The build-up of cooperative behavior among non-cooperative selfish agents

2008 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 239-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hassan Benchekroun ◽  
Ngo Van Long
2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. A. Gutnisky ◽  
B. S. Zanutto

The prisoner's dilemma (PD) is the leading metaphor for the evolution of cooperative behavior in populations of selfish agents. Although cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) has been studied for over twenty years, most of this research has been focused on strategies that involve nonlearned behavior. Another approach is to suppose that players' selection of the preferred reply might be enforced in the same way as feeding animals track the best way to feed in changing nonstationary environments. Learning mechanisms such as operant conditioning enable animals to acquire relevant characteristics of their environment in order to get reinforcements and to avoid punishments. In this study, the role of operant conditioning in the learning of cooperation was evaluated in the PD. We found that operant mechanisms allow the learning of IPD play against other strategies. When random moves are allowed in the game, the operant learning model showed low sensitivity. On the basis of this evidence, it is suggested that operant learning might be involved in reciprocal altruism.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 208-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grant J. Devilly ◽  
Kathleen Brown ◽  
Ivan Pickert ◽  
Riley O'Donohue

2011 ◽  
pp. 115-121
Author(s):  
L. Polishchuk

The paper discusses advantages and shortcomings of the Bowles book, with the emphasis on the community ownership, altruism, and cooperative behavior. The author claims that the book while being surely valuable as an academic contribution, can not, however, substitute standard textbooks in microeconomics.


2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dewi Rosiana ◽  
Achmad Djunaidi ◽  
Indun Lestari Setyono ◽  
Wilis Srisayekti

This study aims to describe the effect of sanctions (individual sanctions, collective sanctions, and absence of sanctions) on cooperative behavior of individuals with medium trust in the context of corruption. Both collective sanctions and individual sanctions, are systemic, which means sanctioning behavior is exercised not by each individual but by the system. Cooperative behavior in this context means choosing to obey rules, to reject acts of corruption and to prioritize public interests rather than the personal interests. Conversely, corruption is an uncooperative behavior to the rules, and ignores the public interest and prioritizes personal interests. Research subjects were 62 students. The Chi-Square Analysis was used to see the association between the variables and the logistic regression model was applied to describe the structure of this association. Individual sanction is recommended as punishment to medium trust individuals to promote cooperative behavior in the context of corruption. The results showed that individuals with medium trust had more cooperative behavior.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
M Testori ◽  
M Kempf ◽  
RB Hoyle ◽  
Hedwig Eisenbarth

© 2019 Hogrefe Publishing. Personality traits have been long recognized to have a strong impact on human decision-making. In this study, a sample of 314 participants took part in an online game to investigate the impact of psychopathic traits on cooperative behavior in an iterated Prisoner's dilemma game. We found that disinhibition decreased the maintenance of cooperation in successive plays, but had no effect on moving toward cooperation after a previous defection or on the overall level of cooperation over rounds. Furthermore, our results underline the crucial importance of a good model selection procedure, showing how a poor choice of statistical model can provide misleading results.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Margoni ◽  
Elena Nava ◽  
Luca Surian

Most cooperative interactions involve the expectation of mutual reciprocation and are based on interpersonal trust. Thus, understanding when and how humans acquire interpersonal trust can help unveiling the origins and development of children’s cooperative behavior. Here, we investigated whether prior socio-moral information about trading partners modulates the choice of preschool- (4-5 years) and school-age children (7-8 years) to share their own goods in a child-friendly version of the Trust Game. In this game, the trustee partner can repay the child’s initial investment or keep everything and betray the trustor. In two studies, we addressed whether trust is modulated by trustees exhibiting prosocial versus antisocial behaviors (Study 1, ‘helpers and hinderers’), or respect-based versus fear-based power (Study 2, ‘leaders and bullies’). Preschoolers trusted the leader more than the bully, and trusted the hinderer less than a neutral agent, but did not yet trust the helper more than the hinderer. The tendency to trust helpers more than hinderers increased with age as a result of the increased propensity to trust the prosocial agent. In Study 3, a group of preschoolers played the Dictator Game, a measure of pure generosity, with the same agents used for Study 1. Sharing rates were reliably lower than in Study 1, suggesting that the rates of investment in the trust game cannot be due solely to altruistic or indirect reciprocity motives. Overall, these findings indicate that, by age five, children understand complex cooperative exchanges and start relying on socio-moral information when deciding whom to trust.


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