scholarly journals Semi-markov strategies in stochastic games

1983 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Hordijk ◽  
O. J. Vrieze ◽  
G. L. Wanrooij
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Chandan Pal ◽  
Somnath Pradhan

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In this paper we study zero-sum stochastic games for pure jump processes on a general state space with risk sensitive discounted criteria. We establish a saddle point equilibrium in Markov strategies for bounded cost function. We achieve our results by studying relevant Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations.</p>


1999 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 9-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. FLESCH ◽  
F. THUIJSMAN ◽  
O. J. VRIEZE

We examine the use of stationary and Markov strategies in zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces. It is natural to evaluate a strategy for the maximising player, player 1, by the highest reward guaranteed to him against any strategy of the opponent. The highest rewards guaranteed by stationary strategies or by Markov strategies are called the stationary utility or the Markov utility, respectively. Since all stationary strategies are Markov strategies, the Markov utility is always larger or equal to the stationary utility. However, in all presently known subclasses of stochastic games, these utilities turn out to be equal. In this paper, we provide a colourful example in which the Markov utility is strictly larger than the stationary utility and we present several conditions under which the utilities are equal. We also show that each stochastic game has at least one initial state for which the two utilities are equal. Several examples clarify these issues.


Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 230
Author(s):  
Elena Parilina ◽  
Stepan Akimochkin

In stochastic games, the player’s payoff is a stochastic variable. In most papers, expected payoff is considered as a payoff, which means the risk neutrality of the players. However, there may exist risk-sensitive players who would take into account “risk” measuring their stochastic payoffs. In the paper, we propose a model of stochastic games with mean-variance payoff functions, which is the sum of expectation and standard deviation multiplied by a coefficient characterizing a player’s attention to risk. We construct a cooperative version of a stochastic game with mean-variance preferences by defining characteristic function using a maxmin approach. The imputation in a cooperative stochastic game with mean-variance preferences is supposed to be a random vector. We construct the core of a cooperative stochastic game with mean-variance preferences. The paper extends existing models of discrete-time stochastic games and approaches to find cooperative solutions in these games.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Cámara ◽  
Gabriel A. Moreno ◽  
David Garlan ◽  
Bradley Schmerl

Author(s):  
Wei Xing ◽  
Congli Mei ◽  
Le Liu ◽  
Dong Guo ◽  
Abdulhameed F. Alkhateeb ◽  
...  

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