scholarly journals Pinpointing the Side-Channel Leakage of Masked AES Hardware Implementations

2006 ◽  
pp. 76-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Mangard ◽  
Kai Schramm
Keyword(s):  
Side Channel ◽  
Hardware Implementations

Power Side-Channel Analysis of RNS GLV ECC Using Machine and Deep Learning Algorithms

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Mohamad Ali Mehrabi ◽  
Naila Mukhtar ◽  
Alireza Jolfaei
Keyword(s):  
Deep Learning ◽  
Elliptic Curve ◽  
Smart Cities ◽  
Information Leakage ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Public Key Cryptosystems ◽  
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems ◽  
Hardware Implementations ◽  
Substantial Progress

Many Internet of Things applications in smart cities use elliptic-curve cryptosystems due to their efficiency compared to other well-known public-key cryptosystems such as RSA. One of the important components of an elliptic-curve-based cryptosystem is the elliptic-curve point multiplication which has been shown to be vulnerable to various types of side-channel attacks. Recently, substantial progress has been made in applying deep learning to side-channel attacks. Conceptually, the idea is to monitor a core while it is running encryption for information leakage of a certain kind, for example, power consumption. The knowledge of the underlying encryption algorithm can be used to train a model to recognise the key used for encryption. The model is then applied to traces gathered from the crypto core in order to recover the encryption key. In this article, we propose an RNS GLV elliptic curve cryptography core which is immune to machine learning and deep learning based side-channel attacks. The experimental analysis confirms the proposed crypto core does not leak any information about the private key and therefore it is suitable for hardware implementations.

Ascon hardware implementations and side-channel evaluation

2017 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
pp. 470-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Gross ◽  
Erich Wenger ◽  
Christoph Dobraunig ◽  
Christoph Ehrenhöfer
Keyword(s):  
Side Channel ◽  
Hardware Implementations

Deep learning side-channel attack against hardware implementations of AES

2020 ◽  
pp. 103383
Author(s):  
Takaya Kubota ◽  
Kota Yoshida ◽  
Mitsuru Shiozaki ◽  
Takeshi Fujino
Keyword(s):  
Deep Learning ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attack ◽  
Hardware Implementations

scholarly journals CRAFT: Lightweight Tweakable Block Cipher with Efficient Protection Against DFA Attacks

2019 ◽  
pp. 5-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christof Beierle ◽  
Gregor Leander ◽  
Amir Moradi ◽  
Shahram Rasoolzadeh
Keyword(s):  
Block Cipher ◽  
Fault Analysis ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Cryptographic Primitives ◽  
Area Overhead ◽  
Differential Fault Analysis ◽  
Hardware Implementations ◽  
Efficient Protection ◽  
Channel Analysis ◽  
Tweakable Block Cipher

Traditionally, countermeasures against physical attacks are integrated into the implementation of cryptographic primitives after the algorithms have been designed for achieving a certain level of cryptanalytic security. This picture has been changed by the introduction of PICARO, ZORRO, and FIDES, where efficient protection against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks has been considered in their design. In this work we present the tweakable block cipher CRAFT: the efficient protection of its implementations against Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) attacks has been one of the main design criteria, while we provide strong bounds for its security in the related-tweak model. Considering the area footprint of round-based hardware implementations, CRAFT outperforms the other lightweight ciphers with the same state and key size. This holds not only for unprotected implementations but also when fault-detection facilities, side-channel protection, and their combination are integrated into the implementation. In addition to supporting a 64-bit tweak, CRAFT has the additional property that the circuit realizing the encryption can support the decryption functionality as well with very little area overhead.

Using Montgomery curve arithmetic over F2p for point scalar multiplication on short Weierstrass curve over Fp with exactly one 2-torsion point and order not divisible by 4

2016 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 33-38
Author(s):  
Michał Wroński
Keyword(s):  
Scalar Multiplication ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Torsion Point ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Torsion Points ◽  
Standard Methods ◽  
Hardware Implementations ◽  
Point Scalar Multiplication ◽  
Montgomery Curve

Montgomery curves are well known because of their efficiency and side channel attacks vulnerability. In this article it is showed how Montgomery curve arithmetic may be used for point scalar multiplication on short Weierstrass curve ESW over Fp with exactly one 2-torsion point and #ESW (Fp) not divisible by 4. If P ∈ ESW (Fp) then also P ∈ ESW (Fp2). Because ESW (Fp2) has three 2-torsion points (because ESW (Fp) has one 2-torsion point) it is possible to use 2-isogenous Montgomery curve EM (Fp2) to the curve ESW (Fp2) for counting point scalar multiplication on ESW (Fp). However arithmetic in (Fp2) is much more complicated than arithmetic in Fp, in hardware implementations this method may be much more useful than standard methods, because it may be nearly 45% faster.

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