Monopoly rent seeking under conditions of uncertainty

Public Choice ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph M. Jadlow
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Monopoly Rent

Monopoly, rent-seeking, and second best theory

Public Choice ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-237
Author(s):  
Roger Latham ◽  
Frances Perivancic
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Second Best ◽  
Monopoly Rent

Monopoly Rents in Motorcycle Taxi Services in Bangkok, Thailand

2015 ◽  
Vol 2512 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Apiwat Ratanawaraha ◽  
Saksith Chalermpong
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Rail Transit ◽  
Economic Rent ◽  
Value Capture ◽  
Transit Systems ◽  
Monopoly Rents ◽  
Operator Group ◽  
Bus Services ◽  
Motorcycle Taxi ◽  
Monopoly Rent

This paper examines the market for motorcycle taxi services in Bangkok, Thailand, in terms of economic rent and the effects of such rent on fares. Three sources of monopoly rent in motorcycle taxi services are identified. Locational rent is attributed to the level of accessibility that is specific to the location of a motorcycle taxi stand. Such locations are limited in terms of accessibility, with few locations that can be substituted with another. The quota rent is arbitrarily created by rent-seeking activities, that is, by setting a quota on the number of operators in each location. Territorial rent is created by restricting the service area for each operator group. Depending on the behavior of the so-called influential people, the monopoly can be either enforced or eroded. A regression analysis of fare data provides evidence that supports the hypothesis of locational and territorial rents. Locational rent decreases as a motorcycle taxi stand is located farther away from a rail transit station. Motorcycle taxi groups with demarcated territories command a fare premium, which may indicate territorial rent. Some stands enjoy a degree of monopoly where there are limited substitute feeder transport modes; stands located near bus stops also command a fare premium because of accessibility. This situation implies that bus services do not compete with motorcycle taxis but provide complementary services. The additional economic rent created by new transit systems is unfairly captured by operator groups and influential people. It is suggested that a competitive market be created for motorcycle taxi services, with value-capture measures that are intended to create a more efficient and fairer feeder transport system.

Peran Pengawasan Internal Dalam Menghindari Kutukan Sumber Daya Alam

Liquidity ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Andilo Tohom
Keyword(s):  
Natural Resources ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Rich Country ◽  
Literature Study ◽  
Indonesian Government ◽  
The World ◽  
Policies And Programs ◽  
The Right

Indonesia is one of many countries in the world so called resource-rich country. Natural resources abundance needs to be managed in the right way in order to avoid dutch diseases and resources curses. These two phenomena generally happened in the country, which has abundant natural resources. Learned from Norwegian experiences, Indonesian Government need to focus its policy to prevent rent seeking activities. The literature study presented in this paper is aimed to provide important insight for government entities in focusing their policies and programs to avoid resources curse. From the internal audit perspective, this study is expected to improve internal audit’s role in assurance and consulting.

Institutional Theory of Endless Redistribution

2005 ◽  
pp. 4-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Sonin
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Growth Rates ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Wide Spread ◽  
Grass Roots ◽  
Protection Systems ◽  
Private Protection ◽  
The Rich

In unequal societies, the rich may benefit from shaping economic institutions in their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing on public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public protection of property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian oligarchs of the 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide motivation for this paper.

On the Origins of Administrative Rent: Doing Business in a Russian Region N

2010 ◽  
pp. 58-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Oleinik
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Resource Rent ◽  
Competitive Edge ◽  
Doing Business ◽  
Russian Region ◽  
Positive Gain ◽  
Access To The Field ◽  
Quantitative And Qualitative Methods

In the article two types of rent are differentiated: resource rent and administrative rent. The latter is linked to restrictions on the access to the field of interactions. The contribution of the theory of public choice and the theory of rent-seeking and directly-unproductive activities is further developed by shifting the emphasis from individual decision-making to interactions between three actors: C, who controls access to the field, A, who gets a competitive edge as a result, and B, who assumes a subjacent position with regard to both A and C, yet still receives a positive gain from transacting. Domination by virtue of a constellation of As, Bs, and Cs interests is illustrated with the help of an in-depth case study of a Russian region. This study combines quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as their triangulation.

The Impact of Sanctions on North Korea’s Foreign Trade from the Perspective of the Comparative Advantage Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 4-15
Author(s):  
I. A. Korgun ◽  
G. D. Toloraya
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Trade ◽  
Competitive Advantage ◽  
National Economy ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Transformation ◽  
Global Trade ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
The North ◽  
The Impact

The presented study analyzes the opportunities for North Korea to capitalize on its competitive advantages in foreign trade in the context of sanctions.Aim. The study aims to identify mechanisms that allow North Korea to engage in foreign trade in circumvention of UN sanctions and to analyze their impact on the national economy.Tasks. The authors analyze the structure of North Korea’s national economy, its initial competitive advantage, identify the specific features of North Korea’s foreign trade in the context of sanctions, and determine the consequences of illicit trade in circumvention of sanctions for the national economy.Methods. This study uses an interdisciplinary approach that combines the classical theory of competitive advantage with the concept of rent seeking, with the concept of rent seeking and analysis of trade flows.Results. The study shows that, despite the restrictions imposed by sanctions, North Korea strives to make the most of its advantages, such as resource availability and cheap labor, in global trade. The country builds its own export-import chains in circumvention of sanctions. These chains are rather mobile, flexible, and controlled by the elite. As a result, benefits from trade that could be evenly distributed among the population are concentrated in the hands of a narrow segment of society. ‘Rent seeking’ makes it possible to formulate the negative consequences of these processes for the North Korean economy and the international community.Conclusions. Solving the North Korean issue requires an economic transformation in the country through the replacement of restrictive sanctions with more constructive ones. The exclusion of North Korea from open global trade leads to the country’s marginalization and impairs the transparency of international commodity flows.

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