Do auctions induce a winner's curse? New evidence from real estate auctions

2012 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Real Estate ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
New Evidence

The Value of Victory - Neural Mechanisms of the Winner's Curse

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wouter van den Bos ◽  
Arjun Talwar ◽  
Samuel McClure
Keyword(s):  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse

The Real Winner's Curse

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leopoldo Fergusson ◽  
Pablo Querubin ◽  
Nelson A. Ruiz ◽  
Juan F. Vargas
Keyword(s):  
Winner's Curse ◽  
The Real ◽  
Winner’S Curse

scholarly journals An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects

2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (5) ◽  
pp. 1452-1475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence M Ausubel
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Preservation ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Multiple Objects ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Treasury Bills ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Interdependent Values ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Current Price

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are “clinched,” and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.

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