Explaining the Paradox of Plebiscites

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 202-219
Author(s):  
Matt Qvortrup ◽  
Brendan O’Leary ◽  
Ronald Wintrobe
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Fractionalization ◽  
Autocratic Regimes ◽  
Foregone Conclusion

AbstractRecent referendums show that autocratic regimes consult voters even if the outcome is a foregone conclusion. They have been doing so with increasing frequency since Napoleon consulted French citizens in 1800. Why and when do dictatorial regimes hold referendums they are certain they will win? Analysing the 162 referendums held in autocratic and non-free states in the period 1800–2012, the article shows that referendums with a 99% yes-vote tend to occur in autocracies with high ethnic fractionalization and, in part, in sultanistic (tinpot or tyrannical) regimes, but generally not in communist (totalitarian) states. An explanation is proposed for this variation.

scholarly journals Are non-competitive elections good for citizens?

2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew T Little
Keyword(s):  
Formal Analysis ◽  
Signal Strength ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Good For ◽  
Autocratic Regimes ◽  
Public Signal ◽  
Do So ◽  
Foregone Conclusion

Many regimes, particularly autocracies, hold elections where the ruling regime’s victory is a foregone conclusion. This paper provides a formal analysis of how these non-competitive elections affect citizen welfare compared to a non-electoral baseline. To do so, I first develop a game-theoretic framework that captures many extant theories of why regimes hold non-competitive elections, which are modeled solely as a public signal of the regime’s strength. Incumbents hold non-competitive elections to signal strength or gather information, which allows the regime to manage political interactions more effectively. However, even though non-competitive elections are a useful tool for (autocratic) regimes, they are also valuable to citizens. This is because citizens can also utilize the information generated by the election, and may receive more transfers, less repression, or more responsive policy than they would with no elections.

On revolt and endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes

Public Choice ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 159 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 27-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel M. Guttman ◽  
Rafael Reuveny
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Autocratic Regimes

scholarly journals Corrupting the Cyber-Commons: Social Media as a Tool of Autocratic Stability

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seva Gunitsky
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Rapid Evolution ◽  
Online Discourse ◽  
Public Preferences ◽  
Public Discussion ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Electoral Democracy ◽  
Autocratic Regimes ◽  
Potential Tool

Non-democratic regimes have increasingly moved beyond merely suppressing online discourse, and are shifting toward proactively subverting and co-opting social media for their own purposes. Namely, social media is increasingly being used to undermine the opposition, to shape the contours of public discussion, and to cheaply gather information about falsified public preferences. Social media is thus becoming not merely an obstacle to autocratic rule but another potential tool of regime durability. I lay out four mechanisms that link social media co-optation to autocratic resilience: 1) counter-mobilization, 2) discourse framing, 3) preference divulgence, and 4) elite coordination. I then detail the recent use of these tactics in mixed and autocratic regimes, with a particular focus on Russia, China, and the Middle East. This rapid evolution of government social media strategies has critical consequences for the future of electoral democracy and state-society relations.

scholarly journals A Critical Evaluation of the FBST ev for Bayesian Hypothesis Testing

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Ly ◽  
Eric-Jan Wagenmakers
Keyword(s):  
Hypothesis Testing ◽  
Null Hypothesis ◽  
Alternative Hypothesis ◽  
Critical Evaluation ◽  
Significance Test ◽  
Bayesian Hypothesis Testing ◽  
Absence Of Evidence ◽  
Evidence Of Absence ◽  
Foregone Conclusion

AbstractThe “Full Bayesian Significance Test e-value”, henceforth FBST ev, has received increasing attention across a range of disciplines including psychology. We show that the FBST ev leads to four problems: (1) the FBST ev cannot quantify evidence in favor of a null hypothesis and therefore also cannot discriminate “evidence of absence” from “absence of evidence”; (2) the FBST ev is susceptible to sampling to a foregone conclusion; (3) the FBST ev violates the principle of predictive irrelevance, such that it is affected by data that are equally likely to occur under the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis; (4) the FBST ev suffers from the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox in that it does not include a correction for selection. These problems also plague the frequentist p-value. We conclude that although the FBST ev may be an improvement over the p-value, it does not provide a reasonable measure of evidence against the null hypothesis.

scholarly journals New evidence on the link between ethnic fractionalization and economic freedom

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marta Marson ◽  
Matteo Migheli ◽  
Donatella Saccone
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Economic Freedom ◽  
Conclusive Evidence ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Ethnic Fractionalization ◽  
Economic Freedom Index ◽  
New Evidence

AbstractAmong the determinants of economic freedom, the presence of different ethnic groups within a country has sometimes been explored by the empirical literature, without conclusive evidence on the sign of the relation, its drivers, and the conditions under which it holds. This paper offers new evidence by empirically modelling how ethnic fragmentation is related to economic freedom, as measured by the Economic Freedom Index and by each of its numerous areas, components and sub-components. The results provide insights on the components driving the effect and, interestingly, detect notable differences between developed and developing countries.

US move against Israeli firm will not slow spyware use

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Regulatory Reform ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Western Countries ◽  
Autocratic Regimes

Significance Reports about this spyware’s widespread use to target activists and critics have tarnished the company, which on November 3 was blacklisted by US President Joe Biden’s administration. This prohibits US entities from purchasing NSO Group products. Impacts Calls for regulatory reform to limit the development, use and export of spyware capabilities will increase in Western countries The private sector in Israel and elsewhere will continue to play a major role in the development of the lucrative global spyware market. Autocratic regimes and states with weak democratic accountability will actively use spyware as more business shifts online.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Nils B. Weidmann ◽  
Espen Geelmuyden Rød
Keyword(s):  
Internet Technology ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Scientific Debate ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Information And Communication ◽  
Internet Penetration ◽  
Autocratic Regimes

The introduction of the book starts out by distinguishing between two narratives about the effect of the Internet in autocratic systems: According to “liberation technology” proponents, Internet technology is likely to empower activists in autocracies by reducing autocratic governments ability to control the ow of information and communication, while the “repression technology” perspective emphasizes the sinister ways by which autocratic regimes can use the Internet for propaganda and surveillance. The chapter argues that in order to advance the scientific debate, research should move beyond this overly simple distinction, and needs to identify the conditions under which this technology helps protesters vs. when it benefits dictators. This requires a more nuanced conception of protest and its different stages, but also better, more fine-grained data of protest and Internet penetration.

The Expected Utility of Insurance

2019 ◽  
pp. 8-47
Author(s):  
Brad Epperly
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Utility Model ◽  
Personal Security ◽  
Power Means ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
The Future ◽  
Autocratic Regimes ◽  
Expected Utility Model

This chapter offers a new version of popular “insurance” models of judicial independence, in which the competitiveness of the electoral arena induces leaders to prefer more independent courts, as a means of offering policy and personal security if they lose power. That is, paying the “premium” of increased constraints on behavior imposed by independent courts now for the insurance of protection in the future if out of office. The crux of the argument is that the risks associated with losing power in autocratic regimes are greater than in democracies, and therefore competition should be more salient in dictatorships than democracies. The stakes are higher because autocratic power means access to wealth and state resources in a way rarely equaled in democratic regimes, and more importantly the likelihood of being punished after leaving office is greater for former autocrats. Judiciaries exercising greater independence, however, can minimize the risks of being a former leader, and the chapter leverages this finding to develop an expected utility model, the empirical implication of which is higher salience of competition—when present—in autocracies. Unlike previous theories of how competition affects independence, this model integrates both the likelihood of losing office and the risks associated with such an outcome, and thus allows us to examine the phenomena across the democracy/dictatorship divide.

14. Democratization and Regime Change

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lise Rakner
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
International Development ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
Developing World ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Democratic Consolidation ◽  
Governance Regime ◽  
Measuring Democracy ◽  
Recent Trends ◽  
Autocratic Regimes

This chapter explores the link between democratization and regime change in the developing world. It begins with a discussion of theories of democratization, along with recent trends and understandings of democratic consolidation. It then considers variations within democratic and autocratic regimes and the different ways of measuring democracy. It also examines how domestic and international factors interact to affect politics in developing countries in general and processes of democratization in particular. Finally, it evaluates international dimensions of democratization, focusing on the significance of democratization for international development. It reflects on how the global good governance regime is adopting to a world that is no longer bipolar and in which U.S. (Western) hegemonic power is reduced.

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