scholarly journals Strategic incentives for keeping one set of books under the Arm’s Length Principle

2020 ◽  
Vol 106 ◽  
pp. 78-90
Author(s):  
Ana B. Lemus ◽  
Diego Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Arm’S Length Principle ◽  
Strategic Incentives

scholarly journals Between strategy and protest: how policy demand, political dissatisfaction and strategic incentives matter for far-right voting

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 662-676 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denis Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Election Study ◽  
Far Right ◽  
Political Dissatisfaction ◽  
Strategic Incentives ◽  
Context Dependent ◽  
European Election

AbstractWhat attracts voters to far-right parties? Emphasizing the repercussions of far-right parties' past achievements on the mobilization of voters' electoral demand, this paper develops an argument of context-dependent strategic far-right voting. Far-right parties seek to mobilize on a combination of demand for nativist policies and anti-establishment protest sentiment. Their capacity of doing so, however, critically depends on the strategic incentives they supply. My findings from a comparative analysis based on six waves of the European Election Study show that far-right parties' past attainment of legislative strength boosts the credibility of their policy appeal and broadens the scope of their protest appeal whereas their participation in government jeopardizes their capacity to mobilize on popular discontent.

scholarly journals Economising, Strategising and the Vertical Boundaries of the firm

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dermot Leahy ◽  
Catia Montagna
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Mode ◽  
Industrial Economics ◽  
Boundaries Of The Firm ◽  
Oligopolistic Market ◽  
Marginal Production ◽  
International Trading ◽  
Strategic Incentives ◽  
Oligopolistic Market Structure

AbstractWe bridge the organisational economics and industrial economics literatures on the vertical boundaries of the firm by contextualising the transaction cost approach to the make-or-buy decision within an oligopolistic market structure. Firms invest in the quality of the intermediate resulting in the endogenous determination of the price of the intermediate and marginal production cost of the final good. We highlight new strategic incentives to outsource and/or vertically integrate and show how these incentives can result in asymmetric-mode-of-operations, investment and costs. We apply our model to a number of different international trading setups.

scholarly journals TRANSAKSI DENGAN PIHAK BERELASI DAN PRAKTIK TRANSFER PRICING DI INDONESIA

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 34-52
Author(s):  
Raymondo Sitanggang ◽  
Amrie Firmansyah
Keyword(s):  
Content Analysis ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Transfer Pricing ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Multinational Companies ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Arm’S Length Principle ◽  
State Finance

This study aims to review transactions conducted by multinational companies operating in Indonesia related to transfer pricing activities. This study uses qualitative methods using two approaches, content analysis, and interviews. The content analysis aims to obtain related party disclosure information in the financial statements as stipulated in PSAK No. 7 (2015). The data used in the financial statements of manufacturing companies in the consumer goods industry sector are included in multinational companies and listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2014-2017. Meanwhile, interviews were conducted to confirm the data obtained through content analysis. The informant in the interview is one of the Polytechnic of State Finance STAN lecturer, who has academic expertise in international tax accounting and transfer pricing. This study concludes that, in general, multinational companies operating in Indonesia have disclosed related party information in their financial statements. Furthermore, the assessment of the fairness of transactions with related parties related to transfer pricing is based on the arm's length principle. The results of this study indicate the need for broader disclosure of financial accounting standards in Indonesia and the harmonization of taxation regulations in Indonesia with tax regulations in other countries related to transfer pricing practices.     Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk untuk mengulas transaksi-transaksi yang dilakukan oleh perusahaan multinasional yang beroperasi di Indonesia terkait dengan aktivitas transfer pricing. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan menggunakan dua pendekatan, yaitu content analysis dan wawancara. Content analysis bertujuan untuk mendapatkan informasi pengungkapan pihak-pihak yang berelasi dalam laporan keuangan sebagaimana diatur dalam PSAK No. 7 (2015). Data yang digunakan adalah laporan keuangan perusahaan manufaktur sektor industri barang konsumsi yang termasuk dalam kategori perusahaan multinasional dan terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia dari tahun 2014-2017. Sementara itu, wawancara dilakukan dengan tujuan untuk mengkonfirmasi data-data yang diperoleh melalui content analysis. Informan dalam wawancara adalah salah satu dosen Politeknik Keuangan Negara STAN yang memiliki keahlian akademis dalam akuntansi perpajakan internasional dan transfer pricing. Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa secara umum perusahaan multinasional yang beroperasi di Indonesia telah mengungkapkan informasi pihak-pihak berelasi dalam laporan keuangannya. Selanjutnya, penilaian kewajaran transaksi dengan pihak berelasi terkait dengan transfer pricing berdasarkan arm’s length principle. Hasil penelitian ini mengindikasikan perlunya pengungkapan yang lebih luas dalam standar akuntansi keuangan di Indonesia dan harmonisasi peraturan perpajakan di Indonesia dengan peraturan perpajakan di negara lain-lain terkait dengan praktek transfer pricing.  

Applying the Arm’s-Length Principle

2017 ◽  
pp. 129-204
Author(s):  
Joel Cooper ◽  
Randall Fox ◽  
Jan Loeprick ◽  
Komal Mohindra
Keyword(s):  
Arm’S Length Principle

scholarly journals Roll-Call Vote Selection: Implications for the Study of Legislative Politics

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 691-706
Author(s):  
CAITLIN AINSLEY ◽  
CLIFFORD J. CARRUBBA ◽  
BRIAN F. CRISP ◽  
BETUL DEMIRKAYA ◽  
MATTHEW J. GABEL ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Legislative Behavior ◽  
Legislative Politics ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Roll Call Vote ◽  
Voting Procedures ◽  
Strategic Incentives ◽  
Theoretical Results ◽  
Representative Samples ◽  
Quantities Of Interest

Roll-call votes provide scholars with the opportunity to measure many quantities of interest. However, the usefulness of the roll-call sample depends on the population it is intended to represent. After laying out why understanding the sample properties of the roll-call record is important, we catalogue voting procedures for 145 legislative chambers, finding that roll calls are typically discretionary. We then consider two arguments for discounting the potential problem: (a) roll calls are ubiquitous, especially where the threshold for invoking them is low or (b) the strategic incentives behind requests are sufficiently benign so as to generate representative samples. We address the first defense with novel empirical evidence regarding roll-call prevalence and the second with an original formal model of the position-taking argument for roll-call vote requests. Both our empirical and theoretical results confirm that inattention to vote method selection should broadly be considered an issue for the study of legislative behavior.

Challenges of Monitoring Tax Compliance by Multinational Firms: Evidence from Chile

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 500-505
Author(s):  
Sebastián Bustos ◽  
Dina Pomeranz ◽  
José Vila-Belda ◽  
Gabriel Zucman
Keyword(s):  
Multinational Firms ◽  
Transfer Pricing ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Tax Compliance ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Profit Shifting ◽  
Effective Tax Rates ◽  
Arm’S Length Principle ◽  
Debt Shifting

This paper reviews common challenges of taxing multinational firms, using Chile as a case study. We briefly describe key international tax avoidance methods: profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions through transfer pricing and debt shifting. We discuss the prevalent policy to tax multinationals--the arm's length principle--and alternative proposals using apportionment formulas. Novel data from Chile show that multinationals make up a large share of GDP but report lower profit and effective tax rates than local firms. In 2011, Chile implemented a reform following OECD guidelines to enforce the arm's length principle. We discuss potential effects on tax collection and welfare.

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