On the location of actions and tryings: Criticism of an internalist view

Erkenntnis ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-56
Author(s):  
Olav Gjelsvik
Keyword(s):  
Internalist View

Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Value of Presence

Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
David de Bruijn
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Perceptual Consciousness ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Perceptual Presence ◽  
Internalist View ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Way

Abstract Epistemological disjunctivists make two strong claims about perceptual experience's epistemic value: (1) experience guarantees the knowledgeable character of perceptual beliefs; (2) experience's epistemic value is “reflectively accessible”. In this paper I develop a form of disjunctivism grounded in a presentational view of experience, on which the epistemic benefits of experience consist in the way perception presents the subject with aspects of her environment. I show that presentational disjunctivism has both dialectical and philosophically fundamental advantages over more traditional expositions. Dialectically, presentational disjunctivism resolves a puzzle disjunctivists face in their posture vis-à-vis skeptical scenarios. More systematically, presentational disjunctivism provides an especially compelling view of disjunctivism as an internalist view of perceptual consciousness by explaining the way perceptual presence manifests the subject's rationality in a distinct way.

Out of their heads: Turning relational reinterpretation inside out

2008 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Barrett
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Comparative Cognition ◽  
Internalist View ◽  
Cognitive Revolution ◽  
Inside Out

AbstractAlthough Penn et al's incisive critique of comparative cognition is welcomed, their heavily computational and representational account of cognition commits them to a purely internalist view of cognitive processes. This perhaps blinds them to a distributed alternative that raises the possibility that the human cognitive revolution occurred outside the head, and not in it.

Epistemology’s Prime Evils

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-43
Author(s):  
Patrick Bondy
Keyword(s):  
Evil Demon ◽  
Internalist View ◽  
Family Resemblances ◽  
Key Features

Abstract This essay addresses what we can call epistemology’s Prime Evils. These are the three demons epistemologists have conjured that are the most troublesome and the most difficult to dispel: Descartes’ classic demon; Lehrer and Cohen’s New Evil Demon; and Schaffer’s Debasing Demon. These demons threaten the epistemic statuses of our beliefs—in particular, the statuses of knowledge and justification—and they present challenges for our theories of these epistemic statuses. This paper explains the key features of these three central demons, highlights their family resemblances and differences, and attempts to show that a certain kind of internalist view of justification provides the resources to handle these demons well.

scholarly journals Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-271
Author(s):  
Luca Moretti
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Conservatism ◽  
Inferential Justification ◽  
Reflective Awareness ◽  
Michael Huemer ◽  
Internalist View

AbstractPhenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential justification rests on appearances. PC’s advocates have recently argued that seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most developed view to this effect is Michael Huemer ’s theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). Luca Moretti has recently shown that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of the same problem and it is thus hostage to inferential scepticism. I also suggest a possible response on behalf of ToIS’s advocates.

scholarly journals A Hermeneutical Analysis of the InternalistApproachin the Philosophy of Sport

2015 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Javier Lopez Frias ◽  
Xavier Gimeno Monfort
Keyword(s):  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
Internalist View ◽  
Philosophy Of Sport ◽  
Normative Requirements

AbstractIn this paper, we make a hermeneutical analysis of internalism, the dominant tradition in the philosophy of sports. In order to accomplish this, we identify the prejudices that guide the internalist view of sports, namely the Platonic-Analytic prejudice introduced by Suits, one of the forefathers of internalism. Then, we critically analyze four consequences of following such a prejudice: a) its reductive nature, b) the production of a unrealistic view of sports, c) the vagueness of the idea of excellence; and d) the leap from the descriptive analysis of the sporting phenomenon to the setting of normative requirements for the practice of sports.

scholarly journals INFERENTIALISM AND COGNITIVE PENETRATION OF PERCEPTION

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack C. Lyons
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Belief ◽  
Cognitive Penetration ◽  
Cognitive States ◽  
Internalist View

AbstractCognitive penetration of perception is the idea that what we see (hear, taste, etc.) is influenced by such “cognitive” states as beliefs, expectations, and so on. A perceptual belief that results from cognitive penetration may be less justified than a nonpenetrated one. Inferentialism is a kind of internalist view that tries to account for this by claiming that (a) some experiences are epistemically evaluable, on the basis of why the perceiver has that experience, and (b) the familiar canons of good inference provide the appropriate standards by which experiences are evaluated. I examine recent defenses of inferentialism by Susanna Siegel, Peter Markie, and Matthew McGrath and argue that the prospects for inferentialism are dim.

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