A response to Dow’s and Musholt’s commentaries on the concept possession hypothesis of self-consciousness

2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 725-726
Author(s):  
Stephane Savanah
Keyword(s):  
Concept Possession

scholarly journals Two Accounts of Concept Possession

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 87
Author(s):  
Mark J. Cain
Keyword(s):  
Concept Possession

scholarly journals How to Tell If Animals Can Understand Death

Erkenntnis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susana Monsó
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Concept Possession ◽  
Nonhuman Species

AbstractIt is generally assumed that humans are the only animals who can possess a concept of death. However, the ubiquity of death in nature and the evolutionary advantages that would come with an understanding of death provide two prima facie reasons for doubting this assumption. In this paper, my intention is not to defend that animals of this or that nonhuman species possess a concept of death, but rather to examine how we could go about empirically determining whether animals can have a concept of death. In order to answer this question, I begin by sketching an account of concept possession that favours intensional classification rather than mere extensional discrimination. Further, I argue that the concept of death should be construed as neither binary nor universal. I then present a proposal for a set of minimal conditions that must be met to have a concept of death. I argue that having a minimal understanding of death entails first expecting a dead individual to be alive, and then grasping its non-functionality and irreversibility. Lastly, I lay out the sort of observational and experimental evidence that we should look for to determine whether animals have the capacity for a minimal comprehension of death.

Know-how and concept possession

2007 ◽  
Vol 136 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Bengson ◽  
Marc A. Moffett
Keyword(s):  
Know How ◽  
Concept Possession

scholarly journals Fully Understanding Concept Possession

2018 ◽  
Vol 50 (148) ◽  
pp. 3-27
Author(s):  
Víctor M. Verdejo
Keyword(s):  
Negative Answer ◽  
Full Understanding ◽  
Simple Argument ◽  
Central Lines ◽  
Concept Possession

Can subjects genuinely possess concepts they do not understand fully? A simple argument can show that, on the assumption that possession conditions are taken to fully individuate concepts, this question must be answered in the negative.In this paper, I examine this negative answer as possibly articulated within Christopher Peacocke’s seminal theory. I then discuss four central lines of attack to the view that possession of concepts requires full understanding. I conclude that theorists should acknowledge the existence of indefinitely many cases of genuine concept possession for partially understood concepts and therefore face the determination challenge, namely, the challenge of fully determining concept individuation from concept possession conditions of partially understood concepts.

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