Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation

2017 ◽  
Vol 89 ◽  
pp. 70-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Issofa Moyouwou ◽  
Hugue Tchantcho
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules ◽  
Positional Voting

Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and positional voting rules

1978 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 272-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
William V. Gehrlein ◽  
Peter C. Fishburn
Keyword(s):  
Simple Majority ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Positional Voting

scholarly journals Positional Voting Rules Generated by Aggregation Functions and the Role of Duplication

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (9) ◽  
pp. 926-946 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Luis García-Lapresta ◽  
Miguel Martínez-Panero
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules ◽  
Aggregation Functions ◽  
Positional Voting

scholarly journals An individual manipulability of positional voting rules

SERIEs ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 431-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuad Aleskerov ◽  
Daniel Karabekyan ◽  
M. Remzi Sanver ◽  
Vyacheslav Yakuba
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules ◽  
Positional Voting

scholarly journals Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules

2007 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 487-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Pritchard ◽  
Mark C. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Exact Results ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Positional Voting

European voting rules flawed

Nature ◽  
2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Ball
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules

A Political Economy Model of a Research University

2009 ◽  
pp. 132-143
Author(s):  
K. Sonin ◽  
I. Khovanskaya
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Structure ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Research University ◽  
Hiring Decisions ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Economy Model ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
Optimal Incentives

Hiring decisions are typically made by committees members of which have different capacity to estimate the quality of candidates. Organizational structure and voting rules in the committees determine the incentives and strategies of applicants; thus, construction of a modern university requires a political structure that provides committee members and applicants with optimal incentives. The existing political-economic model of informative voting typically lacks any degree of variance in the organizational structure, while political-economic models of organization typically assume a parsimonious information structure. In this paper, we propose a simple framework to analyze trade-offs in optimal subdivision of universities into departments and subdepartments, and allocation of political power.

Optimal Two Stage Committee Voting Rules

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Ayres ◽  
Colin Rowat ◽  
Nasser Zakariya
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Committee Voting
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