Structuring residual income and decision rights under internal governance: results from the Hungarian trucking industry

Josef Windsperger; Maria Jell

doi:10.1002/mde.1241

Structuring residual income and decision rights under internal governance: results from the Hungarian trucking industry

Managerial and Decision Economics ◽

10.1002/mde.1241 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 26 (5) ◽

pp. 295-305 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Josef Windsperger ◽

Maria Jell

Keyword(s):

Residual Income ◽

Trucking Industry ◽

Decision Rights ◽

Internal Governance

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Allocation Of Residual Income Rights Under Internal Governance Empirical Results from the Hungarian Trucking Industry

Competitio ◽

10.21845/comp/2004/1/6 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 3 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Joseph Windsperger ◽

Maria Jell

Keyword(s):

Property Rights ◽

Explanatory Variable ◽

Truck Drivers ◽

Residual Income ◽

Trucking Industry ◽

Monitoring Cost ◽

Internal Governance ◽

Empirical Results ◽

Monitoring Costs ◽

Using Data

The paper offers a property rights and monitoring cost explanation for the allocation of residual income rights between the carriers and truck drivers under internal governance. First, by applying property rights theory, we argue that the structure of residual income rights depends on the importance of noncontractible (intangible) assets of the truck driver to generate a residual surplus. The more important the truck driver’s intangible knowledgeassets, the more residual income rights should be transferred to him. In addition, we controlled for the monitoring costs as an additional explanatory variable of the allocation of residual income rights. According to agency theory, the higher the variable proportion of the driver’s income, the higher the monitoring costs.These hypotheses were tested by using data from the Hungarian trucking industry. The empirical results are supportive of the hypotheses. JEL- Index: G32, M2

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