Double Implementation by a Simple Game Form in the Commons Problem

1997 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 205-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sungwhee Shin ◽  
Sang-Chul Suh
Keyword(s):  
Simple Game ◽  
Game Form ◽  
The Commons

A Simple and Procedurally Fair Game Form for Nash Implementation of the No-Envy Solution

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Makoto Hagiwara
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Economic Behavior ◽  
Allocation Problem ◽  
Game Form ◽  
Nash Implementation ◽  
Infinitely Divisible ◽  
Fair Game ◽  
Game Forms

AbstractWe consider the allocation problem of infinitely divisible resources with at least three agents. For this problem, Thomson (Games and Economic Behavior, 52: 186-200, 2005) and Doğan (Games and Economic Behavior, 98: 165-171, 2016) propose “simple” but not “procedurally fair” game forms which implement the “no-envy” solution in Nash equilibria. By contrast, Galbiati (Economics Letters, 100: 72-75, 2008) constructs a procedurally fair but not simple game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria. In this paper, we design a both simple and procedurally fair game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria.

scholarly journals Coordination vs. voluntarism and enforcement in sustaining international environmental cooperation

2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (51) ◽  
pp. 14515-14522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Barrett
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Strategic Thinking ◽  
Environmental Cooperation ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Nation States ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Better Than

The fates of “transboundary” environmental systems depend on how nation states interact with one another. In the absence of a hegemon willing and able to coerce other states into avoiding a “tragedy of the commons,” shared environments will be safeguarded if international cooperation succeeds and degraded or even destroyed if it fails. Treaties and related institutions of international law give form to these efforts to cooperate. Often, they implore states to act in their collective (as opposed to their national) interests. Sometimes, they impel cooperating states to punish free riders. A few agreements coordinate states’ behavior. Here, I present simple game-theoretic models showing whether and how treaties and related institutions can change incentives, aligning states’ self-interests with their collective interests. I show that, as a general matter, states struggle to cooperate voluntarily and enforce agreements to cooperate but that they find it relatively easy to coordinate actions. In some cases, the need for coordination is manifest. In other cases, it requires strategic thinking. Coordination may fall short of supporting an ideal outcome, but it nearly always works better than the alternatives.

"Once? No. Twenty times? Sure!" Repeated decisions and uncertainty in the tragedy of the commons

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. Hardisty ◽  
Howard Kunreuther ◽  
David H. Krantz ◽  
Poonam Arora
Keyword(s):  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
The Commons

Caring for the Commons

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Fisher ◽  
Jennifer Wies ◽  
Stacie King
Keyword(s):  
The Commons

Corruption as “one‑stop‑shop”: theory and empirical analysis

2018 ◽  
pp. 32-51
Author(s):  
R. Yu. Kochnev ◽  
L. I. Polishchuk ◽  
A. Yu. Rubin
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Enterprise Performance ◽  
Double Jeopardy ◽  
One Stop ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Public Production ◽  
Performance Project ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Sector Theory

We present the comparative analysis of the impact of centralized and decentralized corruption for private sector. Theory and empirical evidence point out to a “double jeopardy” of decentralized corruption which increases the burden of corruption upon private firms and weakens the incentives of bureaucracy to provide public production inputs, such as infrastructure. These outcomes are produced by simultaneous free-riding and the tragedy of the commons effects. The empirical part of the paper utilizes data of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance project.

Vickers Hot Springs

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Jennifer M. Bernstein
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Hot Springs ◽  
Public Access ◽  
Common Property Resource ◽  
Resource Conflict ◽  
Social Ecological ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Local Residents ◽  
The Common

Vickers Hot Springs is located near the rural Southern California town of Ojai, and local residents have long enjoyed soaking in the sulfuric pools. But as knowledge of the springs spread, the area saw increases in fights, traffic, burglaries, and drug use. In response, two residents purchased the land and committed to restore the property while allowing limited public access, subsequently generating a great deal of controversy within the community. Privatizing Vickers Hot Springs follows the archetypical lesson of Garrett Hardin's 1968 essay, “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Hardin stated that the problem for common-pool resources was that a finite amount of services are demanded by a potentially infinite number of users, who have little to gain by sacrificing for the common good. But Hardin's theory does not always apply. Many communities have come together to manage resources, often without government oversight. Thus, the question is not whether or not Hardin's theory is accurate, but rather “under what conditions it is correct and when it makes the wrong predictions.” Case studies provide nuance to the broad brushstrokes of a theory, and whether Hardin's parable is applicable depends on the particularities of the common property resource conflict. Employing the frameworks established by Hardin, Dietz et al., and Ostrom, this paper examines the management of Vickers Hot Springs within its broader social, ecological, and political context, asking whether the particular circumstances of this resource use conflict made privatization the most predictable outcome.

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