The myth of the given and realism

Erkenntnis ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Raimo Tuomela
Keyword(s):  
Myth Of The Given ◽  
The Given

Licht und Schatten der Begriffe

2017 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Bonnemann
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Current Controversy ◽  
Myth Of The Given ◽  
The Given

AbstractWhen we regard Adorno’s philosophy against the background of the current controversy between constructivism and realism, his philosophy cannot be attributed to either side. In contrast to realism, an object is constituted by a concept; on the other hand, in contrast to constructivism, Adorno also considers a concept, in turn, to be constituted by the object. Comparing Adorno to Merleau-Ponty reveals that neither philosopher considers that the knowledge of an object can be gleaned from the subject’s unilateral constitution, but is based rather on reciprocity which becomes possible through the subject’s corporeality. Thus Adorno’s epistemology hints towards a way out of the inferentialistic immanence correlation of concepts, which avoids the myth of the given.

scholarly journals Of empty thoughts and blind intuitions Kant's answer to McDowell

2010 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Günter Zöller
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
The Real ◽  
Myth Of The Given ◽  
Passive Data ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Senses ◽  
The Given ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

This paper examines the relation between intuition and concept in Kant in light of John McDowell's neo-Kantian position that intuitions are concept-laden.2 The focus is on Kant's twofold pronouncement that thoughts without content are empty and that intuitions without concepts are blind. I show that intuitions as singular representations are not instances of passive data intake but the result of synthetic unification of the given manifold of the senses by the power of the imagination under the guidance of the understanding. Against McDowell I argue that the amenability of intuitions to conceptual determination is not due some pre-existing, absolute conceptuality of the real but to the "work of the subject."3 On a more programmatic level, this paper seeks to demonstrate the limitations of a selective appropriation of Kant and the philosophical potential of a more comprehensive and thorough consideration of his work. Section 1 addresses the unique balance in Kant's philosophy between the work on particular problems and the orientation toward a systematic whole. Section 2 outlines McDowell's take on the Kantian distinction between intuition and concept in the context of the Kant readings by Sellars and Strawson. Section 3 exposes McDowell's relapse into the Myth of the Given. Section 4 proposes a reading of Kant's theoretical philosophy as an epistemology of metaphysical cognition. Section 5 details Kant's original account of sensible intuition in the Inaugural-Dissertation of 1770. Section 6 presents the transition from the manifold of the senses to the synthesis in the imagination and the unification through the categories in the Critique of pure reason (1781 and 1787). Section 7 addresses Kant's formalism in epistemology and metaphysics.

scholarly journals Non-conceptualism, observational concepts, and the given

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 401
Author(s):  
Federico Castellano
Keyword(s):  
Myth Of The Given ◽  
The Given

In “Study of Concepts”, Peacocke puts forward an argument for non-conceptualism derived from the possession conditions of observational concepts. In this paper, I raise two objections to this argument. First, I argue that if non-conceptual perceptual contents are scenario contents, then perceptual experiences cannot present perceivers with the circumstances specified by the application conditions of observational concepts and, therefore, they cannot play the semantic and epistemic roles Peacocke wants them to play in the possession conditions of these concepts. Second, I argue that if non-conceptual perceptual contents are protopropositions, then Peacocke’s account of the possession conditions of observational concepts falls into the Myth of the Given.

scholarly journals The Myth of the Given today: Perspectives of realistic epistemology

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 452-459
Author(s):  
Sergey V. Nikonenko ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Radical Pluralism ◽  
The World ◽  
Myth Of The Given ◽  
The Given ◽  
Modern Analytical ◽  
Linguistic Phenomenon ◽  
Epistemological Framework ◽  
Made In

The article deals with the reception of Wilfrid Sellars’s The Myth of the Given. The Problem consists in the ontological status of reality and the possibility of empirical knowledge. The ideas of well-known representatives of modern analytical epistemology are analyzed: J. Searle, H. Putnam, J. McDowell, G. Evans, C. Peacocke, W. Child, T. Rockmore, etc. An attempt is made in the article to show that The Myth of the Given is losing its relevance in modern humanistic realism where the world is already becoming a symbolic construct within the epistemological framework. Experience as such is no longer deemed as a linguistic phenomenon in modern epistemology. Sellars’s argumentation is convincing only if universalism, in terms of the interpretation of experience and reality, is criticized from the standpoint of radical pluralism of epistemological theories. In this case, indeed, no “Given” exists, viewed as a correlation between the substance of Sensitivity and the only possible world of Reality. It is illustrated that modern analytical epistemology is an arena of competition between two leading positions in the interpretation of the world: externalism and internalism. Despite the contradiction between these theoretical positions, they are in accord in recognizing a pluralistic worldview, which is, moreover, of a “humanistic” nature. These theories address neither “the given” nor “the world of facts”. The main trouble with The Myth of the Given is the lack of criteria of objectivity in any act of experience.

Sellars and the Myth of the given

2011 ◽  
pp. 188-192
Author(s):  
Willem A. deVries
Keyword(s):  
Myth Of The Given ◽  
The Given

The Dogmas of Empiricism and the Linguistic Turn

Empiricisms ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 339-354
Author(s):  
Barry Allen
Keyword(s):  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Radical Empiricism ◽  
Linguistic Turn ◽  
Entire Line ◽  
Myth Of The Given ◽  
The Given

The chapter considers three lines of anti-empiricism in analytic philosophy: Quine and Davidson against the “dogmas of empiricism”; Sellars against the “myth of the given”; and Rorty’s new pragmatism, with its “higher nominalism” and disdain for radical empiricism. These anti-empiricism arguments were chiefly developed with Carnap in mind, and that is their weakness. The empiricism they criticize is theorematic rather than problematic, the empiricism of Russell and Carnap, not Epicurus or Newton. “Problematic” empiricisms like theirs, and including the work of the radical empiricists, are untouched by this entire line of criticism.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document