scholarly journals Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods

2013 ◽  
Vol 118 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick W. Schmitz
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Incomplete Contracts

Endogenous Power and Crises of the Liberal Order

2019 ◽  
Vol 139 (2-4) ◽  
pp. 385-406
Author(s):  
Richard Sturn
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Network Externalities ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Digital Economy ◽  
Economic Power ◽  
Political Force ◽  
Robust Algorithm ◽  
First Order

The liberal order is conceptualized as an artificial public good of higher order associated with nondiscriminatory provision of first-order public goods such as security and stability of possession. Problems of the liberal order and of liberalism as a political force are explained as a combined result of political challenges endogenously emerging in the economic sphere (including modern phenomena such as incomplete contracts, network externalities, and asymmetries specifically relevant in the digital economy), intertwined with problematic political reactions. There is no robust algorithm for coping with ensuing vicious circles of economic power and shadow politics, due to the intricacies of institutional adaptations required for maintaining the basic architecture of the liberal order under changing circumstances. Conclusions are offered with regard to current challenges of protectionist populism.

Mood and cooperation in a public goods dilemma

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig Parks ◽  
Blythe Duell ◽  
Larry Sanna
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods

public goods

2008 ◽  
pp. 739-747 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnar Sandmo
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods

On the Essence and Tipology of International Public Goods

2005 ◽  
pp. 131-141
Author(s):  
V. Mortikov
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Social Construction ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Global Public Goods ◽  
Club Goods ◽  
Basic Properties ◽  
International Public Goods ◽  
Regional Public Goods ◽  
Joint Products

The basic properties of international public goods are analyzed in the paper. Special attention is paid to the typology of international public goods: pure and impure, excludable and nonexcludable, club goods, regional public goods, joint products. The author argues that social construction of international public good depends on many factors, for example, government economic policy. Aggregation technologies in the supply of global public goods are examined.

The incumbent, challenger, and population during revolution and civil war

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kjell Hausken ◽  
Mthuli Ncube
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Arab Spring ◽  
The Other ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Geographic Regions

We consider revolutions and civil war involving an incumbent, a challenger, and the population. Revolutions are classified into eight outcomes. In four outcomes incumbent repression occurs (viewed as providing sub-threshold benefits such as public goods to the population). Accommodation occurs in the other four outcomes (benefits provision above a threshold). The incumbent and challenger fight each other. The incumbent may win and retain power or else lose, thereby causing standoff or coalition. In a standoff, which is costly, no one backs down and uncertainty exists about who is in power. In a coalition, which is less costly, the incumbent and challenger cooperate, compromise, and negotiate their differences. If the population successfully revolts against the incumbent, the challenger replaces the incumbent. Eighty-seven revolutions during 1961–2011, including the recent Arab spring revolutions, are classified into the eight outcomes. When repressive, the incumbent loses 46 revolutions, remains in power through 21 revolutions, and builds a coalition after 12 revolutions. When accommodative, the incumbent loses seven revolutions and builds a coalition after one revolution. The 87 revolutions are classified across geographic regions and by time-period.

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