Incentive equilibrium strategies in dynamic games played over event trees

Automatica ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
pp. 50-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elnaz Kanani Kuchesfehani ◽  
Georges Zaccour
2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (02) ◽  
pp. 1640002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Parilina ◽  
Georges Zaccour

In this paper, we show that cooperative outcomes in a dynamic game played over an event tree can be supported strategically, that is, to be part of a subgame perfect [Formula: see text]-equilibrium. A numerical example illustrates our results.


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