Expansion of classical noncooperative equilibrium and program differential games

2000 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 561-569 ◽  
Author(s):  
É. R. Smol’yakov
Keyword(s):  
Differential Games ◽  
Noncooperative Equilibrium

Linear-State Differential Games in Partition Function Form

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (04) ◽  
pp. 1950006
Author(s):  
Simon Hoof
Keyword(s):  
Partition Function ◽  
Differential Games ◽  
Coalition Structure ◽  
Function Form ◽  
Equilibrium Payoff ◽  
Noncooperative Equilibrium ◽  
Pollution Accumulation ◽  
Linear State ◽  
Partition Function Form ◽  
Cooperative Differential Games

We introduce a partition function for [Formula: see text]-player linear-state cooperative differential games. The value of a coalition within a given coalition structure is defined as its noncooperative equilibrium payoff of a game played between the coalitions. We also define two core notions, namely, the cautious and the singleton core. If the game is convex, then the cores are nonempty. In order to illustrate the approach, we consider a symmetric game of pollution accumulation.

Ambiguity and long-run cooperation in strategic games

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Rojas ◽  
Damián Vergara
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Parametric Model ◽  
Strategic Games ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Noncooperative Equilibrium ◽  
Ex Ante

Abstract We study the effects of ambiguity on long-run cooperation in infinitely repeated strategic games. Using a simple parametric model of ambiguity, we study conditions for sustaining cooperative equilibria in the long-run. We apply our framework to the prisoner’s dilemma and duopoly models. We find that (i) ambiguity may affect the game’s structure eventually making the noncooperative equilibrium ex ante preferred; (ii) higher levels of ambiguity make long-run cooperation less likely since it makes punishment schemes less effective; and (iii) large levels of ambiguity may preclude the possibility of mutually beneficial long-run agreements, even when cooperation is beneficial from an ex ante perspective.

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