scholarly journals Divine Command and Socratic Piety in the Euthyphro

2018 ◽  
pp. 13-24
Author(s):  
Glen Koehn
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Divine Will ◽  
Moral Decisions ◽  
Moral Praise ◽  
Good For

While Socrates was in his own way a deeply religious man, the Euthyphro is often thought to provide a refutation of the divine command theory of morality: the theory that what is morally good is good because it is divinely approved. Socrates seems to suggest that what is holy or pious (ὅσιος) is pleasing to the gods because it is holy, and not holy because it pleases them. Thus the dialogue is sometimes presented as showing that what is morally good and bad must be independent of the divine will. I argue that matters are not so simple, since there are several ways in which the gods could help determine which acts are good, for instance, by disposing certain human affairs which are relevant to moral decisions. Moreover, Socrates suggests that he has obligations to the gods themselves, and these obligations would have to depend in part on what pleases them. It follows that the dilemma which Socrates poses to Euthyphro (pious because loved by the gods, or loved by the gods because pious) does not offer two mutually exclusive alternatives. There are various ways for the preferences of such gods to help determine which acts are adequate for moral praise or blame. It could therefore hardly be the case that religious doctrines, if true, are irrelevant to the content of morality. Knowledge of the gods’ preferences, if such knowledge were available, would be of importance to moral theory. Socrates himself does not deny this, nor should we.

scholarly journals Aquinas and Scotus on the Metaphysical Foundations of Morality

Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 107
Author(s):  
J. Clanton ◽  
Kraig Martin
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Source Theory ◽  
Divine Will ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Divine Law

This paper retraces some of the contrast between Aquinas and Scotus with respect to the metaphysical foundations of morality in order to highlight how subtle differences pertaining to the relationship between the divine will and the divine intellect can tip a thinker toward either an unalloyed natural law theory (NLT) or something that at least starts to move in the direction of divine command theory (DCT). The paper opens with a brief consideration of three distinct elements in Aquinas’s work that might tempt one to view him in a DCT light, namely: his discussion of the divine law in addition to the natural law; his position on the so-called immoralities of the patriarchs; and some of his assertions about the divine will in relation to justice. We then respond to each of those considerations. In the second and third of these cases, following Craig Boyd, we illustrate how Aquinas’s conviction that the divine will follows the ordering of the divine intellect can help inform the interpretive disputes in question. We then turn our attention to Scotus’s concern about the freedom of the divine will, before turning to his discussion of the natural law in relation to the Decalogue as a way of stressing how his two-source theory of the metaphysical foundations of morality represents a clear departure from Aquinas in the direction of DCT.

An argument for the Divine Command Theory of Right Action

Sophia ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Forrest
Keyword(s):  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Right Action

scholarly journals Beyond Divine Command Theory: Moral realism in the Hebrew Bible

2009 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaco W. Gericke
Keyword(s):  
Hebrew Bible ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Israelite Religion ◽  
False Dichotomy ◽  
Euthyphro Dilemma

Philosophical approaches to ancient Israelite religion are rare, as is metaethical reflection on the Hebrew Bible. Nevertheless, many biblical scholars and philosophers of religion tend to take it for granted that the biblical metaethical assumptions about the relation between divinity and morality involve a pre-philosophical version of Divine Command Theory by default. In this paper the author challenges the popular consensus with several arguments demonstrating the presence of moral realism in the text. It is furthermore suggested that the popular consensus came about as a result of prima facie assessments informed by anachronistic metatheistic assumptions about what the Hebrew Bible assumed to be essential in the deity–morality relation. The study concludes with the observation that in the texts where Divine Command Theory is absent from the underlying moral epistemology the Euthyphro Dilemma disappears as a false dichotomy.

scholarly journals What if God commanded something terrible? A worry for divine-command meta-ethics

2009 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
WES MORRISTON
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Divine Transcendence

AbstractIf God commanded something that was obviously evil, would we have a moral obligation to do it? I critically examine three radically different approaches divine-command theorists may take to the problem posed by this question: (1) reject the possibility of such a command by appealing to God's essential goodness; (2) avoid the implication that we should obey such a command by modifying the divine-command theory; and (3) accept the implication that we should obey such a command by appealing to divine transcendence and mystery. I show that each approach faces significant challenges, and that none is completely satisfying.

Swinburne on the Euthyphro Dilemma. Can Supervenience Save Him?

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-29
Author(s):  
Simin Rahimi
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Euthyphro Dilemma ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Necessary Truths

Modern philosophers normally either reject the „divine command theory” of ethics and argue that moral duties are independent of any commands, or make it dependent on God's commands but like Robert Adams modify their theory and identify moral duties in terms of the commands of a loving God. Adams regards this theory as metaphysically necessary. That is, if it is true, it is true in all possible worlds. But Swinburne's (1981) position is unprecedented insofar as he regards moral truths as analytically necessary. In this paper Swinburne's argument will be discussed and I will reveal some of the difficulties involved in categorising general moral principles (if there are such principles) as logical (analytical/necessary) truths.

Contemporary Moral Apologists

2019 ◽  
pp. 198-209
Author(s):  
David Baggett ◽  
Jerry L. Walls
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
William Lane Craig ◽  
Natural Signs ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Moral Arguments

A. C. Ewing worked on moral goodness; Austin Farrer focused on the value and dignity of persons; George Mavrodes underscored the odd nature of binding moral duties in a naturalistic world. Robert Adams did work in theistic ethics that produced innovative variants of the moral argument; his wife, Marilyn Adams, demonstrated how God’s incommensurable goodness can address versions of the problem of evil. Linda Zagzebski identified three ways we need moral confidence. C. Stephen Evans defended divine command theory and a natural signs approach to apologetics. John Hare did landmark work on moral arguments. William Lane Craig used the moral argument to powerful effect in books and debates. C. Stephen Layman used the overriding reason thesis and conditional thesis in his variant of the argument. Scott Smith, Mark Linville, Angus Menuge, and Angus Ritchie have offered brilliant epistemic moral arguments. Paul Copan has used history to augment the moral argument.

Reply to Almeida

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK C. MURPHY
Keyword(s):  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Property A ◽  
Property B ◽  
Supervenience Thesis ◽  
Moral Supervenience

Michael J. Almeida offers two criticisms of the argument of my ‘A trilemma for divine command theory’. The first criticism is that I mistakenly assume the validity of the following inference pattern: property A is identical to property B; property B supervenes on property C; therefore, property A supervenes on property C. The second criticism is that I have misinterpreted the moral-supervenience thesis upon which I rely in making this argument. The first of Almeida's criticisms is completely untenable. The second of his criticisms casts doubt on my argument, a doubt that I can mitigate but not entirely dispel.

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