scholarly journals Strategic Interactions in the TAC 2003 Supply Chain Tournament

2006 ◽  
pp. 316-331
Author(s):  
Joshua Estelle ◽  
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik ◽  
Michael P. Wellman ◽  
Satinder Singh ◽  
Christopher Kiekintveld ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Strategic Interactions

STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS IN A SUPPLY CHAIN GAME

2005 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael P. Wellman ◽  
Joshua Estelle ◽  
Satinder Singh ◽  
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik ◽  
Christopher Kiekintveld ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Strategic Interactions

Strategic interactions in service supply chain with horizontal competition

Top ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 469-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
X. T. Tang ◽  
S. J. Fang ◽  
F. Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Service Supply Chain ◽  
Horizontal Competition

scholarly journals The Implications of Vertical Strategic Interaction on Green Technology Investment in a Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (18) ◽  
pp. 7441
Author(s):  
Simeng Wang ◽  
Yongsheng Cheng ◽  
Xiaoxian Zhang ◽  
Chenchen Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Green Technologies ◽  
Double Marginalization ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Right

Numerous studies on supply chains have indicated that vertical strategic interactions usually involve the classical double marginalization problem, leading to a downward distortion in profitability. However, at present, the implications of vertical strategic interactions for green technology investment in a supply chain are not all that clear. In particular, such a vertical interaction not only can translate into profits between different parties, but usually also involves differentiated environmental performance. A question which arises is: who is the right undertaker for green technology investment in a supply chain, the supplier or retailer? To answer this question, we highlight the implications of vertical strategic interaction for green technology investment in a supply chain. To fill this gap, using a game-theoretic approach, we formulate two models: (a) Model M, in which an upstream manufacturer adopts technologies to meet consumer demand; and (b) Model R, where a retailer integrates environmental concerns into their supply chain decisions. We find that the retailer, who is closer to the customer, is the more effective undertaker for green technology investment, as this not only creates higher profitability for both parties, but also achieves a more sustainable scheme for our environment. When green technologies are invested in by the manufacturer, the double marginalization effect not only may downward-distort their economic performance but can also reduce the equilibrium of product greenness.

Chaîne d’approvisionnement et résilience

2020 ◽  
pp. 34-37
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain

Durant la période de confinement, la chaîne d’approvisionnement de la filière nucléaire a pleinement joué son rôle. Mais en sort-elle renforcée ? Si l’expérience acquise par les différents acteurs de la supply chain va lui offrir plus de robustesse, les difficultés économiques rencontrées par les autres filières industrielles, comme l’automobile ou l’aéronautique, risquent de fragiliser des acteurs essentiels à la filière nucléaire.

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