scholarly journals Necessary Moral Principles

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 617-634 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD SWINBURNE
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Wide Sense ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
As If

ABSTRACT:Moral realism entails that there are metaphysically necessary moral principles of the form ‘all actions of nonmoral kind Z are morally good’; being discoverable a priori, these must be (in a wide sense) logically necessary. This article seeks to justify this apparently puzzling consequence. A sentence expresses a logically necessary proposition iff its negation entails a contradiction. The method of reflective equilibrium assumes that the simplest account of the apparently correct use of sentences of some type in paradigm examples is probably logically necessary. An account is simple insofar as it uses few predicates designating properties easily recognizable in many different kinds of paradigm examples. I illustrate how reflective equilibrium uses these criteria to discover logically necessary nonmoral propositions such as ‘if S remembers doing X, S believes that he did X’ and ‘if it is scarlet, it is red’. I then illustrate how exactly the same procedures can lead us from paradigm examples of apparently true sentences asserting that actions of some kind are good to discovering moral principles. I advance the contingent hypothesis that most contemporary humans, although they initially disagree about moral issues, have derived from different paradigm examples the same concept of moral goodness, which will ensure that the use of reflective equilibrium will lead to eventual agreement about moral issues. That strongly suggests that the moral principles eventually reached by reflective equilibrium are logically necessary ones.

Normative Principles are Synthetic A Priori

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-383
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Open Question Argument ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Open Question

AbstractI argue for the claim that there are instances of a priori justified belief – in particular, justified belief in moral principles – that are not analytic, i.e., that cannot be explained solely by the understanding we have of their propositions. §1–2 provides the background necessary for understanding this claim: in particular, it distinguishes between two ways a proposition can be analytic, Basis and Constitutive, and provides the general form of a moral principle. §§3–5 consider whether Hume's Law, properly interpreted, can be established by Moore's Open Question Argument, and concludes that it cannot: while Moore's argument – appropriately modified – is effective against the idea that moral judgments are either (i) reductively analyzable or (ii) Constitutive-analytic, a different argument is needed to show that they are not (iii) Basis-analytic. Such an argument is supplied in §6. §§7–8 conclude by considering how these considerations bear on recent discussions of “alternative normative concepts”, on the epistemology of intuitions, and on the differences between disagreement in moral domains and in other a priori domains such as logic and mathematics.

Über Gewissen und Gewissheit

2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dina Emundts
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Status

AbstractThis paper suggests an understanding of the concept of “Gewissen” (conscience) according to which Gewissen is best understood as a receptivity to moral principles that corresponds to certain moral feelings. In the first part of the paper this suggestion is spelled out and alternatives to it are discussed. As is shown in the second part, this suggestion goes back to the thought of Immanuel Kant, but it can be developed even if one does not follow Kant in his understanding of the categorical imperative as an a priori principle. However, if one does not follow Kant with respect to the status of the categorical imperative, there are some interesting consequences for our understanding of conscience and especially for our understanding of its relation to knowledge and certainty. These consequences are discussed in the third part of this paper.

當代生命倫理學危機的根源及解決方案——David Solomon文章評析

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-130
Author(s):  
Ruipeng LEI
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Foundational Principle ◽  
Digital Commons

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English only.David Solomon proposes in his article that deep divisions in our culture, which are reflected in the variety and opposition of foundational normative theories, are key to understanding the contemporary crisis in bioethics. Solomon examines two recent attempts to respond to this crisis of authority in bioethics and suggest that both proposals make the situation worse. However, his criticism of principlism, which has been dominant in bioethics since the 1980s, seems implausible. As observed by Aristotle, the rationale of a principle-based approach lies in the tensions between generality, considered judgment and ethical deliberation. The principle-based approach to meta-ethics is characterized as a dialectic between moral principles and considered judgment, which is analogous to Rawls’s concept of reflective equilibrium. The four principles formulated by Beauchamp and Childress are prima-facie binding, but subject to specification and balancing. It is possible for us to overcome these deep foundational disagreements in normative ethics by emphasizing the foundational principle held by the ancient Greeks; that is, our natural desire to live a good life.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 41 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

Nonlegislative Justification

2021 ◽  
pp. 247-274
Author(s):  
Liam Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Legal Rules ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Positive Mode ◽  
Moral Theorizing ◽  
High Level ◽  
General Regulation ◽  
As If

If moral theorists who otherwise disagree, all approach moral theorizing as a search for a set of desirable moral principles for the general regulation of behavior, then there is a sense in which they are all, as Parfit says, climbing the same mountain. But it is the wrong mountain. Morality should not be understood as hypothetical legislation; it is a mistake to set about constructing morality as if we were making law. Real legislators evaluate possible legal rules by considering the effects they would have. They can do this because enforcement and acceptance of law ensure a high level of compliance. Moral legislators have no reason to assume any particular level of acceptance; the effects of counterfactual acceptance of a principle are not morally relevant. The argument targets rule consequentialism and Scanlon’s official version of contractualism. The paper begins in a positive mode by arguing that a nonlegislative version of Scanlon’s approach, that seeks justification for conduct of such-and-such a kind in such-and-such circumstances by comparing the reasons in favor and the reasons others have to object, is a very attractive way to think about what we owe to each other.

Moral epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Factual Proposition ◽  
The Way

Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. So moral epistemology is the study of what would be involved in knowing, or being justified in believing, moral propositions. Some discussions of moral epistemology interpret the category of ‘moral propositions’ broadly, to encompass all propositions that can be expressed with terms like ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘ought’. Other discussions have focused on a narrower category of moral propositions – such as propositions about what rights people have, or about what we owe to each other. According to so-called noncognitivists, one cannot strictly speaking know (or be justified in believing) a moral proposition in the same sense in which one can know (or be justified in believing) an ordinary factual proposition. Other philosophers defend a cognitivist position, according to which it is possible to know or be justified in believing moral propositions in the very same sense as factual propositions. If one does know any moral propositions, they must presumably be true; and the way in which one knows those moral truths must provide access to them. This has led to a debate about whether one could ever know moral truths if a realist conception of these truths – according to which moral truths are not in any interesting sense of our making – were correct. Many philosophers agree that one way of obtaining justified moral beliefs involves seeking ‘reflective equilibrium’ – that is, roughly, considering theories, and adjusting one’s judgments to make them as systematic and coherent as possible. According to some philosophers, however, seeking reflective equilibrium is not enough: justified moral beliefs need to be supported by moral ‘intuitions’. Some hold that such moral intuitions are a priori, akin to our intuitions of the self-evident truths of mathematics. Others hold that these intuitions are closely related to emotions or sentiments; some theorists claim that empirical studies of moral psychology strongly support this ‘sentimentalist’ interpretation. Finally, moral thinking seems different from other areas of thought in two respects. First, there is particularly widespread disagreement about moral questions; and one rarely responds to such moral disagreement by retreating to a state of uncertainty as one does on other questions. Secondly, one rarely defers to other people’s moral judgments in the way in which one defers to experts about ordinary factual questions. These two puzzling features of moral thinking seem to demand explanation – which is a further problem that moral epistemology has to solve.

Normative Ethics: an Armchair Discipline?

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-166
Author(s):  
Johnnie R.R. Pedersen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Normative Ethics

This paper discusses a challenge to normative ethics motivated by experimental philosophy. Experimental philosophers object to the perceived “armchair” or a priori nature of philosophy, claiming it should rather be empirical or naturalistic. The paper investigates the application of this claim to normative ethics. Dubbing the application of the experimental philosophers’ contention to normative ethics “the Armchair Claim,” I distinguish descriptive and normative versions of this challenge, and consider their merits as comments on the method of normative ethics (descriptive versions), and as comments on how normative ethics should be done (normative versions). Characterizing normative ethics as essentially involving the use of the method of reflective equilibrium, I show how the versions of the Armchair Claim that I distinguish either misconstrue normative ethics, or are committed to metaethical views that are controversial. To bring home the latter point, I contrast two meta-ethical positions, and show how, on one such view, naturalism, the descriptive version could be correct, whereas on another, intuitionism, it would be false. The normative version, in turn, is consistent with naturalism, but begs the question against the intuitionist since she argues that normative ethics cannot be empirical. The upshot is that a conclusive assessment of the Armchair Claim will have to await the resolution of disputed issues in meta-ethics. However, normative ethicists can get on with their work since reflective equilibrium is unaffected by such debates.

A Study of the Sexual Life in Psychoses Associated with Childbirth

1933 ◽  
Vol 79 (324) ◽  
pp. 137-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. W. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Mental Disorder ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Sexual Life ◽  
Precipitating Factors ◽  
Puerperal Depression ◽  
Precipitating Factor ◽  
As If

It is now universally recognized that there is nothing specific in the form of psychoses associated with childbearing. There is, however, still a tendency to attribute to the puerperium itself or to pregnancy or lactation a significance quite out of proportion to that of other precipitating factors; thus such terms as “puerperal depression”, or “puerperal schizophrenia” are still in use, as if the precipitating factor were something special as opposed to the innumerable other causes assigned to the appearance of an attack of mental disorder. Nor is this surprising when one reflects on the enormous significance of the sexual life. One is quite willing ona priorigrounds to grant to the puerperium this all-important rôle.

Instrumental Understanding of Management Ideas

2019 ◽  
pp. 120-138
Author(s):  
Kjell-Arne Røvik
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Social Constructionist ◽  
Translation Theory ◽  
Implementation Phase ◽  
Theoretical Perspectives ◽  
The Social ◽  
Distinct Property ◽  
Symbolic Perspective ◽  
As If

This chapter discusses the instrumental status of management ideas through the lenses of three theoretical perspectives. While from the modernistic–rationalistic perspective, management ideas are conceived of as tools, they are also frequently described as legitimizing elements or fashions viewed from the social constructionist–symbolic perspective. However, seen from a pragmatic perspective—this chapter’s main analytical frame—the instrumental quality of a management idea cannot be decided upon a priori, as if it were a distinct property of each idea. Instead, the implementation phase stands out as critical for the shaping of management ideas. A pragmatic lens, such as offered by translation theory, helps to identify a range of possible trajectories of initiatives to implement management ideas. Some lead to instrumentalization and practical use, while others do not. It is argued that translation theory has the potential to guide practitioners’ efforts to instrumentalize management ideas.

Comments on some Methodological Aspects of Rawls’ “Theory of Justice”

1979 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Tugendbat
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Analysis ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Methodological Aspects ◽  
Court Of Appeal

AbstractIn the first part of the paper Rawls’ conception of a ,reflective equilibrium" with our „considered moral judgements“ is criticized. Moral judgements cannot form a court of appeal for the justification of moral principles, since they are themselves in need of justification. An analysis of the meaning of the sentences in which moral judgements are expressed is called for in order to establish their method of justification.In the second part of the paper the consequence which Rawls' repudiation of semantic analysis has had for his conception of the „original position“ is discussed. In retrogressive extension of his four-stage-sequence a zero-stage is postulated which represents the moral point of view. At this stage the reasons would have to be given for adopting the original position and for conceiving it with just those characteristics that Rawls has assumed. Only thus can the advantages and disadvantages of these characteristics be analytically assessed.

scholarly journals ÉTICA, DIREITO DE RESPOSTA E A ESTREIA DE LAURO JARDIM EM “O GLOBO”

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 704
Author(s):  
Daniel Dantas Lemos
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Principles ◽  
Ethical Question ◽  
Business Associations ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
The Press ◽  
The Right

Este trabalho discute questões ético-morais do jornalismo brasileiro, a partir dos princípios deontológicos da ANJ, da ANER e da FENAJ, especialmente com relação ao exercício do direito de resposta. Para tanto, retomamos a discussão da questão ética no jornalismo a partir da dimensão da parresia e da coragem da verdade em Foucault (2011) e discutimos noções de ética como o estudo das relações entre os sujeitos sociais e os princípios morais. Destacamos a resistência que as associações empresariais (ANJ e ANER) têm ao direito de resposta e sua implicação sobre a imagem de personagens denunciados pela imprensa.  Por fim, analisamos o episódio da estreia do jornalista Lauro Jardim como colunista de “O Globo” e o fato de sua principal manchete em primeira página ter sido objeto de uma errata menos de um mês depois no mesmo espaço editorial.   PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Ética; Deontologia; Jornalismo; Lauro Jardim; O Globo.     ABSTRACT This paper discusses ethical-moral issues in Brazilian journalism, based on the ethical principles of ANJ, ANER and FENAJ, especially regarding the exercise of the right of reply. For that, we return to the discussion of the ethical question in journalism from the dimension of parrhesia and the courage of truth in Foucault (2011) and we discuss notions of ethics as the study of the relations between social subjects and moral principles. We emphasize the resistance that the business associations (ANJ and ANER) have to the right of reply and their implication on the image of characters denounced by the press. Finally, we analyze the episode of the debut of the journalist Lauro Jardim as a columnist for "O Globo" and the fact that his main headline on the first page was errata less than a month later in the same editorial space.   KEYWORDS: Ethics; Deontology; Journalism; Lauro Jardim; O Globo.     RESUMEN Este artículo describe las cuestiones éticas y morales del periodismo brasileño, a partir de los principios éticos de la ANJ, el Aner y la FENAJ, especialmente en relación con el ejercicio del derecho de respuesta. Por lo tanto, reanudamos la discusión de la ética en el periodismo desde el tamaño de parresía y el valor de la verdad en Foucault (2011) y se discuten las nociones de ética como el estudio de las relaciones entre los sujetos sociales y los principios morales. Destacamos la resistencia que las asociaciones empresariales (ANJ y Aner) tienen el derecho de réplica y su implicación en la imagen de los caracteres reportados por la prensa. Por último, se analiza el primer episodio de Lauro Jardim periodista y columnista de "El Globo" y el hecho de que su principal titular en la primera página han sido objeto de una corrección de errores de menos de un mes después en el mismo espacio editorial.   PALABRAS CLAVE: Ética; deontología; el periodismo; Lauro Jardim; O Globo.

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