Power analysis based side-channel attack on visible light communication

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 196-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damla Yucebas ◽  
Heba Yuksel
Keyword(s):  
Visible Light ◽  
Power Analysis ◽  
Visible Light Communication ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attack

scholarly journals Charge Based Power Side-Channel Attack Methodology for an Adiabatic Cipher

Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 1438
Author(s):  
Krithika Dhananjay ◽  
Emre Salman
Keyword(s):  
Power Analysis ◽  
Block Cipher ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Secret Key ◽  
Side Channel Attack ◽  
Ultra Low Power ◽  
Target Signal ◽  
Adiabatic Circuit ◽  
A Charge ◽  
The Internet Of Things

SIMON is a block cipher developed to provide flexible security options for lightweight hardware applications such as the Internet-of-things (IoT). Safeguarding such resource-constrained hardware from side-channel attacks poses a significant challenge. Adiabatic circuit operation has recently received attention for such applications due to ultra-low power consumption. In this work, a charge-based methodology is developed to mount a correlation power analysis (CPA) based side-channel attack to an adiabatic SIMON core. The charge-based method significantly reduces the attack complexity by reducing the required number of power samples by two orders of magnitude. The CPA results demonstrate that the required measurements-to-disclosure (MTD) to retrieve the secret key of an adiabatic SIMON core is 4× higher compared to a conventional static CMOS based implementation. The effect of increase in the target signal load capacitance on the MTD is also investigated. It is observed that the MTD can be reduced by half if the load driven by the target signal is increased by 2× for an adiabatic SIMON, and by 5× for a static CMOS based SIMON. This sensitivity to target signal capacitance of the adiabatic SIMON can pose a serious concern by facilitating a more efficient CPA attack.

scholarly journals Mitigating the Side Channel Power Analysis Attacks using New Variable Mapping Substitution Technique

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 10863-10868
Keyword(s):  
Power Analysis ◽  
Linear Feedback ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Analysis Tool ◽  
Secret Key ◽  
Side Channel Attack ◽  
Channel Power ◽  
Architectural Change ◽  
Variable Mapping ◽  
Differential Properties

Side-channel attack has been a real threat against many cryptographic embedded systems. In this attack, the internal data is retrieved directly by analyzing the power magnitude according to the fact that there is a considerable difference in power when manipulating 0’s and 1’s. A commonly used algorithmic countermeasures incur large execution delay and resources overheads. In this paper, a novel technique using Variable Mapping Substitution (VMS) is proposed for mitigating side channel power analysis attack against Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). VMS-AES is a novel AES-like algorithm which uses Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) to generate the required parameters used to remap the values of substitution box (S-box) randomly to another location depending on a secret key. This remapping also keeps the same good linear and differential properties of the AES S-box. VMS-AES algorithm can be easily deployed in most embedded applications because no architectural change is needed and only software modifications are performed. In our proposal, chipwisperer side channel attack analysis tool is used to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. Also VMS-AES with different number of rounds is evaluated using three methods: NIST statistical suite tests, correlation coefficient analysis, and cryptographic parameters evaluation to study the effects of this change upon the AES security

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