An application of ESL to a stochastic dynamic market model with free entry and exit

1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-118
Author(s):  
G. Ohlendorf ◽  
P. Stahlecker
Keyword(s):  
Market Model ◽  
Stochastic Dynamic ◽  
Entry And Exit ◽  
Free Entry

Cross-industry growth differences with asymmetric industries and endogenous market structure

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chien-Yu Huang ◽  
Lei Ji
Keyword(s):  
Market Structure ◽  
Entry And Exit ◽  
Free Entry ◽  
Industry Growth ◽  
Policy Rules ◽  
Tfp Growth ◽  
Endogenous Market Structure ◽  
Growth Differences ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Patent Breadth

Abstract We develop a two-industry R&D growth model with a free-entry endogenous market structure to evaluate the impact of industrial fundamentals on cross-industry differences of TFP growth and R&D intensity. Endogenous market structure in our model allows the firm’s market size to respond to the firm’s entry and exit which complements the models with an exogenous market structure in the previous literature. We find that surprisingly, an industry with a relatively high R&D productivity or appropriability exhibits “relatively” low in-house innovation growth and R&D intensity during transition. Moreoever, we examine the effects of R&D subsidies and patent breadth policies on industry differences by implementing both asymmetric and symmetric policy rules. We find that only asymmetric R&D subsidies have impacts on TFP growth and R&D intensity differences.

scholarly journals Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns *

2014 ◽  
Vol 130 (1) ◽  
pp. 415-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Atkeson ◽  
Christian Hellwig ◽  
Guillermo Ordoñez
Keyword(s):  
Firm Dynamics ◽  
Total Production ◽  
Entry And Exit ◽  
Free Entry ◽  
Spot Prices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Equilibrium Prices ◽  
Random Growth ◽  
The Impact

Abstract In all markets, firms go through a process of creative destruction: entry, random growth, and exit. In many of these markets there are also regulations that restrict entry, possibly distorting this process. We study the public interest rationale for entry taxes in a general equilibrium model with free entry and exit of firms in which firm dynamics are driven by reputation concerns. In our model firms can produce high-quality output by making a costly but efficient initial unobservable investment. If buyers never learn about this investment, an extreme “lemons problem” develops, no firm invests, and the market shuts down. Learning introduces reputation incentives such that a fraction of entrants do invest. We show that if the market operates with spot prices, entry taxes always enhance the role of reputation to induce investment, improving welfare despite the impact of these taxes on equilibrium prices and total production.

A Free Entry and Exit Experiment

2000 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rod Garratt
Keyword(s):  
Entry And Exit ◽  
Free Entry

Academic Journal Prices in a Digital Age: A Two-Sided Market Model

2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark J McCabe ◽  
Christopher M. Snyder
Keyword(s):  
Product Quality ◽  
Digital Age ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Free Entry ◽  
Academic Journals ◽  
Academic Journal ◽  
Market Structures ◽  
Its Analysis ◽  
Online Journals ◽  
Quality Certification

Abstract Digital-age technologies promise to revolutionize the market for academic journals as they have other media. We model journals as intermediaries linking authors with readers in a two-sided market. We use the model to study the division of fees between authors and readers under various market structures, ranging from monopoly to free entry. The results help explain why print journals traditionally obtained most of their revenue from subscription fees. The results raise the possibility that digitization may lead to a proliferation of online journals targeting various author types. The paper contributes to the literature on two-sided markets in its analysis of free-entry equilibrium and modeling of product-quality certification.

scholarly journals En defensa del monopolio competitivo

2020 ◽  
pp. 233-264
Author(s):  
Iván Cachanosky
Keyword(s):  
Jel Classification ◽  
The State ◽  
Competitive Market ◽  
Competitive Markets ◽  
Entry And Exit ◽  
Free Entry ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Per Se

Why does Monopoly have a bad reputation? Is it true that Monopo- lies are always less desirable than competitive markets? The truth is that the concept of Monopoly is one of the most vitiated and badly analyzed in the economy since the analysis seems  to  tend  to  “Monopoly  yes”  or  “Monopoly no”, when in reality, the relevant discussion is the existence or not of competi- tion in the market. In this context, it could happen that in a competitive market there are several companies that provide the best service at the best price or it could happen that it is only one; that is, a Monopoly, which achieves the same objective. In other words, the Monopoly is not good or bad per se, but depends on the absence or coercion of the State and that competition is guaranteed through the free entry and exit of companies. Keywords: Monopoly, Competition, Market Prices, Market, Competitive Monop- oly, Legal Monopoly, Cartels JEL Classification: D41, D42, D46, L41, L11, L43, P42, R32 Resumen: ¿Por qué el Monopolio tiene mala fama? ¿Es cierto que los Mono- polios son siempre menos deseables que los mercados competitivos?  Lo cierto es que, el término del Monopolio es uno de los más viciados y mal ana- lizados en la economía ya que el análisis pareciera tender a “Monopolio sí” o “Monopolio no”, cuando en realidad, la discusión relevante es la existencia o no de competencia en el mercado. En este marco, podría ocurrir que en un mercado competitivo sean varias empresas las que brindan el mejor servicio al mejor precio o podría ocurrir que sea una sola; es decir, un monopolio, que logra el mismo objetivo. En otras palabras, el Monopolio no es bueno o malo per se, sino que depende de la ausencia o no de coacción del Estado y de que se garantice la competencia mediante la libre entrada y salida de empresas. Palabras clave: Monopolio, Competencia, Precios de Mercado, Mercado, Monopolio Competitivo, Monopolio Legal, Cárteles Clasificación JEL: D41, D42, D46, L41, L11, L43, P42, R32

scholarly journals ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF STRUCTUTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF POULTRY EGG MARKETING IN KANO METROPOLIS, KANO STATE, NIGERIA

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-451
Author(s):  
A. T. Lawal ◽  
A. O. Yusuf ◽  
S. A. Dambazau ◽  
Y. S. Ahmad ◽  
A. A. Adomi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Gini Coefficient ◽  
Average Duration ◽  
Structural Characteristics ◽  
Descriptive Statistics ◽  
Entry And Exit ◽  
Free Entry ◽  
Cooperative Society ◽  
The People ◽  
High Level ◽  
And Storage

This study analyzed the structural characteristics of poultry egg marketing in five selected markets in Kano metropolis. Data were collected with the aid of questionnaires and were analyzed using descriptive statistics and gini coefficient. The study revealed that all marketers were males with an average age of 38 years and 27 years for wholesalers and retailers respectively. For wholesalers, the average household size is 8 and 5 for the retailers. According to the result, the wholesalers had 15 years as mean years of experience in poultry-egg marketing and retailers have 7 years. The result showed that the average duration of stay of the wholesalers is 15 years and 7 years for retailers. The study showed that 79.5% of the wholesalers were married and 20.5% are single while for the retailers 65.9% are married and 34.04% are single. The result indicated that about 66.7% of the wholesalers and 87.2% are literates. Result of the Gini coefficient analysis showed a high level concentration of 0.48 and 0.54 for wholesalers and retailers. The result shows that 100% of both wholesalers and retailers have free entry and exit in to the egg market, majority of the wholesalers (79.5%) do not belong to any cooperative society, while the remaining (20.5%) belong to one or more cooperative societies while 100% of the retailers do not belong to any cooperative group. It is recommended that good roads and storage facilities should be provided for the people in order to reduce the rate .

scholarly journals Electricity Market Stochastic Dynamic Model and Its Mean Stability Analysis

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhanhui Lu ◽  
Weijuan Wang ◽  
Gengyin Li ◽  
Di Xie
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Random Excitation ◽  
Quadratic Functions ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Demand Elasticity ◽  
Stochastic Dynamic ◽  
Deterministic Dynamic ◽  
Gauss Type ◽  
The Stability

Based on the deterministic dynamic model of electricity market proposed by Alvarado, a stochastic electricity market model, considering the random nature of demand sides, is presented in this paper on the assumption that generator cost function and consumer utility function are quadratic functions. The stochastic electricity market model is a generalization of the deterministic dynamic model. Using the theory of stochastic differential equations, stochastic process theory, and eigenvalue techniques, the determining conditions of the mean stability for this electricity market model under small Gauss type random excitation are provided and testified theoretically. That is, if the demand elasticity of suppliers is nonnegative and the demand elasticity of consumers is negative, then the stochastic electricity market model is mean stable. It implies that the stability can be judged directly by initial data without any computation. Taking deterministic electricity market data combined with small Gauss type random excitation as numerical samples to interpret random phenomena from a statistical perspective, the results indicate the conclusions above are correct, valid, and practical.

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