Incomplete Information in Rent-seeking Contests

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cédric Wasser
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Rent Seeking

The Game Analysis of Rent-Seeking Behavior in the Public Project

2011 ◽  
Vol 94-96 ◽  
pp. 2233-2237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Jiang ◽  
Ying Peng ◽  
Yu Shui Chen
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public Project ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Seeking Behavior

Rent-seeking behavior in the public project is a problem which the construction administrative departments at all levels always attach great importance to. This paper analyzed the causes and harms of rent-seeking behavior in the public project. At the same time, according to the hypothesis that supervision department can drive its right impartially, this paper established a tripartite incomplete information static game model in the public project, and then analyzed the own rent-seeking behavior of supervision department, and got the specific measures that could reduce rent-seeking behavior.

Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests

2012 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 239-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cédric Wasser
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Rent Seeking

scholarly journals Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information

Public Choice ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 135 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 225-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Fey
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Rent Seeking

Averaging of temporal memories under conditions of incomplete information

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Leman ◽  
Matthew S. Matell ◽  
Michael Brown
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information

Peran Pengawasan Internal Dalam Menghindari Kutukan Sumber Daya Alam

Liquidity ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Andilo Tohom
Keyword(s):  
Natural Resources ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Rich Country ◽  
Literature Study ◽  
Indonesian Government ◽  
The World ◽  
Policies And Programs ◽  
The Right

Indonesia is one of many countries in the world so called resource-rich country. Natural resources abundance needs to be managed in the right way in order to avoid dutch diseases and resources curses. These two phenomena generally happened in the country, which has abundant natural resources. Learned from Norwegian experiences, Indonesian Government need to focus its policy to prevent rent seeking activities. The literature study presented in this paper is aimed to provide important insight for government entities in focusing their policies and programs to avoid resources curse. From the internal audit perspective, this study is expected to improve internal audit’s role in assurance and consulting.

Institutional Theory of Endless Redistribution

2005 ◽  
pp. 4-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Sonin
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Growth Rates ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Wide Spread ◽  
Grass Roots ◽  
Protection Systems ◽  
Private Protection ◽  
The Rich

In unequal societies, the rich may benefit from shaping economic institutions in their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing on public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public protection of property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian oligarchs of the 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide motivation for this paper.

On the Origins of Administrative Rent: Doing Business in a Russian Region N

2010 ◽  
pp. 58-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Oleinik
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Resource Rent ◽  
Competitive Edge ◽  
Doing Business ◽  
Russian Region ◽  
Positive Gain ◽  
Access To The Field ◽  
Quantitative And Qualitative Methods

In the article two types of rent are differentiated: resource rent and administrative rent. The latter is linked to restrictions on the access to the field of interactions. The contribution of the theory of public choice and the theory of rent-seeking and directly-unproductive activities is further developed by shifting the emphasis from individual decision-making to interactions between three actors: C, who controls access to the field, A, who gets a competitive edge as a result, and B, who assumes a subjacent position with regard to both A and C, yet still receives a positive gain from transacting. Domination by virtue of a constellation of As, Bs, and Cs interests is illustrated with the help of an in-depth case study of a Russian region. This study combines quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as their triangulation.

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