SINR-based multi-channel power schedule under DoS attacks: A Stackelberg game approach with incomplete information

Automatica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 100 ◽  
pp. 274-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Liu
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Dos Attacks ◽  
Channel Power

Game-Based Resource Allocation Mechanism in B5G HetNets with Incomplete Information

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 1557
Author(s):  
Weijia Feng ◽  
Xiaohui Li
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Superior Performance ◽  
Channel Gain ◽  
Mobile Users ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Allocation Process ◽  
Realistic Situation

Ultra-dense and highly heterogeneous network (HetNet) deployments make the allocation of limited wireless resources among ubiquitous Internet of Things (IoT) devices an unprecedented challenge in 5G and beyond (B5G) networks. The interactions among mobile users and HetNets remain to be analyzed, where mobile users choose optimal networks to access and the HetNets adopt proper methods for allocating their own network resource. Existing works always need complete information among mobile users and HetNets. However, it is not practical in a realistic situation where important individual information is protected and will not be public to others. This paper proposes a distributed pricing and resource allocation scheme based on a Stackelberg game with incomplete information. The proposed model proves to be more practical by solving the problem that important information of either mobile users or HetNets is difficult to acquire during the resource allocation process. Considering the unknowability of channel gain information, the follower game among users is modeled as an incomplete information game, and channel gain is regarded as the type of each player. Given the pricing strategies of networks, users will adjust their bandwidth requesting strategies to maximize their expected utility. While based on the sub-equilibrium obtained in the follower game, networks will correspondingly update their pricing strategies to be optimal. The existence and uniqueness of Bayesian Nash equilibrium is proved. A probabilistic prediction method realizes the feasibility of the incomplete information game, and a reverse deduction method is utilized to obtain the game equilibrium. Simulation results show the superior performance of the proposed method.

Bayesian Stackelberg Game for Antijamming Transmission With Incomplete Information

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (10) ◽  
pp. 1991-1994 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luliang Jia ◽  
Fuqiang Yao ◽  
Youming Sun ◽  
Yingtao Niu ◽  
Yonggang Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Stackelberg Game

Averaging of temporal memories under conditions of incomplete information

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Leman ◽  
Matthew S. Matell ◽  
Michael Brown
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information

Competitiveversuscooperative performances of a Stackelberg game between two suppliers

2016 ◽  
Vol 50 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 767-780 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ibtissem Ernez-Gahbiche ◽  
Khaled Hadjyoussef ◽  
Abdelwaheb Dogui ◽  
Zied Jemai
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document