Incentive evolutionary game model for opportunistic social networks

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 ◽  
pp. 14-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Ke Wang ◽  
Chien-Ming Chen ◽  
Siu Ming Yiu ◽  
Mohammad Mehedi Hassan ◽  
Majed Alrubaian ◽  
...  
2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (11) ◽  
pp. 1950094 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianye Yu ◽  
Junjie Lv ◽  
Yuanzhuo Wang ◽  
Jingyuan Li

Information dissemination groups, especially those disseminating the same kind of information such as advertising, product promotion, etc., compete with each other when their information spread on social networks. Most of the existing methods analyze the dissemination mechanism mainly upon the information itself without considering human characteristics, e.g. relation networks, cooperation/defection, etc. In this paper, we introduce a framework of social evolutionary game (SEG) to investigate the influence of human behaviors in competitive information dissemination. Coordination game is applied to represent human behaviors in the competition of asynchronous information diffusion. We perform a series of simulations through a specific game model to analyze the mechanism and factors of information diffusion, and show that when the benefits of competitive information is around 1.2 times of the original one, it can compensate the loss of reputation caused by the change of strategy. Furthermore, through experiments on a dataset of two films on Sina Weibo, we described the mechanism of competition evolution over real data of social network, and validated the effectiveness of our model.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.


Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Jia ◽  
Minghui Jiang ◽  
Lei Shi

From the perspective of the interactive cooperation among subjects, this paper portrays the process of cooperative innovation in industrial cluster, in order to capture the correlated equilibrium relationship among them. Through the utilization of two key tools, evolutionary stable strategy and replicator dynamics equations, this paper considers the cost and gains of cooperative innovation and the amount of government support as well as other factors to build and analyze a classic evolutionary game model. On this basis, the subject’s own adaptability is introduced, which is regarded as the system noise in the stochastic evolutionary game model so as to analyze the impact of adaptability on the game strategy selection. The results show that, in the first place, without considering subjects’ adaptability, their cooperation in industrial clusters depends on the cost and gains of innovative cooperation, the amount of government support, and some conditions that can promote cooperation, namely, game steady state. In the second place after the introduction of subjects’ adaptability, it will affect both game theory selection process and time, which means that the process becomes more complex, presents the nonlinear characteristics, and helps them to make faster decisions in their favor, but the final steady state remains unchanged.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.


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