scholarly journals The impact of CEO power and institutional discretion on CSR investment

Author(s):  
Wolfgang Breuer ◽  
Manuel Hass ◽  
David Johannes Rosenbach
Keyword(s):  
2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 77
Author(s):  
Claudia Palembangan ◽  
Christine Novita Dewi

ABSTRACTThis study purposed to find the impact of CEO power on auditor choice, Big4 or Non Big4. The research supported by delegation of authority to appoint independent auditors as variable independent, firm size and firm performance as variable control. Sampel research are manufactur firms listing at Bursa Efek Indonesia from period 2006-2015. From total 160 manufacture firms, 148 firms meets the criteria. Hypothesis test using logistic regression with SPSS 21th. This research find that CEO power have negative significant impact to auditor choice Big4, delegation of authority have positive significant impact to auditor choice Big4, firm size have positive significant impact to auditor choice Big4, firm performance have positive significant impact to auditor choice Big4.ABSTRAKPenelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui dan menganalisis pengaruh kekuasaan CEO terhadap pemilihan auditor Big4 atau non Big4. Penelitian ini juga didukung dengan variabel bebas lain yakni variabel delegasi wewenang penunjukkan auditor independen serta variabel kontrol berupa ukuran perusahaan, kinerja perusahaan. Sampel yang digunakan merupakan perusahaan manufaktur dan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia tahun 2006-2015. Dari total 160 perusahaan manufaktur,sebanyak 148 yang memenuhi kriteria sampel penelitian yang telah ditetapkan. Pengujian hipotesis menggunakan regresi logistik dengan bantuan SPSS 21. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwakekuasaan CEO berpengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap pemilihan auditor Big4, delegasi wewenang kepada dewan komisaris berpengaruh positif signifikan terhadap pemilihan auditor Big4, ukuran peruusahaan berpengaruh positif signifikan terhadap pemilihan auditor Big4, kinerja perusahaan berpengaruh positif signifikan terhadap pemilihan auditor Big4


2018 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yiwei Li ◽  
Mengfeng Gong ◽  
Xiu-Ye Zhang ◽  
Lenny Koh

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 3197
Author(s):  
María Consuelo Pucheta-Martínez ◽  
Isabel Gallego-Álvarez

The aim of this research was to provide further evidence of the impact of the power of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) on corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure. Additionally, we explore the moderating role of CEO compensation linked to shareholder return on the association between CEO power and CSR disclosure. The theories used follow agency theory and stakeholder theory and the sample comprised 9182 international firm-year observations collected from the Thomson Reuters database from 2009 to 2018. Our model was estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. The results found that CEO power was positively associated with CSR disclosure, contrary to our expectations. Additionally, our evidence also shows that CEO compensation linked to shareholder return plays a positive moderating role on the relationship between CEO power and CSR reporting.


2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-89
Author(s):  
Um-E-Roman Fayyaz ◽  
Raja Nabeel-Ud-Din Jalal ◽  
Gianluca Antonucci ◽  
Michelina Venditti

We intend to investigate the impact of chief executive officers’ (CEO) powers on corporate decisions made by firms in the context of board oversight (BO) and market competition (MC). From 2007 to 2017, we applied a quantitative approach to a sample of two stressed European markets (i.e., Hungary and Greece). We found that CEO power has a negative impact on corporate risk and firm performance. Furthermore, results also reveal no sign of moderation effect for MC with corporate decisions, whereas BO moderated the CEO power and corporate decisions in the Hungarian market. However, the results of moderation for the Greek market are diametrically opposed to those of the Hungarian market. Our study indicates that in stressed markets, the CEO power is suppressed and does not increase the corporate risk and firm performance despite the good governance and high market competition. The study can help boards in the optimal delivery of power to the CEO to perform well in a stressed environment


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Bouteska ◽  
Salma Mefteh-Wali

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of CEO compensation for sample of the US firms. It emphasizes the presence of executive compensation persistence and the importance of CEO power besides performance while setting CEO pay.Design/methodology/approachThe empirical analysis is conducted on a large sample of US firms during the period 2006–2016. It is based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) models to assess the impact of numerous factors on CEO compensation.FindingsThe main findings reveal that firm performance proxied by accounting-based proxies, as well as market-based proxies, plays a significant role in explaining variations in levels of executive compensation. Moreover, there is a significant persistence in executive compensation among the US sample firms. The authors also document that poor governance conditions (managerial power hypothesis) lead to high compensation levels offered to CEO.Research limitations/implicationsAt the end, without a doubt, the analysis has some limitations that prompt the authors to consider future research directions. One future research avenue that can help better explain the effect of firm performance on the CEO compensation is to study this issue using an international sample to determine whether country-level characteristics (e.g. creditor rights, shareholder rights and the enforcement climate) can influence this relationship. Furthermore, it can be worthwhile to deepen the analysis of CEO power and its impact on CEO compensation. It will be interesting to emphasize how the CEO power interacts with the other governance characteristics and some CEO attributes as CEO gender.Practical implicationsThe paper's findings have implications for practitioners, policymakers and regulatory authorities. First, the findings inform regulators that performance is not the only determinant of CEO pay level. This may warrant increased firm disclosure of the details of the pay structure. Second, the study offers insights to policymakers and members of boards of directors interested in enhancing the design of executive compensation and internal corporate governance, to better align managerial incentives to shareholder interests. Firms should strengthen the board independence and properly constitute the board committees (compensation, risk, nomination…).Originality/valueThis paper presents a comprehensive overview of the CEO compensation determinants. It supplements the classic pay-for-performance sensitivity predictions with insights gained from the dynamics of wage setting theory and managerial power theory. The authors develop a composite index to measure the CEO power in order to test the impact of CEO attributes on CEO pay. Additionally, it verifies whether the determinants of CEO pay depend on firm age and size.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Naaman ◽  
Li Sun

Purpose This study aims to examine whether and how the power of a chief executive officer (CEO) relates to firm-level research and development (R&D) investment. Design/methodology/approach The authors use clustered standard errors ordinary least squares regression using a large sample of US firms from 1994 to 2017. Findings The authors find a significant negative relation between CEO power and R&D investment, suggesting that firms with more powerful CEOs are less likely to invest in R&D activities. Besides, the study finds that this significant negative relation is largely driven by firms with weaker corporate governance. Originality/value This study contributes to the finance literature on the impact and consequences of having powerful CEOs and the financial accounting literature on the determinants of R&D expenditures.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 228-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Luo ◽  
Linying Zhou

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the empirical association between the tone of earnings announcements and a company’s membership in a sin industry. Design/methodology/approach This study constructs a model of the determinants of earnings announcement tone to examine the impact of sin industry membership on earnings announcement tone. An interaction term between CEO power (CEO–chairman duality) and sin industry membership is used to test whether CEO power moderates the strength of the association. The earnings announcements tone is measured using the spread in the proportion of positive and negative words. The category of sin industry includes not only industries such as tobacco, gambling and alcohol, but also industries associated with emerging environmental, social, and ethical issues (i.e. firearms, oil and cement). Findings The analysis of a sample of US firms from the 1994 to 2013 period shows that the tone of earnings announcement is less optimistic for companies in sin industries, but this association is weaker for companies that are led by powerful CEOs. The results remain robust to alternative definitions of sin industry membership and CEO power (CEO tenure) and to alternative model specifications. Originality/value The findings suggest that although sin companies cannot change the nature of their business, the management of such companies, in general, uses a less aggressive tone in their earnings announcements. These results further investors’ understanding of sin companies’ reporting behavior.


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