Excess market value, market power, and inside ownership structure

1988 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wi-Saeng Kim ◽  
Esmeralda O. Lyn
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Inside Ownership

scholarly journals Effects of Deregulation and Consolidation of the Broadcast Television Industry

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (8) ◽  
pp. 2185-2218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Calfee Stahl
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Cost Savings ◽  
Local Market ◽  
Significant Cost ◽  
Television Industry ◽  
Broadcast Television ◽  
Joint Ownership ◽  
Market Consolidation

This paper exploits deregulation in the 1990s to estimate viewership and revenue effects of consolidation in broadcast television, then finds cost effects that explain the ownership structure given viewership and revenue effects. Results suggest that consolidation greatly increased profitability in an industry with otherwise declining profitability. Groups with broader national coverage attract more advertising per station. Joint ownership of two stations within a market and network ownership both allow for significant cost savings. There is some evidence that within-market consolidation allows stations to achieve local market power. However, both within-market and across-market consolidation appear to have boosted viewership, on net. (JEL G32, L13, L25, L51, L82, L88)

The correlation between corporate governance and market value: regime or signal?

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang Li ◽  
Wei Zheng ◽  
Philip Chang ◽  
Shanmin Li
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Econometric Methodology ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Negative Factors ◽  
Practical Implications ◽  
Negative Signal

Purpose – As literatures argue that managers’ personalities will affect both corporate governance structures and corporate performance, the correlation between them is a mixed result. The purpose of this paper is to separate different routes leading to the mixed correlation, and name the separated routes as regime effect and signal effect. Design/methodology/approach – By theoretical analysis, the authors list three routes leading to the correlation between corporate governance and corporate performance. Routes 1 and 2 show that governance can directly and indirectly change the performance; while route 3 shows that both the governance and performance are results of managers’ personalities, and the governance has no influence onto the performance, which means the correlation led by route 3 is fake. By design a new econometric methodology, this paper separates the mixed correlation between corporate governance and performance, and names the correlation led by routes 1 and 2 as the regime effect and the correlation led by route 3 as signal effect. Findings – By an empirical research on Chinese listed corporates, the authors find that the correlations between Chinese listed corporates’ market value and main corporate governance factors can be separated into regime effects and signal effects; and the authors also find that some factors (Share of Institutional Investors, Share of Real Controller and the Squared, Dummy of Identical CEO and Chairman, Ownership Concentration) only show regime effects, some factors (Separating Extent of Ownership and Controlling Right, Dummy of Provincial State-Owned Firms) only show signal effects, and some factors (Dummy of Republic State-Owned Firms, Scale of Board) show both. What’s more, the authors find out an interesting result that the state-owning has no negative regime effect on China SOEs’ performance but very significantly negative signal effect; in this paper, the authors suggest that this means the key negative factors of Chinese SOEs is not state-owning ownership structure but the managers’ corruption. Practical implications – As only the factors with regime effects can directly and indirectly affect corporates’ performance and the factors with signal effects show that there’re some managers’ personalities affecting both the governance and performance, the separation method in this paper can help shareholders knowing which governance factors will be helpful to improve the performance and which others will show managers’ hard-working or corruption intention. Originality/value – Separate the regime effect and the signal effect from the correlation between corporate governance and performance.

scholarly journals Pengaruh Economic Value Added, Ownership Structure, Dan Country Of Origin Terhadap Market Value Added Pada Perusahaan Otomotif Di BEI

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (11) ◽  
pp. 1471
Author(s):  
Willy Wigia Sofyan ◽  
Prima Naomi
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Country Of Origin ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Economic Value Added ◽  
Purposive Sampling ◽  
Market Value Added ◽  
Origin Effect

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk melihat seberapa besar pengaruh Economic Value Added (EVA), Ownership Structure (OSS), dan Country of Origin (COO) terhadap kinerja pasar yang diproksikan oleh Market Value Added (MVA) baik secara simultan ataupun parsial, sehingga dapat menjadi informasi untuk investor sebelum menanamkan modalnya pada perusahaan otomotif di Indonesia. Data penelitian yang digunakan yaitu 11 perusahaan sub sektor otomotif yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia selama periode 10 tahun, mulai dari tahun 2009-2018. Pengambilan sampel menggunakan teknik purposive sampling. Metode analisis menggunakan data panel dengan pengujian asumsi klasik. Hasil penelitian ini membuktikan bahwa EVA, OSS, dan COO secara simultan dapat berpengaruh signifikan terhadap MVA. Sedangkan secara parsial EVA dan COO tidak berpengaruh signifikan terhadap MVA, tetapi OSS dapat berpengaruh signifikan terhadap MVA. Pada penelitian ini ditemukan, bahwa kinerja saham tidak selamanya dapat di ukur dengan fundamendal perusahaan, diperlukan proporsi yang ideal pada struktur kepemilikan saham sehingga berdampak pada peningkatan nilai perusahaan, Country of Origin Effect tidak berpengaruh terhadap peningkatan kinerja perusahaan di pasar modal. Keywords: Economic Value Added, Market Value Added, Ownership Structure, Country of Origin

scholarly journals Ownership structure and real earnings management: An empirical study on emerging economy

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-89
Author(s):  
Nitai Chandra Debnath ◽  
Suman Paul Chowdhury ◽  
Safaeduzzaman Khan
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Foreign Ownership ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Inside Ownership ◽  
Price Discounts ◽  
Least Square Regression

We observe the association amid ownership structure and real earnings management in Bangladesh. Our study takes 2195 firm-year observations which are listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange over the period of 2000-2017. The outcome of the panel least square regression indicates that inside ownership, as well as foreign ownership, is inversely related to real earnings management, whereas institutional ownership is positively related to real earnings management. In particular, firms tend to reduce discretionary expenses to manage earnings if the magnitude of inside ownership is low. In contrast to that, when firms are characterized by more institutional ownership, they are more inclined towards real earnings management through additional price discounts, offering a more friendly credit facility, and lowering discretionary expense. This result is consistent with previous findings. Nevertheless, if firms encounter an absence of foreign ownership, they prefer to manage earnings through operating at over-production levels as well as lowering discretionary expenses. Additionally, we find that corporate governance is playing a beneficial role in limiting real earnings management

scholarly journals RELEVANSI NILAI KONSERVATISME BESERTA BEBERAPA FAKTOR YANG MEMPENGARUIII

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Etty Murwaningsari ◽  
Ardhy Puma Caesa Nugraha
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Equation Model ◽  
Earning Management ◽  
Manufacturing Firm ◽  
Outlier Test ◽  
Political Cost ◽  
Debt Covenant

<p class="Style1"><em>The objective of this research is to examine the effect of ownership structure, debt covenant, political cost, growth, and earning management on conservatism, and to examine their effect on thefirm's market value. This research uses secondary data obtained from purposive random sampling. The data sample consists of 50 manufacturing firm between the year 2005-2007. However, from the outlier test, only 103 firm-year can be processedfurther using Structural Equation Model (SEM). This research results suggest that there is a significant effect of earning management on conservatism. Whilst ownership structure, debt covenant, political cost, and growth don't seem to have significant effects on conservatism. There is also no significant relationship between conservatism andfirm's market value.</em></p>

scholarly journals Ownership, control and performance in the most actively traded companies on Stockholm stock exchange. A comparison between 1999 and 2001

2006 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per-Olof Bjuggren ◽  
Helena Bohman
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Inside Ownership ◽  
The Subject ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Ownership Control

The relationship between ownership, control and firm value is the subject matter studied. The study is essentially empirical. Data about the most actively traded non-financial companies on the Stockholm Stock Exchange is used. A comparison is made between the years 1999 and 2001. What do the relationships between firm value and different ownership characteristics like ownership concentration, foreign ownership and inside ownership look like? Do these characteristics differ between the booming year of 1999 and the recession year of 2001? Is there a relation between stock price and ownership structure? These are the three main questions addressed in the study.

The Value Of The State-Owned Enterprises In Indonesia: A Case Study Of Privatization

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sri Hasnawati
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Market Value ◽  
The State ◽  
State Budget ◽  
Market Value Added ◽  
The Impact

This research aims to test the impact of the ownership structure toward the performance of the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). It examines the relationship between the performance of the SOEs and the market value. The study involves 13 SOEs listed at the Jakarta Stock Exchange. Of the 13 SOEs, 9 were selected as samples. The performance of the SOEs is measured by means of the EVA (Economic Value Added) indicator and the market value by the MVA (Market Value Added) indicator. The result of the study reveals that the ownership structure does not have an impact on the performance of the SOEs, either partially or simultaneously. To a smaller degree, the study also indicates that there is a relationship between the EVA and the MVA. The implication of this study is that the privatization of the SOEs should not fully be used to help with the state budget deficit. That is, the majority of the funds should be allocated for the purpose of developing or expanding the SOEs themselves so that they can perform optimally for the sake of society. Furthermore, the SOEs should be well-managed if they would like to obtain good responses from the market.

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