Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals

1995 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 273-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erwin Amann ◽  
Wolfgang Leininger
Keyword(s):  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Expected Revenue ◽  
Sealed Bid Auctions

scholarly journals Optimal auction mechanisms with private values

2010 ◽  
Vol 55 (184) ◽  
pp. 71-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dejan Trifunovic
Keyword(s):  
Single Object ◽  
Revenue Equivalence ◽  
Equilibrium Behavior ◽  
Demand Theory ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Optimal Auction ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Auction Mechanisms ◽  
Expected Revenue ◽  
Sealed Bid Auctions

This paper reviews equilibrium behavior in different auction mechanisms. We will deal with two types of open auctions, English and Dutch, and two types of sealed-bid auctions, first-price and second-price, when there is a single object for sale and bidders have private values. We show that under certain conditions all four auctions yield the same expected revenue to the seller, but once these assumptions are relaxed revenue equivalence does not hold. We will also study auctions by using standard tools from demand theory. Finally, we will analyze collusive behavior of bidders. The two goals that an auction mechanism has to achieve are efficient allocation and maximization of the seller's expected revenue.

scholarly journals Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions

1989 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 41-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
John G Riley
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Revenue Equivalence ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Expected Revenue ◽  
Sealed Bid Auctions ◽  
Open Question

The first objective of this paper has been to explain why it is that expected seller revenue is the same under very different auction rules. The second objective has been to explain why revenue equivalence no longer holds once the central assumptions of risk aversion and independence of beliefs are modified. The effect of risk aversion is to make a sealed high bid auction more attractive from a seller's viewpoint. The effect of correlated beliefs is to favor open bidding. Which of the two factors dominates under plausible assumptions about risk aversion parameters and about the degree to which beliefs are correlated remains an important open question.

Bidding behavior in first price sealed bid auctions

1987 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Walker ◽  
Vernon L. Smith ◽  
James C. Cox
Keyword(s):  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Sealed Bid Auctions

Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Ejaz ◽  
Stephen Joe ◽  
Chaitanya Joshi
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Risk Analysis ◽  
Equilibrium Solution ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Reserve Price ◽  
Solution Concepts ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Sealed Bid Auctions

In this paper, we use the adversarial risk analysis (ARA) methodology to model first-price sealed-bid auctions under quite realistic assumptions. We extend prior work to find ARA solutions for mirror equilibrium and Bayes Nash equilibrium solution concepts, not only for risk-neutral but also for risk-averse and risk-seeking bidders. We also consider bidders having different wealth and assume that the auctioned item has a reserve price.

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