Optimal long-run inflation and the New Keynesian model

2012 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 1077-1094 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Pontiggia
2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (8) ◽  
pp. 2271-2327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Gabaix

This paper analyzes how bounded rationality affects monetary and fiscal policy via an empirically relevant enrichment of the New Keynesian model. It models agents’ partial myopia toward distant atypical events using a new microfounded “cognitive discounting” parameter. Compared to the rational model, (i) there is no forward guidance puzzle; (ii) the Taylor principle changes: with passive monetary policy but enough myopia equilibria are determinate and economies stable; (iii) the zero lower bound is much less costly; (iv) price-level targeting is not optimal; (v) fiscal stimulus is effective; (vi) the model is “ neo-Fisherian” in the long run, Keynesian in the short run. (JEL E12, E31, E43, E52, E62, E70)


Author(s):  
Riccardo M Masolo ◽  
Francesca Monti

ABSTRACT Allowing for ambiguity about the behavior of the policymaker in a simple New-Keynesian model gives rise to wedges between long-run inflation expectations, trend inflation, and the inflation target. The degree of ambiguity we measure in Blue Chip survey data helps explain the dynamics of long-run inflation expectations and the inflation trend measured in the US data. Ambiguity also has implications for monetary policy. We show that it is optimal for policymakers to lean against the households’ pessimistic expectations, but also document the limits to the extent the adverse effects of ambiguity can be undone.


2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 1271-1312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter N. Ireland

This paper uses a New Keynesian model with banks and deposits to study the macroeconomic effects of policies that pay interest on reserves. Although their effects on output and inflation are small, these policies require major adjustments in the way that the monetary authority manages the supply of reserves, as liquidity effects vanish in the short run. In the long run, however, the additional freedom the monetary authority acquires by paying interest on reserves is best described as affecting the real quantity of reserves: policy actions that change prices must still change the nominal quantity of reserves proportionally.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 142-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael U. Krause ◽  
Stéphane Moyen

What are the effects of a higher central bank inflation target on the burden of real public debt? Several recent proposals have suggested that even a moderate increase in the inflation target can have a pronounced effect on real public debt. We consider this question in a New Keynesian model with a maturity structure of public debt and an imperfectly observed inflation target. We find that moderate changes in the inflation target only have significant effects on real public debt if they are essentially permanent. Moreover, the additional benefits of not communicating a change in the inflation target are minor. (JEL E12, E31, E52, H63)


2014 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 338-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Casares ◽  
Antonio Moreno ◽  
Jesús Vázquez

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document