Does the board of directors as Fat Cats exert more earnings management? Evidence from Benford’s law

2018 ◽  
Vol 68 ◽  
pp. 158-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fengyi Lin ◽  
Li-Jung Lin ◽  
Chin-Chen Yeh ◽  
Teng-Shih Wang
2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 351
Author(s):  
Jennifer Martínez Ferrero ◽  
Beatriz Cuadrado Ballesteros ◽  
Marco Antonio Figueiredo Milani Filho

<p>According to Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Lin and Wu (2014), a high degree of earnings management (EM) is associated with a poor quality of information. In this sense, it is possible to assume that the financial data of companies that manage earnings can present different patterns from those with low degree of EM. The aim of this exploratory study is to test whether a financial data set (operating expenses) of companies with high degree of EM presents bias. For this analysis, we used the model of Kothari and the modified model of Jones (“Dechow model” hereafter) to estimate the degree of EM, and we used the logarithmic distribution of data predicted by the Benford’s Law to detect abnormal patterns of digits in number sets. The sample was composed of 845 international listed non-financial companies for the year 2010. To analyze the discrepancies between the actual and expected frequencies of the significant-digit, two statistics were calculated: Z-test and Pearson’s chi-square test. The results show that, with a confidence level of 90%, the companies with a high degree of EM according to the Kothari model presented similar distribution to that one predicted by the Benford’s Law, suggesting that, in a preliminary analysis, their financial data are free from bias. On the other hand, the data set of the organizations that manage earnings according to the Dechow model presented abnormal patterns. The Benford´s Law has been implemented to successfully detect manipulated data. These results offer insights into the interactions between EM and patterns of financial data, and stimulate new comparative studies about the accuracy of models to estimate EM.</p><p>Keywords:<strong> </strong>Earnings management (EM). Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ). Benford’s Law.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (8) ◽  
pp. 26
Author(s):  
Stella Lippolis ◽  
Francesco Grimaldi

This research aims to analyze the relationship between the characteristics of the Board of Directors (BoD) and the effectiveness of the monitoring of earnings manipulation activities in family &ndash; controlled companies in Italy. In particular, specific hypotheses relating to the link between those aspects of the Board, that substantiate its independence, and earnings quality have been formulated to verify whether the mechanisms for monitoring management activity are less effective in these companies. This study applies a univariate and multivariate methods on a sample of Italian listed company over the period 2014-2016.&nbsp; Earnings management is defined by the proxy of abnormal working capital accrual (AWCA) estimed model according to DeFond and Park (2001). Proxies for corporate governance mechanism are the board size, the level of board independence, the CEO non-duality and the interaction between the last two variables. The research shows that independent directors are not, as in other contexts, a factor that contributes to earnings quality, in the same way that the separation of the offices of Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief executive Officer (CEO) does not appear to be relevant to this end. The study aims to provide a double contribution. First, the research represents one of the few studies concerning the Italian context with its peculiarities, taking into consideration the earnings management issue in companies with a high concentration of family ownership. Secondly, this study aims to further stimulate the debate on the most effective features of structure and composition of the BoD in family-controlled companies: specifically, the conclusions could lead to a reconsideration of the validity of certain characters of the boards that defines independence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-146
Author(s):  
YULIUS KURNIA SUSANTO ◽  
ARYA PRADIPTA

The objective of research was to give empirial evidence the influence of audit committee and directors on real earnings management (REM). The samples of this research consist of 336 data from 84 public manufacturing companies from 2013 until 2016 and selected by purposive sampling method. The result showed that the audit committee expertise and independence directors have significantly and postive influence on REM. The board of directors have significantly and negative influence on REM. The influence of audit committee tenure, size, meeting on REM is not significantly. The results of this reasearch shows that outsider of the firm like audit committee and independence directors can’t detect REM. The chance for management doing REM. While, board of directors as insider of the firm can detect and reduce REM.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1, Special Issue) ◽  
pp. 222-224
Author(s):  
Paolo Tenuta ◽  
Alexander Kostyuk

Corporate governance is a system designed to improve corporate performance through supervision of management performance to ensure accountability to stakeholders based on a regulatory framework. Board of directors as a field of research becomes a major point for intersection of many other issues of corporate governance, such as financial reporting, firm performance, earnings management, stock market, and reaching even well-established fields of research such as accounting and finance. Most of the papers published in this issue (volume 18, issue 1, special issue) of the Corporate Ownership and Control journal are linked to the board of directors’ issues directly or indirectly.


2021 ◽  
pp. 220-225
Author(s):  
Jova Yolanda ◽  
Dian Efriyenti

Earnings management practice is the decision to choose a particular accounting method that can achieve the goal of increasing reported profits or reducing investment losses. Misappropriation of financial statements by management can affect the amount of reported income. This study aims to determine whether ownership structure and good corporate governance have a significant influence on earnings management. The study was conducted on pharmaceutical sub-sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in a row for the 2016-2020 period. The sample technique used is purposive sampling, so as many as 7 samples of companies are used. The data testing method uses multiple linear analysis. The results of the data test show that partially institutional ownership has a negative and significant effect on earnings management, independent commissioners, the audit committee, and the board of directors has a negative but not significant effect on earnings management. Simultaneously the results state that institutional ownership, independent commissioners, audit committees, and the board of directors have an effect but not significantly on earnings management.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 159
Author(s):  
Sukiantono Tang ◽  
Shandy Shandy

This study aims to examine the effect of the characteristics of the board of directors on earnings management. Board characteristics are the most important part in the structure or governance of a company and government in limiting or preventing earnings management by a company manager. This study uses data from companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) which include annual reports from 2015 to 2019 except insurance companies, financial and banking institutions. Sampling of data was done by purposive sampling technique. This study combined the research object and one time dimension. This research was conducted using panel data regression test based on data that had been collected using SPSS and Eviews 10 software. The best model chosen for this research model was the Fixed Effect Model. The results showed that the board independent, board meeting, board of directors expertise, size of the audit committee, independent audit committee, audit committee meeting, audit committee expertise, leverage and big4 has no influence on the dependent variable earnings management. Then the size of the board of directors has a negative significant on earnings management. Meanwhile, company size and growth have a positive significant on earnings management.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 11
Author(s):  
Syarifah Rabi’ah Andawiyah ◽  
Astri Furqani

Earnings management in a practical level is the deliberate actions carried out by the company's management to affect earnings in the process of preparation of financial statements that are used to assess a company and usually management provides information about the economic benefits which were not experienced by the company for personal purposes as well as to increase the value of the company. This study aimed to examine the effect of the Return on Assets (ROA), institutional ownership, the percentage of public shares, the board of directors, audit committees and leverage partially or simultaneously on earnings management during the period 2010-2015. The population in this study is a sub company's automotive sector and the components listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange by using purposive sampling method. Data were analyzed using multiple linear regression analysis. The results of hypothesis shows that (1) partially there is influence between the Return on Assets (ROA), commissioners and leverage to earnings management, but there is no influence between institutional ownership, the percentage of public shares and the audit committee on earnings management (2) is simultaneously a influence between the return on Assets (ROA), institutional ownership, the percentage of public shares, the board of directors, audit committees and leverage to earnings management.Keywords: earnings management, Return on Assets (ROA), institutional ownership, the percentage of public shares, the board of directors, audit committee, leverag


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document