Quality incentive contract design in government procurement of public services under dual asymmetric information

2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-44
Author(s):  
Yuting Zhang ◽  
Lan Xu
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Public Services ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Government Procurement ◽  
Incentive Contract ◽  
Quality Incentive

scholarly journals Incentive Contract Design for the Water-Rail-Road Intermodal Transportation with Travel Time Uncertainty: A Stackelberg Game Approach

Entropy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 161
Author(s):  
Wenying Zhang ◽  
Xifu Wang ◽  
Kai Yang
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Travel Time ◽  
Design Problem ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Optimal Time ◽  
Incentive Contract ◽  
Intermodal Transportation ◽  
The Impact

In the management of intermodal transportation, incentive contract design problem has significant impacts on the benefit of a multimodal transport operator (MTO). In this paper, we analyze a typical water-rail-road (WRR) intermodal transportation that is composed of three serial transportation stages: water, rail and road. In particular, the entire transportation process is planned, organized, and funded by an MTO that outsources the transportation task at each stage to independent carriers (subcontracts). Due to the variability of transportation conditions, the travel time of each transportation stage depending on the respective carrier’s effort level is unknown (asymmetric information) and characterized as an uncertain variable via the experts’ estimations. Considering the decentralized decision-making process, we interpret the incentive contract design problem for the WRR intermodal transportation as a Stackelberg game in which the risk-neutral MTO serves as the leader and the risk-averse carriers serve as the followers. Within the framework of uncertainty theory, we formulate an uncertain bi-level programming model for the incentive contract design problem under expectation and entropy decision criteria. Subsequently, we provide the analytical results of the proposed model and analyze the optimal time-based incentive contracts by developing a hybrid solution method which combines a decomposition approach and an iterative algorithm. Finally, we give a simulation example to investigate the impact of asymmetric information on the optimal time-based incentive contracts and to identify the value of information for WRR intermodal transportation.

Incentive contract design in competing distribution channels

2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 295-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Changxian Liu ◽  
Houping Tian ◽  
Jianping Sun ◽  
Desheng Dash Wu
Keyword(s):  
Contract Design ◽  
Distribution Channels ◽  
Incentive Contract
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