scholarly journals The Commitment Curve: Global Regulation of Business and Human Rights

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tori Loven KIRKEBØ ◽  
Malcolm LANGFORD

AbstractThe divide between hard law and soft law approaches to global regulation of corporations in relation to human rights is partly based on empirical assumptions. Taking a step back, we assess the claims concerning the current state of global regulation and political feasibility of hard law approaches. Moving beyond the usual suspects, we map 98 existing standards that regulate corporations and find a great variation in how different sectors treat human rights and accountability issues. Turning to the explanation of the current jungle of global business and human rights regulation, we contrast and test dominant and competingexpressivetheories with a consequentialistcommitment curve, in which corporations and states seek to minimize human rights commitments. We find support for all approaches to regulatory reform, but argue that greater attention should be given to the consequentialist insights, and how political economy can be leveraged to strengthen regulatory outcomes.

2018 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 961-986 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barnali Choudhury

AbstractIn the wake of increasing corporate disasters, there has been an urgent need to address the impact of business on human rights. Yet business responsibilities for human rights are mainly voluntary and best understood as ‘soft law’. Recently, however, States have begun negotiations for an internationally binding treaty in this area, suggesting that there is a need to turn to ‘hard law’ to increase the efficacy of business and human rights (BHR) initiatives. This article argues that because soft and hard law concepts are not dichotomous, BHR governance need not become ‘hard law’ to be effective. Rather ‘hardened’ soft law instruments can be equally effective.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 168-173
Author(s):  
Kishanthi Parella

States and non-state actors, such as business organizations and NGOs, have varying preferences among regulatory options in business and human rights. Some actors prefer soft law governance while others advocate for legally binding solutions at the national and international levels. In this essay, I explore some of the factors that may explain why state and non-state actors hold these diverse preferences. I conclude that while some of these preferences may be attributable to the unique advantages of soft law or hard law, other preferences likely depend on the effects produced by the interaction of both types of law within the broader regulatory landscape.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 174-178
Author(s):  
Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg

This contribution, rather than focusing on the debates within the Business and Human Rights (BHR) domain itself, offers a comparison between soft law regulation in the BHR context, on the one hand, and in the jus in bello (JIB) and jus ad bellum (JAB) contexts, on the other. Specifically, this contribution looks at the recent experience in JIB and JAB wherein states and other actors have tried to address the indeterminacy of treaty law provisions through soft law proposals that advance a disputed interpretation of hard law, producing legal uncertainty and scholarly debate. I use as examples the 2009 Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities and the 2012 Bethlehem Principles as a way to extract lessons for the codifying momentum underway in BHR.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
María Carmelina Londoño-Lázaro ◽  
Ulf Thoene ◽  
Catherine Pereira-Villa

Abstract This article analyses the role of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) within a business and human rights framework. A qualitative data analysis of cases on multinational enterprises (mnes) identifies the following: that the obligations the IACtHR places upon States explicitly contemplate soft law instruments, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; and that there exist shared obligations with companies and attempts to regulate mne conduct by establishing conditions for due diligence, such as prior consultation, benefit-sharing and reparation measures for affected communities. Therefore, IACtHR rulings may contribute to the rule of law in so far as they have normative effects on member States, but they can also prove to be ineffective given the nature of corporate conduct and certain non-enforceable responsibilities.


2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pini Pavel Miretski ◽  
Sascha-Dominik Bachmann

On 11 June 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council endorsed the ‘Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights’ as a new set of guiding principles for global business designed to provide a global standard for preventing and addressing the risk of adverse impacts on human rights linked to business activity. This outcome was preceded by an earlier unsuccessful attempt by a Sub-Commission of the UN Commission on Human Rights to win approval for a set of binding corporate human rights norms, the so called ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’. This article identifies and discusses the reasons why the Norms eventually failed to win approval by the then UN Commission on Human Rights. This discussion assists an understanding of the difficulties in establishing binding ‘hard law’ obligations for transnational corporations with regard to human rights within the wider framework of international law. It elucidates the possible motives as well as the underlying rationale which led first to the adoption and then the rapid abandoning of the Norms. The discussion also sheds light on the future of the voluntarism of business human rights compliance, on the likelihood of finding alternative solutions, and finally on the rationale for, and effect of, the ‘Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights’.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleydis Nissen

The European Union’s 2013 Country-by-Country Reporting (CBCR) rules bring within the public domain information on corporate payments made to governments all over the world for the purpose of exploiting natural resources in the oil, gas, mining and logging sectors. In so doing, the CBCR rules enhance transparency in these sectors and aim to reduce tax avoidance and corruption in resource-rich countries. Arguably, they also contribute to the European Commission’s long-term strategy to secure sustained access to raw materials in the European Economic Area. The CBCR rules represent one of the only three binding regulatory frameworks that have been adopted at the EU level to implement the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Just as with the two other initiatives that came into existence (the Non-Financial Reporting Directive and the Conflict Minerals Regulation), the immediate impact on the competitiveness of corporations based in the EU was a key concern during the legislative process. This article uncovers the two strategies that were employed to overcome such concern and give the CBCR rules a ‘global’ character.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 186-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Methven O'Brien

Achieving respect for human rights by businesses requires not making the “right” choice between hard and soft law but establishing an architecture to sustain a constructive dialectic between the two. This essay argues that a business and human rights treaty modelled as a framework convention and centered initially on the UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs) offers such a structure while avoiding the shortcomings of treaty proposals advanced to date.


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