Coordinating a closed-loop supply chain with fairness concerns through variable-weighted Shapley values

2019 ◽  
Vol 126 ◽  
pp. 227-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao-Xue Zheng ◽  
Deng-Feng Li ◽  
Zhi Liu ◽  
Fu Jia ◽  
Jiuh-Biing Sheu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Shapley Values ◽  
Fairness Concerns

scholarly journals A Stochastic Differential Game in the Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Third-Party Collecting and Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 2241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianmin Xiao ◽  
Zongsheng Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Return Rate ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Fairness Concern

This paper investigates the optimal return control problem in a closed-loop supply chain consisted of one manufacturer, one retailer, and one third-party collector, in the presence of stochastic return disturbance and fairness concern of followers. We formulate the stochastic differential game-theoretic models and resolve the feedback Stackelberg equilibriums without and with fairness concern. We also derive the evolutionary paths of the stochastic return rate and the value functions of the supply chain members under the optimal control strategies. We find that the feedback equilibrium exists only under a specific condition, and the expectation and variance of the return rate both approach the stable state for a specific closed-loop supply chain system. We further discussed the impact of fairness concerns on the supply chain system. The manufacturer would shift profit to the retailer by lowering the wholesale price, and the stable expected return rate will be lower in the supply chain with fairness concerns, as the third party will have less incentive to collect used products, considering unfairness. The manufacturer should set a higher transfer subsidy to incentivize the third party to collect when the third party is concerned with fairness.

Complex Dynamics in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Risk Aversion and Fairness Concerns Under Supply Disruption

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (09) ◽  
pp. 2150132
Author(s):  
Yuhao Zhang ◽  
Tao Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Supply Disruption ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
Adjustment Speed ◽  
Fairness Concerns

In this paper, we consider a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of two suppliers, one manufacturer, one risk-averse retailer and one fair-caring third-party in the presence of supply disruption. We focus on establishing a dynamic Stackelberg game model with bounded rational expectation and analyzing the game evolution process. The effects of key parameters on the Nash equilibrium solutions and their stability are investigated, as well as the complex dynamical behaviors of the CLSC system are explored by using the stability region, bifurcation graph, the largest Lyapunov exponent (LLE), strange attractors, etc. Moreover, the performance of channel members under different values of parameters is researched by utilizing the (average) expected profits or utilities index. The analysis results reveal that the excessive fast adjustment speed of the manufacturer will lead to the system losing stability and falling into chaos. Also, the retailer’s risk aversion and the third party’s fairness concerns have a destabilization effect on the Nash equilibrium point, while the possibility of supply disruption has different effects on the scope of the adjustment speed of decision variables of the manufacturer. Furthermore, in most cases, an over the top adjustment speed of the manufacturer is disadvantageous to all the channel members for more expected profits, but the third-party can achieve a better performance when the system is in periodic state. Finally, the time-delay feedback control method is proposed to eliminate the system chaos.

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