A closed‐loop supply chain decision model considering corporate social responsibility and value‐added services

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruifeng Gong ◽  
Jian Xue ◽  
Ruli Liu ◽  
Jinhua Zhou ◽  
Laijun Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Decision Model ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Corporate Social

scholarly journals Closed-loop Supply Chain with Advertising Investment and Reward-Penalty Mechanism Based on Different CSR Sharing Models

2021 ◽  
Vol 257 ◽  
pp. 02086
Author(s):  
Yi Liu ◽  
Yanting Huang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
Investment Level ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
The Impact

This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer based on different corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviors. In addition, the advertising investment and government’s reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) are also taken in account. To explore the impact of CSR behaviors on supply chain, we developed three models: (1) Only the manufacturer undertakes CSR (model M); (2) only the retailer undertakes CSR (model R); (3) the manufacturer and the retailer share CSR (model MR). By analyzing the results, we found that: (1) The advertising investment level and waste products return rate both increase with the increase of the extent to members undertake CSR when there is only retailer undertakes CSR and when the manufacturer and retailer share CSR, and remain unchanged when there is only the manufacturer undertakes CSR; (2) the overall social welfare increases with the increase of the extent to members undertake CSR no matter which member undertakes CSR, and reaches the highest when there is only the retailer undertakes CSR; (3) it is the most conductive for the performance of the closedloop supply chain when there is only the retailer undertakes CSR.

scholarly journals Operation and coordination mechanism of closed-loop supply chain considering corporate social responsibility behavior consciousness

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1845937
Author(s):  
A. K. M. Mohsin ◽  
Hongzhen Lei ◽  
Syed Far Abid Hossain ◽  
Hasanuzzaman Tushar ◽  
Mozaffar Alam Chowdhury ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Corporate Social

scholarly journals Development of closed–loop supply chain network in terms of corporate social responsibility

PLoS ONE ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. e0174951 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Pedram ◽  
Payam Pedram ◽  
Nukman Bin Yusoff ◽  
Shahryar Sorooshian
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Corporate Social

Collecting channel selection and information value of a closed-loop supply chain with corporate social responsibility

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kebing Chen ◽  
Qi Wang ◽  
Shengbin Wang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Information Value ◽  
Cost Information ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Social

PurposeThe paper aims to explore how the participants in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) select collecting strategies under the scenarios of information symmetry and asymmetry, and to investigate the value of corporate social responsibility (CSR) cost information for participants.Design/methodology/approachThis paper constructs a two-echelon CLSC Stackelberg game consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the manufacturer undertakes CSR and is responsible for the remanufacturing of used products. First, the authors establish two collecting models under information symmetry: manufacturer-collecting and retailer-collecting. Second, the authors construct two collecting models under information asymmetry and propose a two-part tariff contract to coordinate the participants’ profits. Finally, the authors make a numerical analysis to verify the results.FindingsUnder information symmetry, the profit of the participant who does not undertake collecting is positively related to the collecting rate, and the other participant may not benefit from the increase in the collecting rate. Under information asymmetry, the manufacturer will still select the retailer-collecting channel. Asymmetric information only affects the retailer’s selection. In addition, the manufacturer’s private CSR cost information is always valuable to the retailer.Originality/valueThis paper first explores the influence of the CSR cost information value on the selection of collecting channel under information asymmetry in the CLSC. The results can help company managers choose optimal collecting channel under information symmetry or under information asymmetry.

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