Asymptotic solution of zero-sum linear-quadratic differential game with cheap control for minimizer

2000 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valery Y. Glizer
Keyword(s):  
Asymptotic Solution ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Quadratic Differential ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Cheap Control ◽  
Zero Sum

scholarly journals Nash Equilibrium Sequence in a Singular Two-Person Linear-Quadratic Differential Game

Axioms ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Valery Y. Glizer
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Quadratic Functional ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Feedback Controls ◽  
Cheap Control ◽  
Optimal Values ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Equilibrium Sequence

A finite-horizon two-person non-zero-sum differential game is considered. The dynamics of the game is linear. Each of the players has a quadratic functional on its own disposal, which should be minimized. The case where weight matrices in control costs of one player are singular in both functionals is studied. Hence, the game under the consideration is singular. A novel definition of the Nash equilibrium in this game (a Nash equilibrium sequence) is proposed. The game is solved by application of the regularization method. This method yields a new differential game, which is a regular Nash equilibrium game. Moreover, the new game is a partial cheap control game. An asymptotic analysis of this game is carried out. Based on this analysis, the Nash equilibrium sequence of the pairs of the players’ state-feedback controls in the singular game is constructed. The expressions for the optimal values of the functionals in the singular game are obtained. Illustrative examples are presented.

SOLUTION OF A SINGULAR ZERO-SUM LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAME BY REGULARIZATION

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (02) ◽  
pp. 1440007 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOSEF SHINAR ◽  
VALERY Y. GLIZER ◽  
VLADIMIR TURETSKY
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Perturbation Technique ◽  
Weighting Coefficient ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Control Cost ◽  
Singular Perturbation Technique ◽  
Cost Functional ◽  
Cheap Control ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
The Cost

A linear-quadratic zero-sum singular differential game, where the cost functional does not contain the minimizer's control cost, is considered. Due to the singularity, the game cannot be solved either by applying the MinMax principle of Isaacs, or by using the Bellman–Isaacs equation method. In this paper, the solution of the singular game is obtained by using an auxiliary differential game with the same equation of dynamics and with a similar cost functional augmented by an integral of the square of the minimizer's control multiplied by a small positive weighting coefficient. This auxiliary game is a regular cheap control zero-sum differential game. For the analysis of such a cheap control differential game, in the present paper a singular perturbation technique is applied. Based on this analysis, the minimizing control sequence and the maximizer's optimal strategy in the original (singular) game are derived. Moreover, the existence of the value of the original game is established and its expression is derived. The solution is illustrated by an interception example.

Berge and Nash Equilibria in a Linear-Quadratic Differential Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 81 (11) ◽  
pp. 2108-2131
Author(s):  
V. I. Zhukovskiy ◽  
A. S. Gorbatov ◽  
K. N. Kudryavtsev
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Quadratic Differential ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Linear Quadratic

scholarly journals An Analytic and Numerical Investigation of a Differential Game

Axioms ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 66
Author(s):  
Aviv Gibali ◽  
Oleg Kelis
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Equation Approach ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Control Cost ◽  
Dual Representation ◽  
Cost Functional ◽  
Variational Derivatives ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Derivatives Of

In this paper we present an appropriate singular, zero-sum, linear-quadratic differential game. One of the main features of this game is that the weight matrix of the minimizer’s control cost in the cost functional is singular. Due to this singularity, the game cannot be solved either by applying the Isaacs MinMax principle, or the Bellman–Isaacs equation approach. As an application, we introduced an interception differential game with an appropriate regularized cost functional and developed an appropriate dual representation. By developing the variational derivatives of this regularized cost functional, we apply Popov’s approximation method and show how the numerical results coincide with the dual representation.

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