Consistent planning, backwards induction, and rule-governed behavior

1996 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-48
Author(s):  
Christian Koboldt
Keyword(s):  
Backwards Induction ◽  
Rule Governed Behavior

Virtual Implementation in Backwards Induction

1996 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Glazer ◽  
Motty Perry
Keyword(s):  
Backwards Induction

The Dark-Side of Rule Governed Behavior

2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-613 ◽  
Author(s):  
David McAuliffe ◽  
Sean Hughes ◽  
Dermot Barnes-Holmes
Keyword(s):  
Dark Side ◽  
Rule Governed Behavior

The Evolution of Language and Rule-Governed Behavior

2000 ◽  
pp. 49-69
Author(s):  
H. A. Chris Ninness ◽  
Glen McCuller ◽  
Liza Ozenne
Keyword(s):  
Evolution Of Language ◽  
Rule Governed Behavior

Normativity and Concepts

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannah Ginsborg
Keyword(s):  
Concept Acquisition ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Rule Governed Behavior

A number of philosophers, including Kant, Kripke, Boghossian, Gibbard and Brandom, can be read as endorsing the view that concepts are normative. I distinguish two versions of that view: a strong, non-naturalistic version which identifies concepts with norms or rules (Kant, Kripke), and a weaker version, compatible with naturalism, on which the normativity of concepts amounts only to their application’s being governed by norms or rules (Boghossian, Gibbard, Brandom). I consider a problem for the strong version: grasp of a rule seems to require grasp of the concepts which constitute the content of that rule, so how can we explain concept acquisition without falling into regress? I offer a Kantian response, on which grasp of a rule does not require antecedent grasp of concepts, but still involves the recognition of normativity in one’s rule-governed behavior. I distinguish the normativity of concepts, so understood, from the normativity associated with truth or warrant.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document