Spillovers in the development of new pollution abatement technology: A new look at the Porter-hypothesis

2006 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 411-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Greaker
Keyword(s):  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Porter Hypothesis ◽  
Abatement Technology ◽  
New Look

scholarly journals Intra-industry trade with pollution concerned cooperation

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-15
Author(s):  
M. Özgür Kayalica ◽  
Gülgün Kayakutlu
Keyword(s):  
Production Process ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Critical Level ◽  
Home Country ◽  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Environmental Externalities ◽  
Individual Country ◽  
Industry Trade ◽  
Trade Model ◽  
Abatement Technology

The authors develop a two-country, two-firm intra-industry trade model. Each firm is operating at its home country and producing homogeneous goods to be consumed in both countries. Governments apply quantity restriction on pollution. Every individual country is affected from the pollution generated during the production process of its own firm. The model shows that efficiency in pollution abatement technology plays a crucial role on welfare maximizing effort of governments. A critical level of pollution abatement technology determines the preponderance of environmental misgivings in welfare maximizing behavior. The more efficient the firms in pollution abatement technology, the less stricter the governments will be in their policies to reduce negative environmental externalities

scholarly journals Promotion of Green Technology under Different Environmental Policies

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
John C. Strandholm
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Environmental Policies ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Tradeable Permits ◽  
Policy Regime ◽  
Abatement Technology ◽  
Welfare Implications ◽  
Emission Fees

In this paper, I develop a two-stage game of pollution abatement technology adoption in a Cournot oligopoly to investigate a firm’s decision to adopt pollution abatement technology. In particular, I study the adoption incentives and welfare implications of popular environmental policies, namely emission fees and quotas. Tradeable permits result in identical outcomes to emission fees. Within each policy regime, the conditions for Nash equilibria are identified where both firms invest in the green technology, neither firm invests in the technology, or only one firm invests. The following extensions are also analyzed: asymmetric adoption costs, increase in the marginal cost of production from adoption, and a type-dependent fee where adoption reduces the emission fee. Social welfare under an emission fee is identical to that under a quota. However, when policy is (not) stringent, firms are more willing to adopt expensive technology under a fee (quota) than under a quota (fee, respectively).

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