scholarly journals Positional Voting Rules Generated by Aggregation Functions and the Role of Duplication

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (9) ◽  
pp. 926-946 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Luis García-Lapresta ◽  
Miguel Martínez-Panero
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules ◽  
Aggregation Functions ◽  
Positional Voting

scholarly journals Incremental Elicitation of Rank-Dependent Aggregation Functions based on Bayesian Linear Regression

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadjet Bourdache ◽  
Patrice Perny ◽  
Olivier Spanjaard
Keyword(s):  
Weighted Averages ◽  
Numerical Tests ◽  
Choice Procedure ◽  
Aggregation Functions ◽  
Preference Queries ◽  
Bayesian Linear Regression ◽  
Choquet Integrals ◽  
Weighting Coefficients ◽  
Multicriteria Decision Support

We introduce a new model-based incremental choice procedure for multicriteria decision support, that interleaves the analysis of the set of alternatives and the elicitation of weighting coefficients that specify the role of criteria in rank-dependent models such as ordered weighted averages (OWA) and Choquet integrals.  Starting from a prior distribution on the set of weighting parameters, we propose an adaptive elicitation approach based on the minimization of the expected regret to iteratively generate preference queries. The answers of the Decision Maker are used to revise the current distribution until a solution can be recommended with sufficient confidence. We present numerical tests showing the interest of the proposed approach.

Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and positional voting rules

1978 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 272-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
William V. Gehrlein ◽  
Peter C. Fishburn
Keyword(s):  
Simple Majority ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Positional Voting

scholarly journals Information aggregation and communication in committees

2008 ◽  
Vol 364 (1518) ◽  
pp. 763-769 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Austen-Smith ◽  
Timothy J Feddersen
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
The Past ◽  
Strategic Incentives ◽  
Share Information

In this paper, we attempt to explain the underlying strategic incentives confronting individuals when they must make a collective decision over a set of alternatives and each has information that is decision-relevant for others. A significant literature has emerged in formal political theory over the past several years that focuses on such problems, paying particular attention, first, to the extent to which voting can be expected to aggregate committee members' information and, second, to the role of communication among committee members prior to voting. Inter alia , this literature reveals a surprisingly subtle interaction between the voting rules used to make decisions and the incentives for committee members to share information prior to voting.

scholarly journals An individual manipulability of positional voting rules

SERIEs ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 431-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuad Aleskerov ◽  
Daniel Karabekyan ◽  
M. Remzi Sanver ◽  
Vyacheslav Yakuba
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules ◽  
Positional Voting

scholarly journals Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules

2007 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 487-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Pritchard ◽  
Mark C. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Exact Results ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Positional Voting

Role of dactinomycin in the improved survival of children with Wilms' tumor

JAMA ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 195 (12) ◽  
pp. 1005-1009 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. J. Fernbach
Keyword(s):  
Wilms Tumor
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