Winner's curse and parallel sales channels—Online auctions linked within e-tail websites

2006 ◽  
Vol 43 (8) ◽  
pp. 919-927 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas A. Amyx ◽  
Michael S. Luehlfing
Keyword(s):  
Online Auctions ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Sales Channels

scholarly journals A Novel Auction Blockchain System with Price Recommendation and Trusted Execution Environment

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (24) ◽  
pp. 3214
Author(s):  
Dong-Her Shih ◽  
Ting-Wei Wu ◽  
Ming-Hung Shih ◽  
Wei-Cheng Tsai ◽  
David C. Yen
Keyword(s):  
Online Auctions ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Internet Technology ◽  
Online Auction ◽  
Easy Access ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Smart Contract ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
The World

Online auctions are now widely used, with all the convenience and efficiency brought by internet technology. Despite the advantages over traditional auction methods, some challenges still remain in online auctions. According to the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by the World Bank, about 60% of companies have admitted to bribery and manipulation of the auction results. In addition, buyers are prone to the winner’s curse in an online auction environment. Since the increase in information availability can reduce uncertainty, easy access to relevant auction information is essential for buyers to avoid the winner’s curse. In this study, we propose an Online Auction Price Suggestion System (OAPSS) to protect the data from being interfered with by third-party programs based on Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) technology and the characteristics of the blockchain. Our proposed system provides a smart contract by using α-Sutte indicator in the final transaction price prediction as a bidding price recommendation, which helps buyers to reduce the information uncertainty on the value of the product. The amount spent on the smart contract in this study, excluding deployed contracts, plus the rest of the fees is less than US$1. Experimental results of the simulation show that there is a significant difference (p < 0.05) between the recommended price group and the actual price group in the highest bid. Therefore, we may conclude that our proposed bidder’s price recommendation function in the smart contract may mitigate the loss of buyers caused by the winner’s curse.

Bidding Patterns, Experience, and Avoiding the Winner's Curse in Online Auctions

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 241-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert F. Easley ◽  
Charles A. Wood ◽  
Sharad Barkataki
Keyword(s):  
Online Auctions ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse

The Value of Victory - Neural Mechanisms of the Winner's Curse

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wouter van den Bos ◽  
Arjun Talwar ◽  
Samuel McClure
Keyword(s):  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse

The Real Winner's Curse

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leopoldo Fergusson ◽  
Pablo Querubin ◽  
Nelson A. Ruiz ◽  
Juan F. Vargas
Keyword(s):  
Winner's Curse ◽  
The Real ◽  
Winner’S Curse

scholarly journals An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects

2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (5) ◽  
pp. 1452-1475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence M Ausubel
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Preservation ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Multiple Objects ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Treasury Bills ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Interdependent Values ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Current Price

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are “clinched,” and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.

Anomalies: The Winner's Curse

1988 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 191-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H Thaler
Keyword(s):  
Field Studies ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Common Phenomenon ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Empirical Question ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Winning Bidder ◽  
Common Value Auction ◽  
Very High

Next time that you find yourself a little short of cash for lunch, try the following experiment in your class. Take a jar and fill it with coins, noting the total value of the coins. Now auction off the jar to your class (offering to pay the winning bidder in bills to control for penny aversion). Chances are very high that the following results will be obtained: (1) the average bid will be significantly less than the value of the coins (bidders are risk averse); (2) the winning bid will exceed the value of the jar. Therefore, you will have money for lunch, and your students will have learned first-hand about the “winner's curse.” The winner's curse cannot occur if all the bidders are rational, so evidence of a winner's curse in market settings would constitute an anomaly. However, acting rationally in a common value auction can be difficult. Solving for the optimal bid is not trivial. Thus, it is an empirical question whether bidders in various contexts get it right or are cursed. I will present some evidence, both from experimental and field studies, suggesting that the winner's curse may be a common phenomenon.

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