WHAT'S SO SPECIAL ABOUT HUMAN KNOWLEDGE?

Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Williams

AbstractUnlike animal knowledge, mature human knowledge is not a natural phenomenon. This claim is defended by examining the concept of such knowledge and showing that it is best analysed in deontic terms. To be knowledgeable is to possess epistemic authority. Such authority is assessable in two dimensions. The first is contextually appropriate truth-reliability. The second is epistemic responsibility in three senses of “responsibility”: accountability, due diligence and liability to sanction. The fact that knowledge can be impugned by non-culpable unreliability shows that, with respect to loss of authority, liability is strict. This entails that mature human knowledge requires some degree of epistemic self-consciousness: in particular, the conceptual capacities for critically examining one's beliefs. Arguments advanced by Kornblith for the claim that there is a vicious regress involved in this requirement are shown to depend on under-described examples. When the examples are fleshed out, we see that the “critical reflection” requirement does not demand constant self-monitoring but only the capacity to recognize and respond to appropriate epistemic queries. Recognizing that the practice of justifying one's beliefs conforms to a default and query structure also dispels the illusion that insisting that epistemic subjects have some sense of their own epistemic powers involves an unpalatable form of epistemic circularity.

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 243
Author(s):  
Manuel Liz

Resumen De acuerdo a Ernest Sosa, el conocimiento re exivo debería ser capaz de integrar al- gunas circularidades epistémicas como fuentes virtuosas de conocimiento. Argumen- taremos que tal conocimiento re exivo tiene que estar basado en ciertas capacidades para delegar y aplazar de manera adecuada la justi cación de nuestras creencias de primer orden. También argumentaremos que entender esas capacidades comunitarias y temporales como constituyendo virtudes epistémicas re exivas nos conduce fuera de cualquier concepción criterial del conocimiento. Para estas concepciones, conocer siempre requiere saber que se han satisfecho determinados criterios. Si el conoci- miento propiamente humano inevitablemente necesita alguna dosis de re exión, y si nuestro conocimiento re exivo necesariamente depende del ejercicio virtuoso de ciertas capacidades para delegar y aplazar la justi cación, entonces en último término el conocimiento no puede ser criterial. El conocimiento humano es más bien una cuestión de con anza Palabras clave: Conocimiento; criterios; perspectiva epistémica; circularidad epistémica; conocimiento animal; conocimiento re exivo; ascenso epistémico; virtu- des epistémicas re exivas; delegación de la justi cación; aplazamiento de la justicación. AbstractAccording to Ernest Sosa, re ective knowledge would have to be able to integrate some epistemic circularities as virtuous sources of knowledge. We will argue that such re ective knowledge has to be based on some capacities for delegating and relegating in adequate ways the justi cation of our rst-order beliefs. Also, we will argue that to understand those communitarian and temporal capacities as constituting re ective epistemic virtues leads us outside any criterial conception of knowledge. For these conceptions, knowing always requires to know that certain criteria are ful lled. If human knowledge worth of the name unavoidably needs some amount of re ection, and if our re ective knowledge necessarily depends on virtuous delegation and deferring, then at the end of the day knowledge cannot be criterial. Human knowledge is rather a matter of trust.Keywords: Knowledge; criteria; epistemic perspective; epistemic circularity; animal knowledge; re ective knowledge; epistemic ascent; re ective epistemic virtues; delegation of justi cation; deferring of justication.  


Author(s):  
Matti Kohonen ◽  
Radhika Sarin ◽  
Troels Boerrild ◽  
Ewan Livingston

This chapter identifies several areas of convergence between the fields of tax policy and human rights. These include the concept of the corporation as a unitary entity; the notion of extraterritorial impacts and obligations of states and corporations; and the risks of corporate personhood. These principles are all highly relevant to corporations’ human rights due diligence and risk assessment of their tax policies. Applying a business and human rights perspective to international tax law can clarify responsibilities of companies toward their other stakeholders as well as their relationship with subsidiaries and business partners in terms of responsible tax conduct. The chapter then explores two dimensions of the human rights impacts of tax-related corporate decisions: impacts mediated by the state and impacts not mediated by the state.


Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg

We expect certain things of each other as epistemic subjects, and it is the normativity of these expectations that underwrites the normativity of epistemic assessment itself. In developing this claim Sanford C. Goldberg aims to honor the insights of both internalist and externalist approaches to epistemic justification. With the internalist he embraces the idea that knowledgeable belief requires belief that is formed and maintained in an epistemically responsible fashion; with the externalist he embraces the idea that knowledgeable belief requires belief that is formed and sustained through a reliable process. In this book Goldberg proposes to marry these two dimensions into a single account of the standards of epistemic assessment. This marriage reflects our profound and ineliminable dependence on one another for what we know of the world—a dependence which is rationalized by the expectations we are entitled to have of one another as epistemic subjects. The expectations in question are those through which we hold each other accountable to standards of both (epistemic) reliability and (epistemic) responsibility. The resulting theory has far-reaching implications not only for the theory of epistemic normativity, but also for our understanding of epistemic defeat, the theory of epistemic responsibility, and for a full appreciation of the various social dimensions of knowledge.


Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-273
Author(s):  
Jeremy Fantl

AbstractIn Michael Williams' “What's So Special About Human knowledge?” he argues that the kind of knowledge characteristic of adult humans is distinctive in that it involves epistemic responsibility. In particular, when an adult human has knowledge, they have a certain kind of epistemic authority, and that to attribute knowledge to them is to grant them a certain kind of authority over the subject matter. I argue that, while it is true that when we attribute knowledge to adult humans, we typically also attribute to them the relevant kind of epistemic authority, this need not be because adult humans have a distinctive kind of knowledge. Rather, it may be because adult humans are distinctive kinds of beings - beings that can have epistemic authority over the subject matter about which they know. The only thing that need be special about human knowledge is that it's had by human knowers.


2011 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 176-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Eichsteller ◽  
Sylvia Holthoff

Social pedagogy has a longstanding tradition in many European countries. This article outlines its development in relation to culturally specific concepts of children and their upbringing — the pedagogical — and ideas about the relationship between individuals and their community — the social. Both dimensions are closely connected to social pedagogy's ethical orientation, most notably to respect people as resourceful agents, help them develop their potential and support the construction of a more just society. By drawing on historical thinkers in social philosophy and education, the article explains how these two dimensions have shaped social pedagogy as an action-orientated science that requires professionals to work in an ethical manner. It concludes by discussing the need for critical reflection in order to ensure profound respect of people's human dignity and their otherness.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Bücken ◽  
René de Groot

In the international community, there is a continuing trend to deprive citizens of their nationality for certain undesirable behaviour. The 1961 Convention prohibits this practice in cases where the individual concerned would become stateless as a consequence. However, State Parties can reserve certain exceptions to this prohibition by filing a declaration under Article 8 (3) at the time of ratification. This article aims to conduct a thorough analysis and a critical reflection of the declarations of ratifying States of the 1961 Convention submitted under Article 8 (3) of the Convention. This approach includes a quantitative analysis of the submitted declarations against the background of recent geopolitical events, which will show an absolute, yet not a proportional rise, of declarations submitted under Article 8 (3). An analysis of the legality of the submitted declarations as well as a discussion of the corresponding national provisions will be conducted. Furthermore, an evaluation of the reaction of other Contracting States to the submitted declarations will demonstrate serious shortcomings in the due diligence of Contracting States, arguing that a double-standard is applied to declarations submitted under Article 8(3) by Western Contracting States in comparison to the treatment of Contracting States from the Islamic World.


2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-129
Author(s):  
Ioan Dura ◽  
Ionel Mihălescu ◽  
Mihai Frățilă ◽  
Victor Cîrceie ◽  
Rubian Borcan

If we want to define today's society in one word, trying to capture its meaning, it would be polarization. The interdependence between all social segments, articulated by globalization, has a double function: unpacking the identitary elements that enter in the structure of society (religion, politics, culture, science, etc.) and framing them in a relational dynamic. In this situation are Theology and Science, which, of course, maintain a number of components under their general names. Can we talk about a congruence between these two dimensions of human knowledge? Or they are developing completely separately and antagonistic in social progress? According to Ian G. Barbour there are four types of relation between Science and Religion: conflict, independence, dialogue, integration. This article intends to highlight the congruence between Theology and Science in the paradigm of neo-patristic synthesis , which explores in a phenomenological, theological and philosophical way the relationship between these two. Neo-patristic synthesis is a theological movement from the 20th century, generated by the initiative of the orthodox theologian G. Florovsky.


2020 ◽  
pp. 016224392092478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda Menking ◽  
Jon Rosenberg

Wikipedia has become increasingly prominent in online search results, serving as an initial path for the public to access “facts,” and lending plausibility to its autobiographical claim to be “the sum of all human knowledge.” However, this self-conception elides Wikipedia’s role as the world’s largest online site of encyclopedic knowledge production. A repository for established facts, Wikipedia is also a social space in which the facts themselves are decided. As a community, Wikipedia is guided by the five pillars—principles that inform and undergird the prevailing epistemic and social norms and practices for Wikipedia participation and contributions. We contend these pillars lend structural support to and help entrench Wikipedia’s gender gap as well as its lack of diversity in both participation and content. In upholding these pillars, Wikipedians may unknowingly undermine otherwise reasonable calls for inclusivity, subsequently reproducing systemic biases. We propose an alternative set of pillars developed through the lens of feminist epistemology, drawing on Lorraine Code’s notion of epistemic responsibility and Helen Longino’s notion of procedural objectivity. Our aim is not only to reduce bias, but also to make Wikipedia a more robust, reliable, and transparent site for knowledge production.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1986 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 416-416
Author(s):  
Student

Human knowledge is a special case of animal knowledge. From amoeba to Einstein learning takes the same course: it starts from a problem caused by the clash between expectations and experience, proceeds to a solution, and then to the testing of that solution. With the emergence of science, failure need no longer be fatal: we can kill off our theories, instead `of being killed off ourselves.'


Author(s):  
Juan Fernando Ortega Muñoz

RESUMENLa teoría agustiniana del conocimiento supone una síntesis de tres funciones fundamentales de la mente: la intuición intelectual, la intuición sensitiva y la razón discursiva, que aplica a las intuiciones sensibles los principios que la intuición intelectual nos suministra, con lo que alcnzamos un auténtico conocimiento humano, en el que se aúnan la razón discursiva y la razón intuitiva, síntesis a la que Agustín denomina razón superior, gracias a la cual superamos el simple conocimiento animal.PALABRAS CLAVESAN AGUSTÍN-EPISTEMOLOGIA-RAZONABSTRACTSaint Augustine's epistemology entails a synthesis of the mind's three main functions: intellectual intuition, sensitive intuition and discursive reason. It applies to sensible intuitions the principles provided by the intellectual intuition. That way, we reach a genuine human knowledge, where discursive reason and intuitive reason converge: a synthesis called higher reason by augustine. Because of it, we overcome the mere animal knowledge. KEYWORDSSAINT AUGUSTINE-EPISTEMOLOGY-REASON


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