scholarly journals NONINFERENTIALISM AND TESTIMONIAL BELIEF FIXATION

Episteme ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Kenyon
Keyword(s):  
Belief Formation ◽  
Significant Issue ◽  
Epistemology Of Testimony ◽  
Testimonial Belief

AbstractAn influential view in the epistemology of testimony is that typical or paradigmatic beliefs formed through testimonial uptake are noninferential. Some epistemologists in particular defend a causal version of this view: that beliefs formed from testimony (BFT) are generated by noninferential processes. This view is implausible, however. It tends to be elaborated in terms that do not really bear it out – e.g. that BFT is fixed directly, immediately, unconsciously or automatically. Nor is causal noninferentialism regarding BFT plausibly expressed in terms of belief-independent belief formation; the complex cognitive details of BFT fixation do not accord well with such a view. But perhaps the most significant issue is that the relevant causal notion of inference itself is not particularly well-defined, at least with respect to BFT. Causal noninferentialism in this domain is obscure as a result, but this does not in turn clearly vindicate any interesting version of inferentialism.

Beyond Words: Communication, Truthfulness, and Understanding

Episteme ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Rysiew
Keyword(s):  
Reliable Source ◽  
Epistemology Of Testimony ◽  
Important Argument ◽  
Testimonial Belief ◽  
Source Of Information

ABSTRACTTestimony is an indispensable source of information. Yet, contrary to ‘literalism’, speakers rarely mean just what they say; and even when they do, that itself is something the hearer needs to realize. So, understanding instances of testimony requires more than merely reading others' messages off of the words they utter. Further, a very familiar and theoretically well-entrenched approach to how we arrive at such understanding serves to emphasize, not merely how deeply committed we are to testimony as a reliable source of information, but that epistemological questions about testimonial belief are – perhaps even must be – posterior to such a commitment. This result does not itself dictate any particular views on the epistemology of testimony. However, not only does the failure of literalism not support the view that the justificatory basis of testimony-based beliefs is importantly inferential; it in fact undermines a key premise in one important argument for the view that one needs independent, positive reasons for accepting a given testimonial report. More generally, the present paper illustrates how discussions of the epistemology of testimony might usefully interact with an examination of the epistemology of understanding.

Wikipedia and the Epistemology of Testimony

Episteme ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Perron Tollefsen
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Agency ◽  
Epistemology Of Testimony ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Testimonial Belief

ABSTRACTIn “Group Testimony” (2007) I argued that the testimony of a group cannot be understood (or at least cannot always be understood) in a summative fashion; as the testimony of some or all of the group members. In some cases, it is the group itself that testifies. I also argued that one could extend standard reductionist accounts of the justification of testimonial belief to the case of testimonial belief formed on the basis of group testimony. In this paper, I explore the issue of group testimony in greater detail by focusing on one putative source of testimony, that of Wikipedia. My aim is to the answer the following questions: Is Wikipedia a source of testimony? And if so, what is the nature of that source? Are we to understand Wikipedia entries as a collection of testimonial statements made by individuals, some subset of individuals, or is Wikipedia itself (the organization or the Wikipedia community) the entity that testifies? If Wikipedia itself is a source of testimony, what resources do we have for assessing the trustworthiness of such an unusual epistemic source? In answering these questions I hope to further elucidate the nature of collective epistemic agency (Tollefsen 2006), of which group testimony is a paradigm example.When a mans Discourse begineth…at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the Person; and the Resolution is called Beleefe, and Faith: Faith in the man. (1651/1991, Ch. 7; p. 48)

scholarly journals EPISTEMOLOGIA DO TESTEMUNHO: críticas à refutação do reducionismo local quanto ao desempenho justificacional do testemunho

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. 17-32
Author(s):  
Ronaldo Miguel Da Silva
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
Epistemology Of Testimony ◽  
Heated Debate ◽  
Testimonial Belief ◽  
Epistemic Role ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

A epistemologia do testemunho tem reacendido forte interesse entre a classe dos atuais epistemólogos. Tem sido redescoberta a sua indispensabilidade epistêmica e reassumida a posição de que o testemunho é uma fonte de crenças penetrante e natural, no qual muitas das crenças nele fundamentadas constituem conhecimento e estão justificadas. Reducionistas e antirreducionistas se alternam, repetidamente, para explicar o papel epistêmico do testemunho na justificação da crença testemunhal, gerando um acirrado debate na epistemologia contemporânea. Advogada do Reducionismo local, Elizabeth Fricker refuta a relevância da justificação com base no testemunho para crença testemunhal. Com base nisso, este artigo propõe apresentar algumas críticas aos argumentos de refutação reducionista de Fricker quanto à possibilidade epistêmica do testemunho.Abstract: The epistemology of testimony has rekindled strong reigniting interest among the train of current epistemologists. Its epistemic indispensability has been unearthed anew and the importance that the testimony is a natural and pervasive source of beliefs has been recaptured as well, considering that many of the beliefs based on itself constitute knowledge and are justified. Reductionists and Anti-Reductionists alternate, repeatedly, explaining the epistemic role of testimony in justification of testimonial belief, generating a heated debate in contemporary epistemology. Reductionism local lawyer, Elizabeth Fricker, refutes the relevance of justification with testimony-based to testimonial belief. Based on that, this paper aims at presenting some criticism to the reductive refutation of Fricker’s arguments as to the epistemic possibility of testimony. Keywords: Epistemology of testimony. Testimonial justification. Local Reductionism. Anti-Reductionism. Inferential Support. 

Consciousness, Metacognition, & Perceptual Reality Monitoring

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hakwan Lau
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Reality Monitoring ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Brute Fact ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Subjective Level

I introduce an empirically-grounded version of a higher-order theory of conscious perception. Traditionally, theories of consciousness either focus on the global availability of conscious information, or take conscious phenomenology as a brute fact due to some biological or basic representational properties. Here I argue instead that the key to characterizing the consciousness lies in its connections to belief formation and epistemic justification on a subjective level.

The Dynamics of Belief Formation and Price Momentum

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Dontoh ◽  
Joshua Ronen ◽  
Bharat Sarath
Keyword(s):  
Belief Formation ◽  
Price Momentum

Why so Negative? Belief Formation in Boom and Bust Markets

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascal Kieren ◽  
Jan Müller-Dethard ◽  
Martin Weber
Keyword(s):  
Belief Formation ◽  
Negative Belief ◽  
Boom And Bust

Testimony and Assertion

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Owens
Keyword(s):  
Speech Acts ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Testimonial Knowledge ◽  
Epistemology Of Testimony ◽  
Ethical Norms

Two models of assertion are described and their epistemological implications considered. The assurance model draws a parallel between the ethical norms surrounding speech acts like promising and the epistemic norms that govern the transmission of testimonial knowledge. This model is rejected in favour of the view that assertion transmits knowledge by (intentionally) expressing belief. The expression of belief is distinguished from the communication of belief. The chapter goes on to compare the epistemology of testimony with the epistemology of memory, arguing that memory and testimony are mechanisms that can preserve the rationality of the belief they transmit without preserving the evidence on which the belief was originally based.

Sincerity and the Reliability of Testimony

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Graham
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Tyler Burge ◽  
P Content ◽  
Epistemology Of Testimony ◽  
Content Preservation

“Content Preservation” by Tyler Burge is one of the most influential articles in the epistemology of testimony. Burge argues for three theses: (1) That we enjoy a prima facie entitlement to take testimony (presentations-as-true) at face value, (2) That this entitlement has an a priori basis, based in the nature of reason, and (3) That in some cases testimony-based beliefs are warranted a priori. Most of the debate in the testimony literature is over the truth of (1). Most of the criticism of Burge’s paper focuses on (3). Burge has since abandoned (3). What about (2)? Burge’s argument for (2) is compressed; the underlying nuts and bolts are difficult to understand. This chapter reconstructs Burge’s overall teleo-functional reliabilist framework and then reconstructs Burge’s overall argument for (2) in some detail. Three criticisms are then offered of the argument. Even granting (1), Burge’s argument does not establish (2).

Core Criteria I

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Forming Process ◽  
Epistemic Criteria ◽  
Problem Of The Criterion

Chapter 3 deals with the first issue one faces in the task of articulating the explicit epistemic criteria for belief: the problem of the criterion. It is tempting to suppose that a belief can be normatively proper from the epistemic point of view only if the believer can certify for herself the reliability of every belief-forming process on which she relied. But insisting on this quickly leads to the threat of an infinite regress. This chapter defends a foundationalist response to this problem, according to which we enjoy a default (albeit defeasible) permission to rely on certain cognitive processes in belief-formation. These are processes that satisfy what the author calls the Reliabilist Rationale. Importantly, our permissions here are social: any one of us is permitted to rely on any token process that satisfies this rationale, whether the token process resides in one’s own mind/brain or that of another epistemic subject.

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