Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?

2017 ◽  
Vol 103 ◽  
pp. 19-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Alós-Ferrer ◽  
Klaus Ritzberger
Keyword(s):  
Backwards Induction ◽  
Subgame Perfection

Virtual Implementation in Backwards Induction

1996 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Glazer ◽  
Motty Perry
Keyword(s):  
Backwards Induction

Game Theory and Security Studies

2019 ◽  
pp. 7-24
Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Short Review ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Security Studies ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Subgame Perfection ◽  
Extensive Form Game ◽  
The Many ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter describes the basic assumptions of game theory and illustrates its major concepts, using examples drawn from the security studies literature. An arms race game is used as an example of a strategic form game, illustrating the meaning of an equilibrium outcome and the definition of a dominant strategy. Backward induction and the definition of subgame perfection are explained in the context of an extensive form game that features threats. Nash equilibrium and the Bayesian equilibrium are discussed, and a short review of the many applications of game theory in international politics is provided. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the usefulness of game theory in generating insights about deterrence.

Subgame Perfection and the Rule of k Names

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 805-825
Author(s):  
Ignacio García-Jurado ◽  
Luciano Méndez-Naya
Keyword(s):  
Subgame Perfection

Backwards induction in the centipede game

Analysis ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 237-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Broome ◽  
W. Rabinowicz
Keyword(s):  
Backwards Induction

Exact results for a secretary problem

1996 ◽  
Vol 33 (03) ◽  
pp. 630-639 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. P. Quine ◽  
J. S. Law
Keyword(s):  
Markov Chain ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Secretary Problem ◽  
Exact Results ◽  
Asymptotic Results ◽  
Backwards Induction ◽  
Imbedded Markov Chain ◽  
Probability Of Success

We consider the following secretary problem: items ranked from 1 to n are randomly selected without replacement, one at a time, and to ‘win' is to stop at an item whose overall rank is less than or equal to s, given only the relative ranks of the items drawn so far. Our method of analysis is based on the existence of an imbedded Markov chain and uses the technique of backwards induction. In principal the approach can be used to give exact results for any value of s; we do the working for s = 3. We give exact results for the optimal strategy, the probability of success and the distribution of T, and the total number of draws when the optimal strategy is implemented. We also give some asymptotic results for these quantities as n → ∞.

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