Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: general cost functions

1998 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
James A. Dearden
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Cost Functions ◽  
Excludable Public Goods ◽  
Serial Cost Sharing ◽  
General Cost Functions

Dynamic Scheduling of Multiclass Many-Server Queues with Abandonment: The Generalized cμ/h Rule

2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 1218-1230
Author(s):  
Zhenghua Long ◽  
Nahum Shimkin ◽  
Hailun Zhang ◽  
Jiheng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Queue Length ◽  
Dynamic Scheduling ◽  
Cost Functions ◽  
Hazard Rates ◽  
Service Capacity ◽  
Allocation Policy ◽  
Many Server Queues ◽  
Priority Order ◽  
General Cost Functions ◽  
Queues With Abandonment

In “Dynamic Scheduling of Multiclass Many-Server Queues with Abandonment: The Generalized cμ/h Rule,” Long, Shimkin, Zhang, and Zhang propose three scheduling policies to cope with any general cost functions and general patience-time distributions. Their first contribution is to introduce the target-allocation policy, which assigns higher priority to customer classes with larger deviation from the desired allocation of the service capacity and prove its optimality for any general queue-length cost functions and patience-time distributions. The Gcμ/h rule, which extends the well-known Gcμ rule by taking abandonment into account, is shown to be optimal for the case of convex queue-length costs and nonincreasing hazard rates of patience. For the case of concave queue-length costs but nondecreasing hazard rates of patience, it is optimal to apply a fixed-priority policy, and a knapsack-like problem is developed to determine the optimal priority order efficiently.

The stand-alone test and decreasing serial cost sharing

2000 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 355-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Leth Hougaard ◽  
Lars Thorlund-Petersen
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Serial Cost Sharing

scholarly journals The Role of Prices for Excludable Public Goods

2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
S�ren Blomquist ◽  
Vidar Christiansen
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Excludable Public Goods

The Retention Effect of Withholding Performance Information

2007 ◽  
Vol 82 (2) ◽  
pp. 389-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Korok Ray
Keyword(s):  
Performance Evaluations ◽  
Cost Functions ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Performance Information ◽  
Outside Options ◽  
Pooling Equilibrium ◽  
General Cost Functions ◽  
Multiple Stages

It is a common practice for firms to conduct performance evaluations of their employees and yet to withhold this information from those employees. This paper argues that firms strategically withhold performance information to retain workers. In particular, if the worker enjoys high outside options and is tempted to quit, then the firm chooses not to reveal his performance information in order to keep him on the job. The firm's equilibrium strategy is to fire if performance is sufficiently low, reveal information if performance is sufficiently high, and withhold information otherwise. The pooling equilibrium is robust under a wide variety of settings, such as general cost functions, ability-contingent outside options, nonlinear contracts, nonverifiable output, and multiple stages of production.

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