Trump Administration Continues Push to Reshape American Trade Relations by Imposing Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum Imports

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-322 ◽  

On March 8, 2018, President Trump signed Proclamation 9704 and Proclamation 9705 imposing tariffs on imported aluminum and steel articles, respectively. According to Trump, the tariffs are “necessary and appropriate to address the threat that imports” of steel and aluminum articles “pose to the national security.” The imposition of tariffs in the name of national defense is the latest and most high-profile move by the Trump administration to orient the United States toward an “America First” trade policy.

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 439-449
Author(s):  
Ryszard ŁAWNICZAK

In March 2018, the newly elected President of the United States, Donald Trump, surprised the world by triggering a trade war with his largest trading partners. He announced that he would introduce 25% and 10% of customs tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium. Besides he threatened to impose duties on imports of European cars, as well as on the entire list of other products, as long as the trading partners do not stop unfair trading practices and will not reduce their own barriers to American products. In the article, the author tries to explain why protectionist measures of the American administration should be defined as "neo-protectionism", and why and if justly those protectionist steps President Trump justifies as a “threat to national security".


Asian Survey ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-20
Author(s):  
Robert Sutter

Early Trump administration initiatives upset regional stability, complicating the foreign policies of Asian partners and opponents alike. Subsequent pragmatic summitry eased regional anxiety and clarified the new government’s security and political objectives. The administration’s national security strategy, released in December, provided a well-integrated security, economic, and diplomatic strategy for Asia and the rest of the world.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (02) ◽  
pp. 24-33
Author(s):  
Litao ZHAO ◽  
Xiangru YIN

The United States’ fear of losing its technological edge to China is on the rise. The Trump administration has viewed China’s techno-industrial plans and policies as a national security threat. Recognising the reality that it cannot afford to have a Cold War or “cold peace” with the United States, China has shown willingness to make concessions, but only to a certain degree. The Trump administration’s growing hostility is unlikely to stop China from pursuing frontier technologies, which are a source of national competitiveness, security and pride for China as much as for the United States.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-142

In the fall of 2019, the Trump administration reached several trade arrangements, some of them tentative, with important U.S. trade partners. On October 11, 2019, China and the United States announced a preliminary trade deal subject to finalization—one that came after more than a year of escalating tariffs. Just a week earlier, the United States had signed two trade agreements with Japan, one regarding tariff reductions and the other regarding digital trade. None of these deals appear to require subsequent congressional approval in the eyes of the executive branch, unlike the earlier United States-Mexico-Canada-Agreement (USMCA), which was signed in November 2018 and whose fate in Congress appears promising as of mid-December of 2019. In addition to these trade arrangements, the fall of 2019 saw several developments in trade relations between the United States and the European Union tied to the long-running trade disputes.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 389-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Lande ◽  
Dennis Matanda

In an era in which multilateral trade arrangements have garnered more public notoriety than ever before, the suboptimal trade and investment relationship between America and Africa, as underpinned by the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), is one of the less controversial ones. AGOA could nevertheless use some adjustments or augmentations to facilitate deeper U.S.-Africa commercial relations. For instance, adjusting AGOA's origin rules could nudge the private sector on both sides of the Atlantic towards gains for U.S. and African employment and the reduction of trade deficits. Africa must leverage the period before AGOA expires to redefine its trade relationship with the United States in innovative ways. The United States should welcome these measures, since the type of value that Africa would add to the global supply chain would not replace the high-quality jobs that the Trump Administration would like to see in the United States. In fact, this type of production would make U.S. manufacturing more competitive.


Slavic Review ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip S. Gillette

In 1921 a young American doctor named Armand Hammer went to Russia, met Lenin, and undertook the first American concession in Soviet Russia. Interest in this episode has been heightened by the fact that fifty years later Armand Hammer, as chairman of the Occidental Petroleum Corporation, forged new commercial links between the United States and the Soviet Union. This article provides a new interpretation of Hammer’s meeting with Lenin and his receipt of the first American concession granted by the Soviet government. It throws light on how Soviet national security objectives and personal relations can influence Soviet government decisions on American trade.


Author(s):  
S. S. Dmitriev

Trump’s administration is configured negatively to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which it considered ineffective and is allegedly used by some United States trading partners to achieve trade and political objectives contrary to American interests. Some American claims to the WTO, at least partially, are shared by other members of the organization. The process of improving international trade rules is clearly not keeping up with the pace of change in the world. Signs of the WTO erosion are evident in advocating increased use of trade policy instruments outside the organization under the pretext of protecting national interests and national security, the introduction of new trade sanctions and other restrictive measures, the crisis of the system for the settlement of trade disputes. The absence of multilaterally agreed arrangements on the reform of the WTO encourages the Trump Administration to act unilaterally. The United States stated their right to apply the restrictive measures against the WTO members under the pretext of protecting national security, insisting on the need for a selective approach to decisions taken not in their favor, probe to eradicate undesirable for this country most favored nation trade regime (MFN), and accentuate the flaws of multilateralism in trade negotiations. Against this backdrop, the Trump Administration announced its willingness “to lead the international efforts” for the reformatting of the WTO with a view to restoring its sole political leadership in the organization. However, aggressive, reckless and uncoordinated with the partners of the United States actions untie hands to other countries to protect their own interests, both within the legal framework of the WTO and beyond, making the risks of returning to the priority of force factor on the principle of “everyone for himself ”. The future of the multilateral trading system, the scope and depth of these reforms will largely be determined by the coherence or uncoordinated actions of key players - the United States, China and the EU. While the contribution of other countries, including Russia, could also be significant. The priorities will be the prevention of further escalation of trade conflicts and preparation of the conditions for a new round of trade negotiations. 


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (4) ◽  
pp. 751-759 ◽  

Over the summer of 2018, trade relations between the United States and many of its trading partners continued to be marked by tensions. The United States and China ratcheted up their use of tariffs against each other. The United States both received and initiated requests for consultation with various countries at the World Trade Organization (WTO) related to its earlier steel and aluminum tariffs and to tariffs imposed in response by other countries. President Trump has continued to pursue the possibility of further tariffs, including with respect to automobile and uranium imports. The United States also escalated trade tensions with Turkey through various measures, explicitly linking some of these measures to Turkey's detainment of an American pastor. Despite the broader theme of tensions, negotiations have proved productive between the United States and two of its major trading partners—the European Union and Mexico—paving a way for future settlements. With the European Union, the Trump administration has reached a tentative understanding and agreed not to impose new tariffs while the parties negotiate toward finalizing this understanding. As to Mexico, in late August 2018 the Trump administration announced that the two countries had reached agreement with respect to many issues underlying their ongoing North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 237
Author(s):  
Feng Guo ◽  
Fen Zhou

China committed to initiate the accession to Government Procurement Agreement when it entered the WTO as a compromise to the requirements made by GPA parties, mostly the developed western countries such as the United States. China started its official attempt to join the GPA on December 28, 2007 by submitting the first offer to the GPA Commission. Six revised offer were then submitted during the past years. The position of the United States and China in international trade changed dramatically since then. This article finds that Trump Administration’s attitude toward China’s accession to GPA is mixed and the US government might impede China’s accession with the analysis on the current American foreign trade policy and the latest development in government procurement in the US’s related international agreements and domestic laws. However, this accession process can only be delayed but not terminated even if the standpoint of the US is proved to be negative due to the theoretical and technical analysis on GPA. Effective and significant measures will be taken by Chinese government since the president Xi Jinping made the statement to accelerate the accession to GPA in Boao Forum in early 2018.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-173

On September 10, 2018, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered an address fiercely criticizing the International Criminal Court (ICC). Bolton challenged the legitimacy of the ICC and expressed particular concern over its inquiry into potential war crimes committed by members of the U.S. military and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan. He identified retaliatory measures the United States would undertake if the ICC “comes after us, Israel or other U.S. allies.”


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