Redistributing resilience? Deliberate transformation and political capabilities in post-Haiyan Tacloban

2021 ◽  
Vol 140 ◽  
pp. 105360
Author(s):  
Jonathan Ensor ◽  
Heidi Tuhkanen ◽  
Michael Boyland ◽  
Albert Salamanca ◽  
Karlee Johnson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Political Capabilities

Welche Chancen haben Entwicklungsländer im globalen Innovationswettbewerb?

2003 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tilman Altenburg
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Technological Change ◽  
Global Competition ◽  
Spatial Concentration ◽  
Interactive Process ◽  
Global Innovation ◽  
Gradual Process ◽  
Political Capabilities ◽  
Knowledge Content

Opportunities for developing countries in global innovation-based competition: Innovation becomes increasingly important for global competition. Innovation is a cumulative and interactive process that builds on externalities, thus enhancing spatial concentration and discriminating against latecomers. Yet technological upgrading is a gradual process, and latecomers may specialize on factor cost advantages and subsequently increase their knowledge content. Success mainly depends on socio-political capabilities to govern technological change.

The impact of political capabilities and political markets on firms' decision to lobby

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 100796
Author(s):  
Seong-jin Choi ◽  
Alfredo Jiménez ◽  
Jeoung Yul Lee
Keyword(s):  
Political Markets ◽  
Political Capabilities ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals Competition between Specialized Candidates

2010 ◽  
Vol 104 (4) ◽  
pp. 745-765 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEFAN KRASA ◽  
MATTIAS POLBORN
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Voter Model ◽  
Unique Equilibrium ◽  
Political Experience ◽  
Median Voter Model ◽  
Political Office ◽  
Political Capabilities

Opposing candidates for a political office often differ in their professional backgrounds and previous political experience, leading to both real and perceived differences in political capabilities. We analyze a formal model in which candidates with different productivities in two policy areas compete for voters by choosing how much money or effort they would allocate to each area if elected. The model has a unique equilibrium that differs substantially from the standard median voter model. Although candidates compete for the support of a moderate voter type, this cutoff voter differs from the expected median voter. Moreover, no voter type except the cutoff voter is indifferent between the candidates in equilibrium. The model also predicts that candidates respond to changes in the preferences of voters in a very rigid way. From a welfare perspective, candidates are “excessively moderate”: almost certainly, a majority of voters would prefer that the winning candidate focus more on his or her strength.

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