scholarly journals Can Finance Be a Virtuous Practice? A MacIntyrean Account

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marta Rocchi ◽  
Ignacio Ferrero ◽  
Ron Beadle

ABSTRACTFinance may suffer from institutional deformations that subordinate its distinctive goods to the pursuit of external goods, but this should encourage attempts to reform the institutionalization of finance rather than to reject its potential for virtuous business activity. This article argues that finance should be regarded as a domain-relative practice (Beabout 2012; MacIntyre 2007). Alongside management, its moral status thereby varies with the purposes it serves. Hence, when practitioners working in finance facilitate projects that create common goods, it allows them to develop virtues. This argument applies MacIntyre’s widely acknowledged account of the relationship between practices and the development of virtues while questioning some of his claims about finance. It also takes issue with extant accounts of particular financial functions that have failed to identify the distinctive goods of financial practice.

Author(s):  
T.J. Kasperbauer

This chapter applies the psychological account from chapter 3 on how we rank human beings above other animals, to the particular case of using mental states to assign animals moral status. Experiments on the psychology of mental state attribution are discussed, focusing on their implications for human moral psychology. The chapter argues that attributions of phenomenal states, like emotions, drive our assignments of moral status. It also describes how this is significantly impacted by the process of dehumanization. Psychological research on anthropocentrism and using animals as food and as companions is discussed in order to illuminate the relationship between dehumanization and mental state attribution.


Author(s):  
John Basl

Chapter 2 takes up two distinct sets of challenges to biocentrism. The first concerns the relationship between moral status and normative theory. The challenge is that there is no defending the claim that nonsentient organisms have moral status without defending a particular normative theory. This chapter defends the view that questions about the bearers of moral status can be settled independently of issues of normative theory. The second challenge, the subjectivist challenge, rests on the claim that there is no satisfactory account of welfare that does not depend in some way on the bearer of welfare having cognitive capacities, that attributions of welfare to nonsentient things are illusory, derivative, etc. Here the chapter makes space for the welfare of nonsentient organisms by defending an objective-list view of welfare and using the subjectivist challenge to set conditions of adequacy for a theory of welfare for nonsentient organisms.


Author(s):  
D. Justin Coates ◽  
Neal A. Tognazzini

In this brief introduction, the editors summarize the motivation for the coming together of these chapters—which is to celebrate the work and philosophical legacy of Gary Watson—as well as the content of each contribution. Michael McKenna builds on and systematizes several key elements of Watson’s views on agency and responsibility. Susan Wolf extends elements of Watson’s oeuvre, notably the relationship between the way agents are responsible for their actions and the kind of response licensed by those actions. Pamela Hieronymi goes on from Watson’s work to offer her own account of what blame’s about. R. Jay Wallace is also concerned with Watson’s overall conception of moral responsibility, understanding blame to be an incipient form of moral address. Michael Smith continues the theme, offering a possible theory of moral responsibility similarly grounded in the reactive emotions. T. M. Scanlon continues a debate that Scanlon and Watson have been having over the moral status of psychopaths. Jeanette Kennett argues that psychopaths are not accountable for their actions in the sense required for moral blameworthiness; and that psychopaths’ actions are not attributable to them so as to make them plausibly criminal. Antony Duff extends Watson’s work on moral responsibility to the domain of criminal responsibility. Gideon Yaffe seeks to better understand the prospects of Watson’s account of addiction. Gary Watson himself offers his current account of the distinction between the two faces of responsibility and thoughts on weakness of will and negligence. Finally, a 2016 interview of Watson by Sarah Buss is a wide-ranging and significant discussion of Gary’s personal history and philosophical development.


2020 ◽  
pp. 264-282
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Insole

The chapter articulates the following problem: given all that Kant’s notion of freedom, and the intelligible realm can achieve, what precisely is the role of God? That is, what do we need God for? And then, even if we have identified a role which God is expected to fill, there is the further question of whether God can fulfil this role, consistently with Kant’s wider commitments. It is suggested that God either seems to be ‘too much’, or ‘not enough’: ‘too much’, in that God can seem redundant, given all that is achieved by the notion of freedom, and ‘not enough’, in that, were God needed to make up some sort of deficit in our moral status, this would seem to violate Kant’s restrictions on human freedom, which is always ‘all or nothing’, such that all our free actions must come as a first cause from ourselves, and ourselves alone. This is a problem that threatens the cogency of Kant’s ‘moral proof’, which is to say, his understanding of the relationship between the highest good, happiness, and the existence of God.


2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 291-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liane Young ◽  
Daniel Tranel ◽  
Fiery Cushman ◽  
Marc Hauser ◽  
Ralph Adolphs

1995 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Twigg ◽  
Karl Atkin

ABSTRACTThe article explores factors mediating the relationship between carers and service provision, exploring the judgements and expectations that lie behind the complex and sometimes seemingly inconsistent pattern of provision for carers. The article which is based on an empirical study teases out a series of factors that structure responses in this area covering: the attitude adopted by the carer to his or her caring role; the views of the cared-for person and other kin; the impact of different relationships, of what we term ‘moral status’, and of the existence or otherwise of a separate future for the cared-for person, as well as more social structural factors such as gender, age, class and race. The significance of these is explored through their impact on the assumptions of both service providers and carers.


Author(s):  
Clovis Demarchi ◽  
Tainá Fernanda Pedrini

The State and the Business Activity have a relationship of Interdependence. That holds the punitive and regulatory power, this, the economic. The achievement of the global Sustainability goal implies harmony between the actors for joint policies. In view of this, it aims to demonstrate the participation of the business sector to achieve this objective, through socio-environmental management - with the organization or business financially viable, fair to the Company and endowed with environmental responsibility. To do so, the relationship between the human being and the environment is first analyzed in order to identify the consequences of human performance over time. Subsequently, the application of Sustainability as a concept to the application of management policies for the business sector is studied, considering the awareness developed about the existence of a Risk Society, as well as, the possibility of benefits arising from this management model. The method used was inductive.


Author(s):  
Colin Bird

This chapter investigates the relationship between the so-called ‘politics of recognition’ and the philosophical discussion of principles of distributive justice. It argues that the literature has failed to distinguish clearly between three forms of recognition potentially relevant to distributive justice: status-recognition, authenticity-recognition and worth-recognition. Each of these forms of recognition is explored, and their various possible links to arguments about the requirements of justice are distinguished and critically discussed. Against much conventional wisdom, the chapter suggests that models of recognition built around the recognition of ‘equal status’ need not be problematically ‘difference blind’; that claims about authenticity-recognition have a more tenuous relation to discussion of (distributive) justice than many suppose; and that disadvantaged individuals’ need for respectful recognition is not reducible either to claims about their moral status or to demands that identity be authentically expressed in social discourse.


e-Finanse ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 87-97
Author(s):  
Teresa Famulska ◽  
Beata Rogowska-Rajda

AbstractThe principle of VAT neutrality is among the fundamental characteristics of this tax. It is implemented through reduction of VAT output by the amount of VAT input. The right of deduction constitutes an integral part of the VAT mechanism and is intended to free the entrepreneur entirely from the burden of VAT paid for the goods and services purchased within the framework of business activity. However, in certain situations it is possible to shift the obligation to pay VAT to the customer being a taxable person by introducing a reverse charge mechanism. The purpose of the article is to identify the relationship between the implementation of the principle of VAT neutrality and the reverse charge mechanism. The conducted analysis of the essence and functioning of the reverse charge and the detailed findings drawn on its basis allow us to conclude generally that this mechanism does not affect implementation of this principle.


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