The impact of patterns of industrialization and of popular sector incorporation on political regime type: A case study of Colombia

1984 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Hartlyn
2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 280-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
András Körösényi

Most political science interpretations of the post-2010 Orbán regime have been written either within the framework of populism or in the democratization paradigm. We have learned much from these papers about Hungary’s drift in an authoritarian direction, but they also have drawbacks. This article aims to fill the gap between these two approaches and offers a theoretical framework to analyze the impact of populism and other trends of contemporary politics (like de-alignment, growing electoral volatility, citizens’ disengagement, personalization, legitimacy problems, the decline of party membership and partisanship, the mediatization of politics, etc.) on the political regime. It argues that these trends add up to an authority and regime type that can be conceptualized by Weber’s concept of plebiscitary leader democracy (PLD). PLD forms a new hybrid regime type that differs from comparative authoritarianism and other hybrid regime types known from the literature in three respects. First, PLD is less about institutional framework and procedures than about the sources of legitimacy; second, it serves better to understand how the regime works than measuring its distance from liberal democracy; third, it is an ideal type that aims to reveal the endogenous logic of democracy that generates authoritarian elements of the regime. The article also demonstrates the suitability of the concept of PLD for empirical research through presenting a structured case study of the Orbán regime. The PLD model enables us to reveal the endogenous logic of the Orbán regime and the impact of populist governance on it.


2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 435-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Bélanger ◽  
Érick Duchesne ◽  
Jonathan Paquin

Abstract.This article explores the impact of political regime type on the decision of third states to support secessionist movements abroad. It suggests that democracies share political values, which lead them to oppose their mutual secessionist claims, while autocracies are not bound by this normative consideration. The statistical analysis supports the effect of the democratic factor: democracies rarely support secessionist groups emerging from democratic states. Moreover, it shows that there is no autocratic counterpart to this argument. This research also casts some serious doubts on the ability of conventional explanations—namely vulnerability and ethnic affinities—to explain external support to secessionist movements.Résumé.Cet article analyse l'impact du type de régime politique sur la décision des États tiers d'appuyer des mouvements sécessionnistes à l'étranger. L'étude soutient que les démocraties partagent des valeurs politiques communes qui les mènent à s'opposer aux mouvements indépendantistes qui se manifestent parmi elles, alors que les régimes autocratiques ne sont pas liés par cette considération normative. L'analyse statistique valide l'effet du facteur démocratique : les démocraties appuient rarement les groupes sécessionnistes qui émergent au sein d'autres États démocratiques. Les données démontrent également qu'il n'y a pas d'équivalent autocratique faisant écho au facteur démocratique. L'étude indique en outre que les thèses courantes de la vulnérabilité et du lien ethnique expliquent mal l'appui des États tiers aux groupes sécessionnistes.


2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-240
Author(s):  
Byung-Kook Kim

This article analyzes the impact of political regime and state bureaucracy on policy responses to the 1997 financial crisis in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. The political regime type — classified broadly into democracy and authoritarianism — is found to shape the direction of policy responses by influencing the political elites' understanding on causes, processes, and consequences of the crisis, whereas the state bureaucracy — classified into hybrid and Weberian types — decides the implementation of reform plans by determining the power of big business to resist policy change, as well as the state's organizational capacity to counter that resistance. The article argues that only when the political regime is democratic and the state Weberian will comprehensive — as opposed to partial — reform succeed.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ylber Limani ◽  
Edmond Hajrizi ◽  
Rina Sadriu

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