whole subject in the first place. Unfortunately, these options are not available to anyone who sees the need for moral education and takes it that bringing about rational assent to moral standards is among its aims. Given this starting point, the fact of reasonable disagreement makes it difficult to see how to avoid the problem of indoctrination.  Hand’s solution is to argue that, while disagreement about moral matters is a salient feature of social life, there is a significant core of moral values about which there is actually little contention, and for which an adequate justification is within reach. Among them are “prohibitions on killing and causing harm, stealing and extorting, lying and cheating, and requirements to treat others fairly, keep one’s promises and help those in need” (p. 78). With well-known caveats, there is at least general assent to these prescriptions, but their rational justification is more problematic. The history of ethical theory is littered with arguments as to why such things are wrong, but the arguments are contentious—and that looks to compound the problem. Nevertheless, Hand believes that there is at least one sound argument that can be used to justify our core moral standards.

Citizenship and autonomy in acquired brain injury

2011 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 526-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Schipper ◽  
Guy A M Widdershoven ◽  
Tineke A Abma
Keyword(s):  
Brain Injury ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Acquired Brain Injury ◽  
Care Ethics ◽  
Deliberative Dialogue ◽  
Professional Caregiver

In ethical theory, different concepts of autonomy can be distinguished. In this article we explore how these concepts of autonomy are combined in theory in the citizenship paradigm, and how this turns out in the practice of care for people with acquired brain injury. The stories of a professional caregiver and a client with acquired brain injury show that the combination of various concepts of autonomy in practice leads to tensions between caregivers and clients. These dynamics are discussed from a care ethics perspective, stressing the importance of relationships and interdependence, as well as paying attention to various, sometimes conflicting, perspectives in a deliberative dialogue.

What is the opposite of speciesism? On relational care ethics and illustrating multi-species-isms

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Westerlaken
Keyword(s):  
Everyday Life ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Animal Studies ◽  
Care Ethics ◽  
Relational Ethics ◽  
Social Implications ◽  
Alternative Futures ◽  
Critical Animal Studies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Starting Point

PurposeThis paper articulates a counter-concept to the notion of speciesism with the aim to encourage thinking beyond critique, towards imagining what non-speciesist worlds can actually look like.Design/methodology/approachBy using the concept of “multi-species-isms” (or “multispecies”, as a simpler adjective), and linking it to feminist and relational ethics of “care”, the paper seeks to unite perspectives from both Critical Animal Studies as well as feminist, posthumanist theories. Already existing traces of multi-species-isms that exemplify different forms of multispecies care are visualised through annotated illustrations that accompany the text. These traces offer a cue for negotiating multispecies worlds without attempting to define their content in all too definite forms.FindingsRather than focusing on critiquing oppressive structures, the paper contributes narratives of multispecies worlds that inspire further imagination towards the positive ingredients of such worlds and show more concretely how multispecies care is practised in everyday life.Social implicationsThese insights frame a starting point for a repertoire that shows the numerous ways in which multispecies relationships between humans and other animals are already given form.Originality/valueBy articulating the actual ingredients of multi-species-isms, rather than focusing on what they are not, the paper seeks to advance a move towards adding multispecies possibilities that can be especially helpful for those researchers, designers and activists concerned with imagining alternative futures.

Aristotle on Agency

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Charles
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Action ◽  
Final Part ◽  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Starting Point

This essay attempts to answer three questions about Aristotle’s account of agency: (1) What is an action? (2) Under what conditions is an action voluntary or intentional? (3) What is the relation between an agent and an action when he or she acts voluntarily? This article focuses on those actions that are processes, taking as its starting point Aristotle’s account of processes and capacities in the Physics to suggest that this account underlies his discussion of actions there and elsewhere. In the second part, it is argued that, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle, is concerned with analyzing intentional action in terms of an agent’s capacities (or skills) and their desired goals and knowledge. The final part of the essay contrasts Aristotle’s views of agency with some recent proposals in the philosophy of action.

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