Social Welfare Effects of Transparency and Misinformation in a Political Economy
2019 ◽
Vol 51
(3)
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pp. 485-494
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AbstractWe present a game-theoretical model arguing that greater public transparency does not necessarily lead to higher social welfare. Political agents can benefit from providing citizens with misleading information aimed at aligning citizens’ choices with the political agents’ preferences. Citizens can lose from being fooled by political agents, though they can mitigate their losses by conducting costly inspections to detect false information. Producing and detecting false information is costly and can reduce social welfare.
1992 ◽
Vol 24
(2)
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pp. 163-172
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Keyword(s):
2019 ◽
Vol 11
(3)
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pp. 357-375
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Keyword(s):
2020 ◽
pp. 189-209
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1988 ◽
Vol 13
(2)
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pp. 177-201
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Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):