A Theory of Moral Praise

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (9) ◽  
pp. 694-703 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajen A. Anderson ◽  
Molly J. Crockett ◽  
David A. Pizarro
Keyword(s):  
Moral Praise

Moral and Ascriptive Responsibilities

2021 ◽  
pp. 75-94
Author(s):  
A P Simester
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Moral Praise ◽  
Act Requirement

This chapter sets out in more detail two concepts of responsibility, “moral” and “ascriptive”, as they are used in this book. Moral responsibility is concerned with a defendant’s eligibility for moral praise or blame in respect of her behaviour. Ascriptive responsibility, by contrast is concerned with the conditions of accountability. The latter is audience-relative: the former is not. Within the criminal law, denials of moral responsibility are accommodated through defences such as infancy and insanity, and by the requirement of voluntariness. Denials of ascription, by contrast, turn primarily upon doctrines of causation, omissions, and complicity. The chapter concludes with a critique of the so-called voluntary act requirement.

Desert

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. M. Scanlon
Keyword(s):  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Marginal Productivity ◽  
Moral Praise ◽  
Legitimate Expectations

The idea that just economic institutions should give people what they deserve can be appealed to as a way of justifying unequal rewards or as a way of limiting them. Claims about desert that could play these roles would be pure desert claims: that treating people in a certain way is justified simply by certain facts about what they are like or have done (where the qualifier “simply” excludes claims of need, and ideas of entitlement or legitimate expectations that presuppose particular institutions). Some pure desert claims are valid, such as claims about the appropriateness of moral praise, blame, and other evaluative attitudes. But economic rewards cannot be justified in this way. Claims to special reward based on moral merit, effort, ability, and marginal productivity, insofar as they are valid, are not desert claims in the relevant sense.

Virtue Ethics and Moral Responsibility: Confucian Conceptions of Moral Praise and Blame

2013 ◽  
Vol 40 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 381-399
Author(s):  
Yong Huang
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Great Ease ◽  
Moral Praise

This essay discusses how Confucianism can deal with two related issues of virtue ethics and moral responsibility: praise and blame. We normally praise a person because the person has done something difficult, but a virtuous person does the virtuous things effortlessly, delightfully, and with great ease. Thus the question arises regarding whether such actions are indeed praiseworthy. We can blame a person for doing something wrong only if the person does it knowingly. However, according to virtue ethics, anyone who has genuine moral knowledge acts virtuously, and anyone who does not act virtuously, or acts viciously, only because the person does not have the genuine moral knowledge. Thus the question arises regarding whether such actions are blameworthy.

scholarly journals The Epistemology of Moral Praise and Moral Criticism

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Jimmy Alfonso Licon
Keyword(s):  
Signaling Theory ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
Moral Criticism ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Praise ◽  
Epistemic Insight ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Abstract Are strangers sincere in their moral praise and criticism? Here we apply signaling theory to argue ceteris paribus moral criticism is more likely sincere than praise; the former tends to be a higher-fidelity signal (in Western societies). To offer an example: emotions are often self-validating as a signal because they're hard to fake. This epistemic insight matters: moral praise and criticism influence moral reputations, and affect whether others will cooperate with us. Though much of this applies to generic praise and criticism too, moral philosophers should value sincere moral praise and moral criticism for several reasons: it (i) offers insight into how others actually view us as moral agents; (ii) offers feedback to help us improve our moral characters; and (iii) encourages some behaviors, and discourages others. And so as moral agents, we should care whether moral praise and moral criticism is sincere.

scholarly journals Divine Command and Socratic Piety in the Euthyphro

2018 ◽  
pp. 13-24
Author(s):  
Glen Koehn
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Divine Will ◽  
Moral Decisions ◽  
Moral Praise ◽  
Good For

While Socrates was in his own way a deeply religious man, the Euthyphro is often thought to provide a refutation of the divine command theory of morality: the theory that what is morally good is good because it is divinely approved. Socrates seems to suggest that what is holy or pious (ὅσιος) is pleasing to the gods because it is holy, and not holy because it pleases them. Thus the dialogue is sometimes presented as showing that what is morally good and bad must be independent of the divine will. I argue that matters are not so simple, since there are several ways in which the gods could help determine which acts are good, for instance, by disposing certain human affairs which are relevant to moral decisions. Moreover, Socrates suggests that he has obligations to the gods themselves, and these obligations would have to depend in part on what pleases them. It follows that the dilemma which Socrates poses to Euthyphro (pious because loved by the gods, or loved by the gods because pious) does not offer two mutually exclusive alternatives. There are various ways for the preferences of such gods to help determine which acts are adequate for moral praise or blame. It could therefore hardly be the case that religious doctrines, if true, are irrelevant to the content of morality. Knowledge of the gods’ preferences, if such knowledge were available, would be of importance to moral theory. Socrates himself does not deny this, nor should we.

In Praise of Blame

Hypatia ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 128-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Houston
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Feminist Ethics ◽  
Moral Praise ◽  
Moral Blame

Recent writers in feminist ethics have been concerned to find ways to reclaim and augment women's moral agency. This essay considers Sarah Hoagland's intriguing suggestion that we renounce moral praise and blame and pursue what she calls an “ethic of intelligibility.” I argue that the eschewal of moral blame would not help but rather hinder our efforts to increase our sense of moral agency. It would, I claim, further intensify our demoralization.

Urban Infrastructure and the Problem of Moral Praise

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-129
Author(s):  
Shane Epting ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Urban Infrastructure ◽  
Public Works ◽  
Significant Issue ◽  
Moral Language ◽  
Moral Praise

Most components of urban infrastructure remain hidden. Due to this condition, we do not think about them in a way that pays attention to the full scope of moral possibilities. For instance, when such topics are forced from the periphery of our thinking to the forefront of our minds, it is usually in terms of figuring out who to blame when they fail to function properly. In turn, one could argue that we only care to talk about an action’s moral status that pertains to infrastructure when it becomes a hazard. While this point deserves examination, the more significant issue is that we lack the moral language required to have conversations about moral praise regarding public works. The purpose of this paper, then, is to flesh out how to discuss morality and infrastructure regarding moral praise.

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